AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC. (APD): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $308.09, AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC. (APD) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APD

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAPD
CompanyAIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$308.09/sh
CompositionOn-site 51% / Merchant 44% / Sale of equipment 4%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)17.4%
Operating margin (mid-cycle)14.7%
Margin expansion (value-band)+2.7pp
Trailing margin (depressed year)-4.7%
Must persist for5.3y
Multiple paid46x mid-cycle operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.4% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.81σ

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset5.22x2expensive
Earnings2.69x1expensive
Relative3.63x3expensive
Growth1.20x2expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=8)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$287.601.07xyesReference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $3.3B
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$0.00noNegative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0
Relative ValuationRelative$84.893.63xyesP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 1.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$62.354.94xyesReference only (book value floor): BV/sh $62.35, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$56.115.49xyesReference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $62.35, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$232.341.33xyesRev $12.6B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.6x / 5.4x / 6.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$114.602.69xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.94B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$91.433.37xyesEBITDA $2.50B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelative$84.893.63xyesRevenue $12.60B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$16.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)11.50x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)9.08x
Interest coverage8.4x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.0%
Burning cashno

Leverage and coverage are computed on normalized mid-cycle operating income (mid-cycle margin 14.7%); the trailing year was depressed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Here is the number that does not fit the story anyone tells about this company. Over the trailing twelve months, Air Products reported an operating loss of $50.2 million. In the March 2026 quarter alone it reported $753 million of operating income at a 23.7% margin, with earnings per share of $3.19. Both figures are real and neither is a typo. The trailing line is dominated by write-downs on projects the company walked away from; the quarterly line is what the gas business does when nobody is cleaning up. A buyer today is choosing which of those two numbers describes the asset.

The reason to think it is the second one sits in how the revenue is contracted. The 10-K puts it plainly: "Approximately half our total revenue is generated through the on-site supply mode, which is governed by contracts that are generally long-term in nature with provisions that allow us to pass through changes in energy costs to our customers." An on-site plant is built behind a refinery or a steel mill, connected by pipe, and paid for over years by a customer who cannot switch without rebuilding the plumbing. Energy, the largest input, moves through to that customer rather than into the margin. That is a genuinely unusual position in a sector where most companies are price takers at both ends.

Break the revenue down by region and the earning power is easy to see. The Americas contribute about 45% of revenue and run at 31.1%, Europe about 25% and runs at 28.7%, Asia about 29% and runs at 26.6%. Now look at what surrounds this name in the materials sector: Westlake (WLK) ran an operating margin of negative 15.7%, LyondellBasell (LYB) negative 1.0%, Albemarle (ALB) negative 2.8%, and Tronox (TROX) negative 8.0%. Only Linde (LIN), the other industrial gas major, keeps company at 26.5%. Industrial gases share a stock-market label with commodity chemicals and almost nothing else.

Management's forecasting record supports taking its guidance at face value rather than discounting it. Since 2006 the guidance ledger runs 24 raises and 15 reaffirmations against a single withdrawal, and the most recent entry was another raise: full-year fiscal 2026 adjusted earnings guidance moved up in April. For a business whose earnings depend on project timing, that is a management team that has generally known what was coming.

None of this makes the price cheap, and a bull who pretends otherwise is not paying attention. The argument is narrower: the trailing income statement understates the business by a wide margin, the contracted half of revenue is close to an annuity, and the assets being built now are the ones the multiple is waiting on.

Bear Case

Start with what a share costs, because everything else is commentary on it. At $297.94, the market pays roughly 47 times what this company earns at the operating line across a full cycle. Not one family of valuation method reaches that. Methods built on asset value land about 2.4 times under the quote, methods built on earnings power about 2.6 times under, and peer multiples about 2.4 times under. Even the forward-growth methods, the ones built to credit future expansion, land below the current quote. For the price to be right, today's economics have to hold at their limit for about 5.3 years. Of companies that have run at that level, only about 32% kept it up that long.

That is the structural truth: this is priced as though the cycle has been abolished, by a business that just spent a year proving it has not. The trailing operating result of negative $50.2 million is the arithmetic residue of project cancellations and write-downs, and the 10-K describes exactly the mechanism that produced them, warning of "project delays, scope changes, cost escalations, contract terminations, customer cancellations, or postponement of projects and sales" and noting that a delay may force the company "to cancel a project and/or compensate the customer for the delay, which may also cause us to incur material costs that we may be unable to recover."

The annuity is also smaller than the reputation. About half the revenue is contracted long-term, which leaves the merchant half, and the filing is specific about what that half is not: "Sales of both liquid bulk and packaged gases do not include minimum purchase requirements, as they are governed by contracts and/or purchase orders that reflect the customer's specific needs. These contracts contain stated terms that are generally five years or less." Merchant volumes track industrial production. When the customers who buy them run negative margins, as several in this cohort currently do, the orders thin out.

Then the balance sheet, which is carrying more than it looks. Net debt of $17.1 billion is about 9.5 times operating profit measured through the cycle, and operating profit covers the interest bill 8.7 times over. Against that, capital spending is running near $4.0 billion a year. The share count has not moved over the four years to March 2026, so none of the cash is coming back that way. A company spending that heavily, at that leverage, at that multiple, has no room for a second bad project cycle.

The final dependency is one the company names itself. A portion of the growth pipeline rests on decarbonisation demand, and the 10-K does not hide the conditionality: "certain of our green and blue hydrogen projects are largely based on expected demand for technologies and projects to limit the impact of global climate change. Demand for our solutions could be negatively impacted if the public and private sectors reduce their focus on reducing carbon emissions." That is a policy variable dressed as a growth plan, and policy has already moved once during the life of these projects.

Valuation

The bet embedded in $297.94 is about duration, not about a rate. The market is paying roughly 47 times what the business earns at the operating line through a full cycle, and that multiple requires today's economics to persist at their limit for about 5.3 years. History is not encouraging on that specific question: of companies operating at that level, only about 32% sustained it that long. The read on the assumption comes out elevated, which is a statement about how rarely the requirement has been met rather than a forecast about this company.

Every family of method lands below the price, which is unusual and worth stating plainly. Methods built on asset value sit about 2.4 times under the quote, methods built on earnings power about 2.6 times under, and peer multiples about 2.4 times under. Even the forward-growth methods, which exist precisely to credit expansion the static frames cannot see, come in below today's level. There is no family here for the price to hide behind, and that is the single most informative fact in this section.

The trailing income statement is the wrong lens and it is worth saying why. Operating income over the last twelve months was negative $50.2 million because of write-downs, while net income was $2.107 billion. The multiple above is therefore computed on through-the-cycle economics rather than on the trough: a mid-cycle operating margin near 14.7% applied to about $12.5 billion of revenue. That normalization is generous to the company, not harsh, which makes the resulting multiple more striking rather than less.

Where the revenue comes from shapes how durable those economics are. About 51% arrives through on-site supply, 44% through merchant, and 4% through equipment sales. The on-site half is the contracted piece, described in the 10-K as "generally long-term in nature with provisions that allow us to pass through changes in energy costs to our customers." The merchant half carries no such protection: "These contracts contain stated terms that are generally five years or less." Regionally the earning power is concentrated in the Americas, which contributes about 45% of revenue and runs at 31.1%, with Europe running at 28.7% and Asia at 26.6%.

The balance sheet does not bound the downside so much as extend it. Net debt of $17.1 billion runs at about 9.5 times operating profit measured through the cycle, with interest covered 8.7 times, and the share count is unchanged across the four years to March 2026. Against that, the guidance ledger since 2006 shows 24 raises and 15 reaffirmations against a single withdrawal, which is a management team that has been reliable about the next twelve months. The multiple, though, is not asking about the next twelve months.

Catalysts

The fiscal second quarter, reported on April 30, 2026, was the quarter that changed the trajectory of the numbers. Sales of $3.2 billion rose 9% on higher volumes, favourable currency and higher energy cost pass-through, offset in part by weaker helium pricing. Operating income of $753 million and earnings per share of $3.19 each rose more than 130% against the prior-year quarter, which had carried heavy charges, and the reported operating margin came in at 23.7%.

Management raised the outlook in the same release. Full-year fiscal 2026 adjusted earnings per share guidance went to a range of $13.00 to $13.25, up from $12.85 to $13.15, with fiscal third-quarter adjusted earnings per share guided to $3.25 to $3.35. Capital spending guidance for fiscal 2026 was held near $4.0 billion, so the improvement in earnings is not coming from a reduced investment programme.

Fiscal third-quarter results are scheduled for July 30, 2026 at 8:00 a.m. Eastern time. The specific things that release will settle are whether the non-helium pricing actions taken earlier in the year are showing up in the second half as management indicated, and whether the newly commissioned assets are ramping on the schedule the capital programme assumes.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Air Products fiscal 2026 second quarter results, April 30, 2026 · Air Products earnings teleconference announcement, July 15, 2026

View the full interactive APD report on boothcheck