ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC. (ARW): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $215.97, ARROW ELECTRONICS, INC. (ARW) is priced for -4.1% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ARW

Headline

FieldValue
TickerARW
CompanyARROW ELECTRONICS, INC.
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$215.97/sh
CompositionGlobal components 70% / Global ECS 30%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.5%
Operating margin today3.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.9pp
Implied growth-4.1%
Multiple paid11x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.48σ
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)10

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.13x5expensive
Earnings1.28x5expensive
Relative0.38x2justifies
Growth0.41x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$1144.490.19xyesFCF base $0.9B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.4%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$524.670.41xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.6x / 9.6x / 11.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.5x / 18.0x / 21.5x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$172.361.25xyesBV/sh $137.61, ROE (TTM) 11.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$191.971.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$406.030.53xyesRev $35.9B, growth 26% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.2x / 0.3x / 0.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$547.400.39xyesEPS $15.64, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.39 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$320.380.67xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.44B × (1−23%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$195.861.10xyesBV $137.61 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.5%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$220.060.98xyes√(22.5 × EPS $15.64 × BVPS $137.61) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $1.35B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$137.471.57xyesFCF $825.5M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$129.061.67xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.79B (FCF $0.83B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$504.650.43xyesEPS $15.64 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$53.724.02xyesBV $137.61 × (ROIC 3.3% / WACC 8.4%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $35.92B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$586.500.37xyesEPS $15.64 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$169.081.28xyesEPS $15.64 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Global Componentsoperatingenterprise$21.5b$774.7m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Global ECSoperatingenterprise$9.4b$425.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.06x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.59x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-6.1%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

What today's price asks for is modest. At about 15 times operating income, the market is paying for company-wide operating profit to grow around 5% a year across a five-year stage and then settle into an ordinary pace. For a business coming out of a components downturn, that is a low bar. The most recent quarter cleared it by a distance.

Revenue rose 39% on the year to $9.5 billion in the March quarter, with Global Components and Global ECS each growing about 39%, and segment operating income of $363.5 million in components and $103.7 million in enterprise computing. Set that against a 2025 in which the whole company's reported operating margin was 2.7% of sales, and the shape of the recovery is not subtle.

Components is where the swing happens. Reported operating income in that segment was $775 million in 2025 against $741 million in 2024, on 3.6% of segment sales versus 3.7% a year earlier, which says the improvement came through volume rather than through price. The 10-K is direct about the driver, noting that both the Asia/Pacific and Americas regions saw an increase in sales compared to the year-earlier period and that the company anticipates that demand for components will continue to gradually increase aided by the market focus on AI technology.

Distribution gets underrated because the profitability looks thin on the page. The slice is not the point; the turn is. Arrow buys inventory, holds it briefly, sells it, and the return on the capital committed depends on how often that cycle repeats in a year. What protects the position is that no chip maker can afford to be left out of the catalogue and no engineer wants to manage a thousand supplier relationships directly. The filing reports that no single supplier accounted for more than 8% of consolidated sales in 2025, which is the concentration profile of a genuine intermediary rather than a reseller fronting for one vendor.

Among the listed peers the conversion is competitive. AVNET (AVT) turns about 2.27% of its $24.96 billion of revenue into operating profit, Ingram Micro (INGM) about 1.66% of $54.24 billion, and TD SYNNEX (SNX) about 2.57% of $69.77 billion. Arrow sits above all three on the same measure, which is what a mix weighted toward components and value-added engineering work looks like when it is working.

And the equity has been shrinking throughout. The company repurchased 1.3 million shares for $149.9 million in 2025 and 2.0 million shares for $250.0 million in 2024, with $172.9 million still authorized under a program that has no expiration date. Over four years the share count has fallen about 6.9% a year. In a cyclical business, buying your own stock through the trough is the version of capital allocation that actually compounds, and it is the version most cyclical managements skip.

Bear Case

Everything here is a bet on where the cycle is, which is why the valuation approaches split so neatly. The ones that value Arrow on what it has already earned find it dear: the price sits about 41% above the earnings-power methods and about 30% above the asset-value methods. The ones that project find it cheap, with the price about 39% below the forward-looking cash-flow methods and about 57% below the peer-multiple methods, largely by carrying this cycle's rate of improvement forward. For a distributor the conservative reads are usually the more honest ones, because the cycle is the whole story and extrapolating the good part of it is precisely the error this sector punishes.

Underneath the disagreement sits one structural fact. The operating margin is about 2.8%. On roughly $33.5 billion of revenue, a hundred basis points of erosion in what Arrow keeps on each sale, or a hundred basis points of cost creep, is more than a third of all the operating profit there is. The filing describes the pressure without decoration, naming competition from national distributors and smaller specialists that creates pricing and margin pressure.

Demand is not contracted, either. The 10-K says the quiet part in plain sight: conditions outside the company's control may cause customers to cancel, reduce, or delay orders that were previously made. A distributor is the party holding the inventory when that happens. The write-downs on the wind-down of businesses, $60.6 million in 2024 against a $10.3 million recovery in 2025, are the accounting record of what a demand air pocket costs once it arrives.

The balance sheet is not a problem today, but it is not spare capacity either. Net debt is about $2.2 billion, roughly 2.45 times operating profit. That is manageable while operating profit is climbing. It is a different number at a cyclical trough, because the denominator in a distributor's leverage ratio is the most volatile figure on the page.

The bull's answer to all of this is that the recovery is real and the backlog supports it, and for now that answer is holding. The harder question is what the enterprise computing half is worth. Global ECS is about 30% of revenue and sells much the same infrastructure hardware and software that everyone else in the channel sells. CDW (CDW) turns about 7.29% of revenue into operating profit and INSIGHT ENTERPRISES (NSIT) about 4.19%, both ahead of what Arrow's blended business achieves, and both are chasing the same reseller and end-customer relationships. Buying components distribution and getting enterprise reselling attached to it is not obviously a bargain at any price.

Valuation

Price a distributor and you are pricing a cycle, so the question is which part of the cycle is already in the number. At about 15 times operating income, today's price embeds company-wide operating profit growing around 5% a year across a five-year stage before settling to an ordinary long-run pace. Against Arrow's own record that is unremarkable, and against the peer group the multiple sits in the lower part of the range rather than at the top of it.

The methods split cleanly along one line: what the company already has versus what it is going to get. The price sits about 41% above the earnings-power methods and about 30% above the asset-value methods, both of which read Arrow on trailing profitability and book equity. It sits about 39% below the forward-looking cash-flow methods and about 57% below the peer-multiple methods, both of which credit the recovery already visible. That is the ordinary signature of a cyclical at an inflection. The backward-looking lenses call it fully valued, the forward-looking ones call it cheap, and which is right is a question about the durability of the upturn rather than about the arithmetic.

In operating terms the requirement is narrow. Consolidated sales were $30,853 million in 2025 against $27,923 million in 2024. Global components carried $775 million of operating income on 3.6% of segment sales, against $741 million a year earlier. Company-wide, the reported operating margin came to 2.7% of sales. What the price needs is for that thin conversion to hold while volume grows. It does not need the business model to be re-rated.

Among the distribution peers, Arrow's position is respectable on conversion and unremarkable on scale. AVNET (AVT) turns about 2.27% of $24.96 billion of revenue into operating profit, Ingram Micro (INGM) about 1.66% of $54.24 billion, and TD SYNNEX (SNX) about 2.57% of $69.77 billion. The differences are small in percentage points and enormous in dollars, which is the whole nature of the trade.

The balance sheet frames the downside rather than the upside. Net debt of about $2.2 billion is roughly 2.45 times operating profit, comfortable at this level of earnings and considerably less so at a trough. What has been doing the work for shareholders in the meantime is the share count, down about 6.9% a year over the last four years, with $172.9 million still authorized under a repurchase program carrying no expiration date. In a business where the operating margin is under three cents on the dollar, retiring roughly a quarter of the equity is not a footnote.

Catalysts

The March quarter reset the trajectory. Revenue rose 39% on the year to $9.5 billion, ahead of the company's own guidance range, with Global Components and Global ECS both growing about 39%. Segment operating income came in at $363.5 million in components and $103.7 million in enterprise computing. Management attributed the swing to a broad recovery in component demand and to AI and data-centre spending flowing through the enterprise computing business.

The guidance for the June quarter keeps the pace. Management pointed to Global Components sales of $6.80 billion to $7.20 billion and Global ECS sales of $2.35 billion to $2.55 billion, with GAAP diluted earnings per share of $3.91 to $4.11. That is the first genuinely comparable test of whether March was a restocking quarter or a trend, and it is the next thing due.

Management also said backlog visibility now extends into the third and fourth quarters. That is the specific claim to test rather than to accept. Backlog in components distribution is a soft commitment, and the 10-K is explicit that customers can cancel, reduce, or delay orders that were previously made. The distance between a backlog that converts and one that evaporates is the same distance as the one between the forward-looking methods being right about this company and the backward-looking ones being right.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Global Components (reported)

Global ECS (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Arrow Electronics first-quarter 2026 results, May 2026 · Arrow Electronics first-quarter 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · Arrow Electronics first-quarter 2026 outlook, May 2026

View the full interactive ARW report on boothcheck