AMPHENOL CORP /DE/ (APH): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $157.74, AMPHENOL CORP /DE/ (APH) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.8 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APH

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAPH
CompanyAMPHENOL CORP /DE/
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$157.74/sh
CompositionUnited States 35% / China 16% / Other foreign locations 50%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)10.1%
Operating margin today27.0%
Margin compression (value-band)-16.9pp
Must persist for5.8y
Multiple paid27x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 7: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.6% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.03σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)47

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.50x5expensive
Earnings4.96x5expensive
Relative1.09x2expensive
Growth0.81x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$178.270.88xyesFCF base $5.3B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$194.560.81xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 19.6x / 22.6x / 25.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 26.74x (blended: static sector reference 22x + trailing (TTM) 38x), scenarios: 21.4x / 26.7x / 32.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$45.103.50xyesBV/sh $12.56, ROE (TTM) 33.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$90.061.75xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$228.880.69xyesRev $29.0B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.4x / 6.7x / 8.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$139.651.13xyesEPS $3.99, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.08 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$18.378.59xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $3.95B × (1−25%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$69.782.26xyesBV $12.56 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 33.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$33.594.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.99 × BVPS $12.56) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $9.15B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$31.794.96xyesFCF $4713.7M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$30.425.19xyesSBC-adj FCF $4.56B (FCF $4.71B − SBC $0.16B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$128.741.23xyesEPS $3.99 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$10.3815.20xyesBV $12.56 × (ROIC 7.1% / WACC 8.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $29.01B × sector P/S 5.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$149.621.05xyesEPS $3.99 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$43.143.66xyesEPS $3.99 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Communications Solutionsoperatingenterprise$12.1b$3.7b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Harsh Environment Solutionsoperatingenterprise$5.9b$1.5b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Interconnect and Sensor Systemsoperatingenterprise$5.2b$1.0b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$13.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.29x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.71x
Interest coverage12.4x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Component makers are supposed to be easy to value and dull to own. They sell parts into somebody else's product, the customer holds the pricing power, and the earnings follow whatever cycle that customer is riding. Price them on a mid-cycle multiple, allow for the downturn, and move on. That framework describes most of this cohort accurately. It does not describe Amphenol, and the gap is measurable rather than rhetorical.

The measurement is the operating margin. Amphenol runs at 24.6% on a trailing basis. TE Connectivity (TEL), the closest thing to a direct peer, earns 19.7%. Corning (GLW) earns 15.2%, CTS (CTS) 15.9%, Bel Fuse (BELFA) 15.6%, TTM Technologies (TTMI) 9.2%, Littelfuse (LFUS) 2.8%, Vishay (VSH) 2.4%, and Rogers (ROG) is negative at 4.1%. A parts business is not supposed to be able to do that, and doing it consistently is the entire investment case.

The explanation the company gives is organisational rather than technological. It "relies on local management in every region, which we believe creates a high degree of organizational stability and operational agility, as well as a deeper understanding of local markets", and it extends the same principle into places most firms centralise: "the Company maintains a decentralized information technology infrastructure, where each of our business units utilizes a separate and distinct information technology system." Dozens of small businesses each own their customers, their costs and their pricing. Nobody in Wallingford decides what a connector for a defence programme should cost.

That structure is also what makes the acquisitions work, and there have been a lot of them. Trexon, folded into Harsh Environment Solutions, "expands the Company's high-reliability interconnect and cable assembly capabilities, primarily for the defense market" and brought $708.2 million of goodwill with $318.0 million of definite-lived intangibles. Andrew, in Communications Solutions, added "advanced antenna and associated interconnect products, technologies and capabilities" for next-generation wireless. An acquirer that leaves the acquired management in charge of its own P&L has a far easier integration problem than one that promises synergies from consolidation.

And the growth in 2025 was mostly earned rather than purchased. The 10-K reports that "Net sales were $23,094.7 for the year ended December 31, 2025 compared to $15,222.7 for the year ended December 31, 2024, representing an increase of 52% in U.S. dollars, 51% in constant currencies and 38% organically." Thirty-eight percent organic, from a business this size, is the number that separates a compounder from a roll-up. It is also the number the price is betting continues in some diminished form for years.

Bear Case

Look at what sits on the asset side of this balance sheet, because it explains more about the risk than the debt does. A large share of what Amphenol owns was bought rather than built. Goodwill stood at $7,092.4 million across the three segments at the end of 2023, and the purchases since have kept adding to it: the 2024 acquisitions produced "$1,195.1 of goodwill and $576.0 of definite-lived intangible assets, comprised of customer relationships and acquired backlog", and Trexon alone brought $708.2 million more. Book value works out to $10.84 a share. Almost nothing an investor is buying here is tangible.

That matters for how the leverage should be read. Net debt of $14.2 billion sits at about 2.4 times operating profit, and operating profit covers the interest bill 13.4 times over, which looks entirely comfortable. But both of those ratios are measured against operating profit produced at a 24.6% margin, and no other company in this cohort earns anything close to that. TE Connectivity (TEL) manages 19.7%, Corning (GLW) 15.2%, TTM Technologies (TTMI) 9.2%. Move Amphenol's margin toward the middle of that range and gross borrowings of $18.7 billion sit against a much smaller stream, with the coverage ratio falling faster than the revenue does.

The acquisition engine also has to keep running for the story to hold, and the company lists what can go wrong with it in its own words: integration risk includes "retaining the management team; managing the response of business partners and competitors; exposure to new regions and countries, including managing the impact of particular economic, tax, currency, political, legal and regulatory risks associated with specific countries; or retaining key employees, suppliers and distributors." A decentralised acquirer buys the management along with the assets. When that management leaves, the thing that was purchased leaves with them.

Geography adds a second structural exposure. Half of revenue comes from foreign locations outside China, with China itself at 16% and the United States at 35%, and the manufacturing footprint follows the revenue. The 10-K notes that difficulties in international operations "may include regulatory restrictions and the imposition of additional tariffs" and that these "may also negatively impact the pricing of materials and components sourced or used by the Company." A margin advantage built partly on where things are made is a margin advantage exposed to trade policy.

None of that would matter much at a modest multiple. At $152.68 the market pays about 34 times company-wide operating profit, which requires today's economics to hold for roughly 7.6 years. Only about 21% of companies operating at that level sustained it that long. Approaches built on asset value land about 3.4 times under the quote and those built on earnings power about 5.2 times under. Only the forward cash-flow methods reach the price, and they reach it by assuming the current EBITDA multiple survives to the exit year intact.

Valuation

What today's price asks for is persistence rather than acceleration. At $152.68 the market pays about 34 times company-wide operating profit, and that multiple needs today's economics to hold for roughly 7.6 years. The historical record on that specific requirement is the useful reference: of companies that reached this level, only about 21% held it that long. The read comes out elevated, which describes how rarely the requirement has been met, not a prediction about this particular business.

The methods disagree in a very particular shape. Approaches built on asset value land about 3.4 times below the price. Approaches built on earnings power land about 5.2 times below. Peer multiples land about 1.35 times below. Only the forward cash-flow methods reach today's level, and the assumption doing the work there is that the current EBITDA multiple survives to the end of the projection intact. When precisely one family reaches the price, and it is the one that credits future expansion, the premium being paid is for durability the static frames cannot encode. That is worth naming plainly rather than averaging into a single figure.

What has to prove durable is unusually well documented here. The 10-K reports 2025 net sales of $23,094.7 million against $15,222.7 million in 2024, "an increase of 52% in U.S. dollars, 51% in constant currencies and 38% organically." The trailing operating margin is 24.6%, which is the highest in its comparison set by a clear distance: TE Connectivity (TEL) earns 19.7%, Bel Fuse (BELFA) 15.6%, TTM Technologies (TTMI) 9.2%. So the multiple is not paying for a turnaround or a recovery. It is paying for the continuation of results that are already at the top of the group.

Where those results come from shapes the risk to them. Locations outside the United States and China supply half of revenue, the United States 35% and China 16%, so the earnings stream carries currency, tariff and jurisdictional exposure that a domestically concentrated peer does not. That is a feature of the operating model rather than a defect, but it belongs in any assessment of how stable the margin is.

The balance sheet is not the constraint at present. Net debt of $14.2 billion runs at about 2.4 times operating profit, interest is covered 13.4 times, liquid assets are $4.583 billion, and the share count has moved only about 0.8% a year over the four years to March 2026. The guidance record offers less to lean on: the ledger since 2006 shows 8 raises and a single withdrawal, which is a thin history for judging how management handles a forecast when conditions turn.

Catalysts

The most recent reported quarter, published on April 29, 2026, was a record. Sales reached $7.62 billion, up 58% against the prior-year quarter with 33% of that organic, and the result came in ahead of the company's own guidance. Growth at that rate from a business already generating more than $20 billion of annual revenue is the fact driving the current multiple.

Management guided the second quarter in the same release: sales of $8.1 billion to $8.2 billion, a 43% to 45% increase over the prior-year quarter, with GAAP diluted earnings per share of $1.13 to $1.15. Those are the specific figures the next print gets measured against.

Second-quarter results and the accompanying conference call are scheduled for Wednesday, July 29, 2026 at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time. Two things in that release matter more than the headline beat or miss. Whether organic growth is still running near the pace the 2025 annual report described, and whether the operating margin holds at a level no comparable company in this group currently reaches.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Communications Solutions (reported)

Harsh Environment Solutions (reported)

Interconnect and Sensor Systems (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Amphenol first quarter 2026 results, April 29, 2026 · Amphenol investor relations event listing, second quarter 2026 earnings

View the full interactive APH report on boothcheck