Associated Banc-Corp (ASB): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $31.07, Associated Banc-Corp (ASB) is priced for 11.2% return on equity. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ASB

Headline

FieldValue
TickerASB
CompanyAssociated Banc-Corp
Sector / IndustryFinancial Services
Current price$31.07/sh
CompositionCorporate and Commercial Specialty 38% / Community, Consumer and Business 62%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basisfinancials
Return on equity needed11.2%
Return on equity now9.7%
ROE gap+1.5pp
Price-to-book1.07x

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.7% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 10-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026).

How unusual the bet is: within-range

ReferenceValue
vs own history+2.01σ
cohort percentile (of 121 peers)18
sustained it ~10 years at this level72%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.94x3justifies
Earnings1.00x1justifies
Relative0
Growth0.91x1justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 10.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowthno
Bank Fair Value (P/TBV)$26.681.16xyesTBVPS $23.33 × 1.14x (ROE (TTM) 9.9% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption))
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 8.0x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$34.240.91xyesStage 1: 20% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$32.100.97xyesBV/sh $30.12, ROE (TTM) 9.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$33.110.94xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowthnoRev $1.2B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.4x / 4.2x / 5.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.88, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.30 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAsset$44.180.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.88 × BVPS $30.12) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativeno
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsnoEPS $2.88 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativeno
PEG Fair ValueRelativenoEPS $2.88 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$31.141.00xyesEPS $2.88 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

The issuer is a funded financial business. Debt, interest, and cash flows are operating inputs, so industrial EV, net-debt, WACC, and free-cash-flow lenses do not apply; value the common-equity claim with book, earnings, capital, and payout economics.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Corporate and Commercial Specialtyfinancialequity0.6B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Community, Consumer and Businessfinancialequity1.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required
Risk Management and Shared Servicesfinancialequity-0.1B reported-currencywithheldunresolved standalone equity facts required

No unit-level total common-equity value is stated. Each financial unit requires supported standalone common equity, normalized earnings, capital adequacy, and payout capacity. Consolidated debt, interest, and cash are operating balances, not an enterprise-to-equity bridge; company-level book, earnings, capital, and payout lenses remain the coherent cross-checks.

Solvency

FieldValue
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.6%

Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Every line on the June quarter's balance sheet moved in the same direction, and moved hard. Period-end loans reached $36.5 billion, up 19% on the year. Deposits reached $39.9 billion, up 17%, and the core customer portion of that base, the stickiest kind a bank can hold, grew 21% to $34.2 billion. Net interest income rose 23% year over year to $370 million, on a net interest margin of 3.17%. For a Midwestern regional bank, that is not the growth profile of a business quietly harvesting an established franchise.

Part of that came from a deliberate decision to shrink first. The Corporation sold assets it did not want in order to buy assets it did, and the annual filing describes the mechanic plainly: the balance sheet repositioning announced in the fourth quarter of 2024 which sold lower yielding residential mortgage loans and investment securities. The proceeds went where the returns are better. The 10-K attributes the subsequent loan growth to increases in commercial and industrial lending and auto finance, partially offset by a decrease in residential mortgage lending. Selling a low-yielding mortgage book at a loss, taking the hit in one quarter, and redeploying into commercial credit is an unglamorous trade that only pays if the commercial demand actually shows up. It has. More than $600 million of commercial and industrial balances were added in the June quarter alone, which put the bank past its full-year organic target for that line by the end of June.

Credit has been improving while the book has been growing, which is the harder combination. The 10-K reports that Provision for credit losses was $54.0 million in 2025, compared to $85.0 million in 2024. Banks that grow loans fast usually pay for it later in charge-offs, so the direction of the provision line is the number to watch, and it has been falling while the portfolio expanded. The credit process behind that is conventional in the way a lender wants it to be: the filing describes managing risk by employing sound underwriting guidelines, lending primarily to borrowers in local markets and businesses, periodically evaluating the underlying collateral. Local lending is not a differentiator anyone can market, but it is the reason a regional bank's losses tend to behave differently from a national syndicated book.

The American National deal extends the same trade into new geography rather than into new risk. It brought 33 branches concentrated in Greater Omaha and the Minneapolis and St. Paul metros, with roughly $3.8 billion of loans and $4.5 billion of deposits attached. Deposits, not loans, are the scarce input for a bank in this rate environment, and the deal bought a funded base rather than a lending pipeline that would need funding later.

Against the cohort, the revenue trajectory reads as respectable rather than exceptional. WTFC grew revenue 12.4% over its trailing year and UCB 13.6%, while RF managed 4.5% and FULT 4.2%. Associated sits among the faster movers in a group where most of the growth is being bought rather than earned, and it has been buying too. The honest concession is that some of the expansion is paid for in stock: the share count has risen about 2.6% a year over the four years to March 2026. The counter is that the assets acquired are deposits and local commercial relationships in markets adjacent to the existing footprint, which is the version of bank acquisition that has historically been easiest to integrate.

Bear Case

Start with how the money is borrowed rather than how it is lent. A bank funds itself from depositors and, when deposits are not enough, from wholesale sources that want security. The annual filing sets out the arrangement: FHLB advances are secured by pledging qualifying collateral of the subsidiary bank (such as residential mortgage loans, residential mortgage loans held for sale, home equity loans, CRE loans, and investment securities). The same property-backed assets that carry the credit risk are also the collateral standing behind the borrowed funding. In good conditions this is administrative detail. In a real estate downturn it means the asset side and the funding side deteriorate together rather than independently.

The concentration behind that collateral is not small, and the filing flags it in its own risk section: CRE lending may expose us to increased lending risks. Our policy generally has been to originate CRE loans primarily in the states in which the Bank operates. Local origination is a strength when local conditions hold and a concentration when they do not. The 10-K goes further and states the exposure directly, noting that decreases in real estate values could adversely affect the value of property used as collateral, which, in turn, can adversely affect the value of our loan and investment portfolios. Book value per share is $30.01. Between a collateral revaluation and the owner's stake there is not a great deal of cushion, and the market is paying only a little more than that book figure to own it.

That matters because of what the price is already asking for. Today's price assumes the bank sustains a return on equity of about 11.4%. That is not what the recent record shows, and the distance is the whole argument. Actual performance has been running closer to 9.7%, so roughly a point and a half of improvement is already bought and paid for. The gap is not enormous in percentage points, but the arithmetic that produces it tops out around 11.7%, which means the assumption is not sitting comfortably inside the range of plausible outcomes; it is sitting near the ceiling of it. Buy the shares here and the return being underwritten is close to the best this balance sheet is set up to deliver. If the bank keeps earning what it has been earning, the 1.06 times book the market is paying compresses toward the level that lower return supports, and the compression comes out of the share price rather than out of the loan book.

Then there is who owns the earnings. The share count has grown about 2.6% a year over the four years to March 2026, and the American National purchase added roughly 23.0 million more shares on April 1. Growth funded with stock is growth the existing holder pays for. Total earnings can rise while earnings per existing share stand still, and a bank paying out about a third of its profit as dividends has limited internal capital to fund the next expansion without repeating the exercise.

The fair reading of the other side is that the credit trend has been going the right way and the funding base has been getting broader, not narrower. But the bear case here is not that the bank is fragile today. It is that a bank whose growth depends on acquisitions, whose collateral is concentrated in property, and whose price already assumes a return above what it has demonstrated, has three things that have to keep working at once.

Valuation

A bank is not valued on an operating multiple, because its product is capital and its cost is capital. The right lens is what it earns on the equity it holds, and what the market pays to own that equity. The quoted share price is $30.79, which works out to roughly 1.06 times the equity carried on the books. The return that valuation assumes the bank sustains is about 11.4%.

That is the whole bet, stated plainly. Recent performance on equity has been running nearer 9.7%, so the buyer is paying for an improvement of about a point and a half and for that improvement to hold. The calculation runs out of headroom only a few tenths of a point above the assumed figure, so there is very little room to be pleasantly surprised. American National is the obvious mechanism for closing the gap, since acquired cost savings arrive as expense reduction rather than as new revenue, but the improvement has to be delivered rather than announced.

What is unusual here is the direction of the disagreement. Most reports of this kind find a share price sitting above the methods that value it. This one does not. Asset-value approaches, earnings-power approaches, peer-multiple approaches and forward-growth approaches all land at or above where the shares trade. The excess-return methods start from book value, add the value of earning a return above the cost of that capital, and both versions of that calculation finish higher than the market quote. The peer-multiple lens applies a sector reference of ten times earnings to $2.88 of trailing earnings per share and reaches a similar place. Nothing in the standard toolkit says this is expensive.

The cohort read is consistent with that. Against the regional banks it is grouped with, Associated sits in the lower half on price-to-book, while WTFC grew revenue 12.4% and UCB 13.6% over their trailing years, and RF, the largest name in the group with $5.0 billion of revenue, grew 4.5%. The company is priced more cheaply relative to its book than the group median while growing faster than the group's biggest member. Whether that discount is a bargain or a judgment about credit quality is the open question, and the CRE concentration in the loan book is the reason a reader should treat it as a question rather than an answer.

Deposits and float fund this balance sheet, so the coverage and net-debt tests that apply to an industrial company do not apply here. The relevant capacity test is what the bank can return and what capital it must keep. Dividends absorbed about 33.6% of earnings in the latest fiscal year, leaving roughly two thirds retained, and the 10-K describes management as reviewing capital strategies for the Corporation and each of its subsidiaries in light of perceived business risks, future growth opportunities, industry standards, and compliance with regulatory requirements, with buybacks explicitly contingent on capital levels, growth prospects, and any necessary regulatory approvals. Retained capital has been going into acquisitions rather than into repurchases, and the share count records that choice: it has risen about 2.6% a year over the last four years. Set against every method that values this bank, the quote is undemanding. What it demands is something else entirely, which is that the return on equity move up and stay there.

Catalysts

The defining event of 2026 has already happened. Associated Banc-Corp closed its acquisition of American National Corporation on April 1, 2026, issuing 22,975,382 shares for total consideration of $594.1 million. American National brought 33 branches concentrated in Greater Omaha and the Minneapolis and St. Paul metros, with total assets of roughly $5.2 billion, total loans of $3.8 billion and total deposits of $4.5 billion as of March 31, 2026. Management has guided to 25% cost savings from the acquired base and roughly 2% accretion to fiscal 2027 earnings per share. Both of those are projections, and the second quarter already carried $24 million of nonrecurring acquisition costs against them.

The June quarter was the first to include the acquired business, which makes the year-over-year comparisons flattering and the sequential ones hard to read. Period-end loans of $36.5 billion were up 15% from the prior quarter and deposits of $39.9 billion up 12%, most of which is the acquisition arriving rather than the existing franchise compounding. The organic signal underneath it is cleaner: more than $600 million of commercial and industrial balances were added during the quarter, enough to reach the full-year organic target for that line by the end of June.

The next four quarters are an integration story rather than a growth story. Deposit retention in the acquired Nebraska and Minnesota markets, the pace at which the cost savings actually appear in the expense line, and whether the commercial and industrial momentum continues once the easy comparisons are gone are the three things worth tracking. The third-quarter report, due in the autumn, is the first print in which the acquired business is fully in both the current and prior sequential period on a comparable operating basis.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Corporate and Commercial Specialty / Community, Consumer and Business / Risk Management and Shared Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Associated Banc-Corp acquisition completion release, April 2026 · Q2 2026 earnings release, July 2026 · Associated Banc-Corp merger announcement materials, 2026

View the full interactive ASB report on boothcheck