ARIS MINING CORPORATION (ARIS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $15.65, ARIS MINING CORPORATION (ARIS) is priced for -1.4% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ARIS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerARIS
CompanyARIS MINING CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$15.65/sh
CompositionGold in doré 98% / Silver in doré 1% / Metals in concentrate 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.5%
Operating margin today38.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-32.2pp
Implied growth-1.4%
Multiple paid9x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.4% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~4.7pp.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 77 peers)7
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.75x5expensive
Earnings2.93x4expensive
Relative2.05x2expensive
Growth0.69x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$22.640.69xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.3%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$19.530.80xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 5.0x / 10.0x / 15.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 21.96x (blended: static sector reference 14x + trailing (TTM) 41x), scenarios: 16.5x / 22.0x / 26.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 8x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$4.173.75xyesBV/sh $7.04, ROE (TTM) 5.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$3.085.08xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$22.710.69xyesRev $0.9B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.6x / 3.5x / 4.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$5.043.11xyesEPS $0.42, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=21.62 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$5.722.74xyesNormalized EBIT (4y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.16B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$2.945.32xyesBV $7.04 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 5.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 3.6%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$8.151.92xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.42 × BVPS $7.04) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.36B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$5.023.12xyesFCF $129.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$13.551.15xyesEPS $0.42 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.291.18xyesBV $7.04 × (ROIC 15.7% / WACC 8.3%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.93B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$15.750.99xyesEPS $0.42 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$4.543.45xyesEPS $0.42 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Segoviaoperatingenterprise830.9B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Marmatooperatingenterprise96.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$127.6m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.45x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.36x
Interest coverage9.7x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Read the trailing numbers here with a calendar in hand. This is a cyclical producer, which normally means the last twelve months either flatter the company or bury it depending on where the metal price sat. It is also mid-build, which is the less common half of the story: the trailing year blends a smaller company with the larger one now emerging, and those are not the same asset.

The volume evidence is not a forecast. Consolidated gold production reached 73.7 thousand ounces in the second quarter of 2026, up 26% on the same quarter of 2025, and 148.0 thousand ounces across the first half, up 31%. Full-year guidance of 300,000 to 350,000 ounces remains intact.

Behind that sits physical construction rather than an operating tweak. A second mill at Segovia was completed in June 2025 and is ramping, and a new bulk mine and CIP plant at Marmato is under construction with first gold expected in the fourth quarter of 2026; taken together the company targets annual production of roughly 500,000 ounces. That is a step change in scale, and it does not require the gold price to do anything at all.

It is worth being precise about where that leaves the company on the industry's risk ladder, because most mining capital dies long before an ounce is poured. A peer's annual filing states the base rate without decoration: Even if mineral deposits are found, those deposits may be insufficient in quantity or quality to return a profit from production, or it may take a number of years until production is possible, during which time the economic viability of the project may change, and CDE goes on to note that few explored properties are ever developed. Aris sits on the far side of that filter. Two operations are already producing, and the third plant is being built into an orebody that has already been drilled rather than into a hope.

Returns on the capital already deployed sit near 15.7%, comfortably above what that capital costs, which is the test that separates an expansion that creates value from one that merely creates tonnes. And the build is not being run from a stretched position: interest is covered close to 9.7 times out of operating profit. A producer that can finance a plant while carrying obligations that light keeps its choices open if the metal price turns against it, which is the difference between finishing a project and finishing it on somebody else's terms.

Bear Case

The valuation approaches disagree here, and the shape of the disagreement is the bear case. Only the methods that project cash forward land above where the shares change hands. The approaches anchored on book value land well below. So do the earnings-power approaches, which value a business on what it has already proven it can earn with no growth credited at all. When the optimistic methods are the ones that need the future to cooperate, the conservative ones usually deserve the benefit of the doubt.

Why earnings power lands where it does is worth spelling out, because it is not a glitch. That lens normalizes profit across four years rather than one, and the four-year average of operating profit here is well under half of what the trailing year produced. Put plainly, that method is valuing the company it was, averaged with the company it is. Which of those two is closer to the truth across a full cycle is the entire argument.

Then there is the metal itself. Gold sold in the second quarter of 2026 at an average realized price of about $4,445 an ounce. A large share of the trailing margin is that number rather than anything management did. CDE, a precious-metals producer in the comparison set, puts the dependency plainly in its own annual filing: As a mining company, the revenue, profitability and future rate of growth of the Company are substantially dependent on the prevailing prices for gold, silver and other metals, and notes that Gold and silver prices may fluctuate widely due to numerous factors, such as U.S. dollar strength or weakness, global political and economic conditions, demand, investor sentiment, inflation or deflation. The same physics governs here.

Set that against what the quote already assumes. The market pays about 8.8 times trailing operating profit and implies that operating profit falls roughly 3.2% a year from here. That sounds cautious until the starting point is examined. A gentle fade from a high-price year is close to the mildest version of mean reversion on offer, not a bearish assumption. If gold gives back a serious part of its recent move, the profit base contracts faster than that, and a multiple that looked undemanding is suddenly being applied to a much smaller number.

Two structural risks sit underneath all of it. Both producing operations and the plant under construction are in Colombia, so permitting, community relations and security concentrate in one jurisdiction with no geographic offset anywhere on the map. And mines deplete. Every ounce sold has to be replaced by exploration that, in the words of CDE's filing, is frequently unproductive, or bought in at prices set against the same elevated metal market that makes the current figures look good.

The bull answer is that volume is rising fast enough to carry the thesis even if the price fades, and the first-half production numbers do support that. The bear reply is narrower than a rejection: rising volume into a falling price is a race, and the company does not control the faster runner.

Valuation

Start with what today's quote assumes. The market is paying about 8.8 times trailing operating profit, and the assumption embedded in that is operating profit declining roughly 3.2% a year over a five-year horizon. For most businesses a priced-in decline would read as pessimism. For a gold producer in a period when the realized metal price has been unusually high, it reads as the market declining to treat current profit as the run rate. Against a share price of $14.66 as of July 25, 2026, that is the bet on offer: pay a single-digit multiple of profits the market does not expect to last.

The methods split along a clean line. Those that project cash forward land above where the shares trade. Those anchored on book value land well beneath, and the earnings-power approaches land beneath as well. For a mining company that split is less damning than it first appears: book value carries mines at depreciated cost and does not mark the ounces still in the ground, so a producing miner nearly always screens expensive against its own book. The more telling detail is which book-based method does reach the price. The one that scales book value by the return the business earns on its capital, rather than taking book value straight, lands essentially on today's quote. Together those say the price is paying for the returns, not for the assets.

Underneath, the operating economics are strong and narrow. Gold sold as doré is about 98% of revenue, with silver and metals in concentrate accounting for about one percent each, so there is nothing inside the business to smooth a metal-price move. The trailing operating margin runs 38.7%. CDE, the one precious-metals producer in the comparison set, posts an operating margin of about 38.7% as well, which is a useful reminder that a figure like that in this environment describes the metal market at least as much as it describes either company.

The balance sheet is not the constraint. Net debt is about $127.6 million, roughly 0.36 times operating profit, and liquid assets comfortably exceed that net position. Building a plant is where miners usually get into trouble, and this one is doing it without needing the metal price to hold just to stay current on what it owes. That matters more than any multiple in this section, because it decides whether a bad year is an inconvenience or a financing event.

Catalysts

The operating half of the second quarter is already reported. Consolidated gold production came in at 73.7 thousand ounces, up 26% from the second quarter of 2025, and 72.1 thousand ounces were sold at an average realized price of about $4,445 an ounce, generating roughly $320 million of gold revenue. Across the first half, production of 148.0 thousand ounces and sales of 147.0 thousand ounces produced revenue of more than $680 million, a 31% increase in output over the first half of 2025.

The growth program is on its stated schedule. Full-year 2026 guidance of 300,000 to 350,000 ounces was reaffirmed alongside the production report, the second mill at Segovia that was completed in June 2025 continues to ramp, and the new bulk mine and CIP plant at Marmato is tracking toward first gold in the fourth quarter of 2026, with the two projects together aimed at roughly 500,000 ounces a year.

The near-term information event is the full second-quarter financial and operating report, expected on or around July 29, 2026. Volumes and realized prices are already known, so the new information will be on the cost side: what the ramp at Segovia has done to unit costs, how much of the Marmato build is being absorbed through the income statement, and whether the margin holding at the trailing level is a function of the metal market alone or of the operations as well.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q2 2026 production release, July 7, 2026 · company results announcement, July 2026

View the full interactive ARIS report on boothcheck