DIGITAL TURBINE, INC. (APPS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $13.19, DIGITAL TURBINE, INC. (APPS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~27.5 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-10 · Exported: 2026-08-12 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APPS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAPPS
CompanyDIGITAL TURBINE, INC.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$13.19/sh
CompositionU.S. and Canada 40% / Europe, Middle East, and Africa 29% / Asia Pacific and China 31% / Mexico, Central America, and South America 1% / Elimination -1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)12.4%
Operating margin today6.0%
Margin expansion (value-band)+6.4pp
Must persist for27.5y
Multiple paid56x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 15.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~4.1 years.

Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~10.6 years; the models below use their own rates.

How unusual the bet is: high

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.05σ
cohort percentile (of 187 peers)87
sustained it ~10 years at this level14%
implied end-window share0%

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset8.70x2expensive
Earnings14.03x1expensive
Relative0
Growth1.45x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=6)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$6.302.09xyesFCF base $0.0B, growth 15% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$11.211.18xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 16.3x / 18.3x / 20.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$1.608.24xyesBook value floor: BV/sh $1.60, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$1.449.16xyesBook value with convergence: BV/sh $1.60, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$9.111.45xyesRev $0.6B, growth 15% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.8x / 3.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthnoMargin ramp: -7% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 15% (input: historical growth; tapered)
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.011319.00xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 8.4% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.11B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.9414.03xyesFCF $41.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.011319.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.03B (FCF $0.04B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.3043.97xyesBV $1.60 × (ROIC 1.6% / WACC 8.4%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.57B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
On Device Solutions (ODS)operatingenterprise$341.6mwithheldunresolved no unit value
App Growth Platform (AGP)operatingenterprise$153.2mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$323.2m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)12.02x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)9.50x
Share count CAGR (dilution)3.9%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One number decides this company, and it is not revenue. Over the trailing year Digital Turbine earned an operating margin of 1.9%. Measured across the full cycle rather than the trough, the same business has run closer to 6%. Everything else in the file is commentary on which of those two figures honestly describes what this business earns.

What makes a recovery plausible is where the product physically lives. Most mobile advertising competes for attention after the phone is already in someone's hand. On Device Solutions gets there before that, through what the 10-K calls both exclusive and non-exclusive agreements with our supply partners, which consist of wireless carriers and OEMs, and it converts through tooling built for that position: SingleTap, described in the filing as delivering apps to devices with a single touch, resulting in higher conversion rates. An install that takes one touch instead of five is not a marketing claim. It is conversion arithmetic an advertiser can measure, and it is why a revenue-share model works at all here.

The economics of that share are also moving the right way. Revenue share is the largest single cost in the business, the money handed back to the carriers and device makers whose handsets carry the placements, and the 10-K reports it was 43.1% as a percentage of total net revenue for the year ended March 31, 2026, against 48.0% the year before. Nearly five points of net revenue stayed with the company that previously did not. On a business this size, that shift alone is worth more than most of what gets discussed on an earnings call.

Growth in the most recent year came from outside the home market. The 10-K attributes the improvement to improved performance in the Asia Pacific and China regions, with application media revenue lifted by higher device volumes internationally. That is visible in how the revenue is now spread: the United States and Canada carry about 40% of it, Asia Pacific and China 31%, Europe, the Middle East and Africa 29%. A company that was once a wager on a handful of American carrier relationships is now majority non-domestic, which widens the pool of handsets its software can occupy.

The operating leverage is showing up in the balance sheet as well as the income statement. Fiscal 2026 revenue rose 15% to 565 million dollars while total debt fell to 361 million dollars from 409 million dollars over the same year. Retiring 48 million dollars of secured borrowings in twelve months while growing the top line is not the profile of a company out of options, and shareholders have not been the source of that cash: the share count has risen 3.9% a year across the four years to December 2025, real dilution but nowhere near what a distressed borrower gets forced into.

Bear Case

The wager embedded in these shares is not really about advertising volumes. It is about a margin recovery and about how long that recovery has to be held, and both assumptions are load-bearing. Digital Turbine earned 1.9% at the operating line over the trailing year and has run near 6% through the cycle. What the shares now assume is an operating margin around 7.2%, reached and then held across the better part of a decade rather than touched once. Stated in absolute terms that sounds modest, which is exactly the problem: it looks reachable, and it sits above anything the company has actually held.

The other half of the assumption is duration, and it is the fragile half. Today's quote works out to roughly 39 times the operating income the business earns through the cycle, and the arithmetic that supports it needs operating growth pinned at the 25% self-funding ceiling for close to 18 years. Every percentage point of shortfall against that ceiling adds about 2.8 years to the wait. Of comparable fast-growers, only about 14% held such a pace even a decade. The recent pace is not the stretch. The persistence is.

Where the thesis could break is on the supply side, and the 10-K says so without hedging. Distribution runs through wireless carriers and handset makers, and the filing names as its most material threat internally developed operator solutions and specific media distribution solutions built in-house by OEMs and wireless carriers, noting that Some of our existing wireless carriers could make a strategic decision to develop their own capability. A supplier turning into a competitor does not simply take share. It removes the placement, and there is no auction in which to win it back.

Then there is the financing, which is where a margin disappointment would actually bite. Gross debt of about 361 million dollars sits against 37.7 million dollars of liquid assets, leaving a net position near 323.2 million dollars. That is roughly 9.6 times operating profit on a through-the-cycle basis, and operating profit covers only about four fifths of the interest bill. The loans are secured on substantially all of the company's assets, they carry a margin running from 7.50 % to 8.00 % over term SOFR, scheduled repayment begins in the September 2026 quarter, and the company has told shareholders it is currently seeking to refinance certain Loan tranches. On what the agreement forbids the filing is blunt: Our Financing Agreement essentially prevents all payments of dividends to our stockholders.

None of this touches the fact that the product works, and the bull is right that a recovering revenue share and an amortizing loan can coexist happily for years. But the bottom line has not turned yet, with fiscal 2026 closing on a net loss of 37.7 million dollars, and the share count has been climbing 3.9% a year while that happened. An amortizing secured loan, a margin requirement above anything demonstrated, and a supplier base that can become a competitor add up to a thesis with very little slack in it.

Valuation

Two of the four ways of reading this business reach today's quote and two fall well short, and the split is the whole story. Peer-multiple approaches land above it, but they get there on revenue rather than earnings, because there are not enough earnings to work with. The forward-growth methods also reach it, sitting only a little under. Asset-based approaches, anchored on a book value of $1.60 a share, land at a small fraction of it, and the earnings-power lens lands lower still. When the frames that clear today's quote are the ones extrapolating and the frames that fall short are the ones counting what already exists, what is being paid for is a recovery rather than a franchise already earning.

The requirement is stateable in a line. Roughly 39 times the operating income the business earns through the cycle, which needs operating growth held at its 25% self-funding ceiling for close to 18 years, or equivalently an operating margin near 7.2% reached and then held across the better part of a decade. Digital Turbine ran 1.9% at the operating line over the trailing year and closer to 6% through the cycle. The near-term pace is inside what the company has recently delivered; the entire stretch lives in how long it must persist.

The mechanism that would deliver the margin is visible in the cost structure rather than in the revenue line. The single largest expense is the share handed back to the partners whose handsets carry the placements, and the 10-K reports it was 43.1% as a percentage of total net revenue for the year ended March 31, 2026, against 48.0% a year earlier. Almost five points of net revenue changed hands in the company's favour in one year. Repeat that even twice more and the through-cycle margin question answers itself; stall it and the duration assumption has to carry the entire load alone.

Geography now spreads the risk in a way it did not a few years ago. About 40% of revenue comes from the United States and Canada, 31% from Asia Pacific and China, and 29% from Europe, the Middle East and Africa, with the 10-K attributing the most recent year's improvement to improved performance in the Asia Pacific and China regions. That does not repair a margin. It does mean no single carrier relationship in a single country is the whole business anymore.

Solvency sets the tolerance for error in everything above. Gross debt near 361 million dollars against 37.7 million dollars of liquid assets is a thin cushion for a borrower whose facility begins amortizing in the September 2026 quarter, and the loans are secured on substantially all of the company's assets. The direction of travel is favourable: total debt fell across fiscal 2026 from 409 million dollars to 361 million dollars, and the company has disclosed it is currently seeking to refinance certain Loan tranches. Measured against through-the-cycle operating profit the balance still runs about 9.6 times operating profit, with roughly four fifths interest coverage, which leaves the recovery no room to arrive late.

Catalysts

Fiscal 2026 closed on March 31, 2026, and the results arrived on May 26, 2026. Fourth-quarter revenue was $142.5 million, up 20% year over year, and full-year revenue reached $565 million, up 15%. The reported bottom line stayed negative through both: a quarterly net loss of $7.3 million and a full-year net loss of 37.7 million dollars. Management guided fiscal 2027 revenue to a range of $630 million to $650 million.

The financing calendar is the nearer event. Scheduled repayment of the secured loans begins in the September 2026 quarter, and the company has disclosed that it is currently seeking to refinance certain Loan tranches. The existing borrowings carry a margin running from 7.50 % to 8.00 % over term SOFR, so the spread the refinancing clears at determines how much of any operating recovery actually reaches shareholders rather than lenders. Total debt already fell to 361 million dollars from 409 million dollars over fiscal 2026.

Beyond that, the reporting cadence itself is the information. Because the fiscal year ends in March, the next quarterly print covers the June quarter and is the first read on whether the revenue-share improvement the 10-K disclosed, where the partner share was 43.1% as a percentage of total net revenue, carries into fiscal 2027, and on whether the international device volumes that drove last year's gain hold up.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Digital Turbine fiscal 2026 fourth-quarter and full-year results, May 26, 2026 · Digital Turbine fiscal 2027 guidance, issued May 26, 2026 · Digital Turbine Form 10-Q for the quarter ended December 31, 2025

View the full interactive APPS report on boothcheck