Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. (APAM): what the price requires
At today's price, Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. (APAM) is priced for +1.9% earnings growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APAM
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | APAM |
| Company | Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc. |
| Current price | $36.54/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | fee-financial |
| Implied earnings growth | 1.9% |
| Price-to-earnings | 12.5x |
| Earnings yield | 8.0% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on a 5-year median GAAP earnings base; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied earnings growth ~3.1pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.30σ |
| cohort percentile (of 49 peers) | 12 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.78x | 5 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.85x | 5 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.65x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.62x | 4 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=18)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $75.01 | 0.49x | yes | FCF base $0.2B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.6%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $48.37 | 0.76x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 4.4x / 6.4x / 8.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $56.64 | 0.65x | yes | P/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.0x / 12.0x / 14.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | $157.85 | 0.23x | yes | Stage 1: 9% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $46.96 | 0.78x | yes | BV/sh $5.88, ROE (TTM) 73.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $208.60 | 0.18x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $30.97 | 1.18x | yes | Rev $1.2B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.7x / 2.0x / 2.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $47.88 | 0.76x | yes | EPS $3.99, growth 9% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.89 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $49.93 | 0.73x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.39B × (1−22%) / WACC 8.6% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $78.12 | 0.47x | yes | BV $5.88 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 73.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $22.98 | 1.59x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $3.99 × BVPS $5.88) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $29.04 | 1.26x | yes | FCF $195.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $24.59 | 1.49x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.17B (FCF $0.20B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $91.71 | 0.40x | yes | EPS $3.99 × (8.5 + 2×9.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $8.67 | 4.21x | yes | BV $5.88 × (ROIC 12.7% / WACC 8.6%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $55.46 | 0.66x | yes | Revenue $1.22B × sector P/S 3.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $56.63 | 0.65x | yes | EPS $3.99 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $43.14 | 0.85x | yes | EPS $3.99 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $190.0m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.67x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.52x |
| Interest coverage | 45.9x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Artisan Partners is a high-fee active equity and credit manager whose earnings ride directly on assets under management, which stood at about $173 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2026, down from roughly $180 billion three months earlier.
- The defining risk is equity outflows: the firm shed about $3.1 billion of net client money in the first quarter, concentrated in equity strategies, the structural headwind every active manager faces as money moves to passive products.
- The offset to watch is credit and alternatives, where the firm logged its 15th straight quarter of positive flows and just closed the Grandview real estate acquisition, the diversification that determines whether the fee base stops shrinking.
Bull Case
Lead with the obvious bear point, because the bull case has to clear it first: Artisan is an active equity manager in an era when active equity bleeds assets to index funds, and the first quarter of 2026 showed it again with about $3.1 billion of net outflows. The pivot is that the data does not actually show a firm in decline. Revenue rose to $303 million from $277 million a year earlier, and the firm reported net inflows in 13 of its investment strategies even while the headline number was negative. The outflow is concentrated, not pervasive, and the parts that are growing are the parts the firm has been building toward.
The business model is unusually well aligned for an asset manager, and that is the durable edge. The 10-K describes a structure where each investment team "is also entitled to a share of the performance-based revenues earned by the strategies it manages," a revenue share that "directly links the majority of the investment teams' cash compensation to long-term growth in revenues." When AUM falls, compensation falls with it, so the cost base flexes with the fee base instead of fighting it. That is why the firm sustained a roughly 40% operating margin through a quarter of falling assets, and why interest coverage near 47 times sits on only $190 million of debt. The economics are capital-light: the value is the fee stream, not the balance sheet.
The credit and alternatives build-out is the part the equity-outflow narrative misses. The firm logged net inflows in its credit businesses for the 15th consecutive quarter and closed the acquisition of Grandview Property Partners, laying the groundwork for a flagship private equity real estate fund. The 10-K is candid that closing a strategy to protect performance produces outflows: "when a strategy is closed or its growth is restricted we expect there to be periods of net client cash outflows." That reframes some of the equity outflow as deliberate capacity management rather than lost confidence, while the credit and alternatives platforms add fee streams that do not compete with passive in the same way. The bull case is that the mix is shifting from a melting equity book to a diversified fee base, and the price does not credit the shift.
Bear Case
The bear case is about what the price quietly depends on, and the most fragile dependency is the durability of the equity AUM base. Artisan's earnings are a direct function of assets under management, and assets under management fell from about $180 billion to $173 billion in a single quarter. Part of that was market, but $3.1 billion was clients leaving, concentrated in the high-fee equity strategies that are the most profitable assets the firm has. The price assumes those strategies hold and compound; the structural reality is that active equity is in secular outflow across the entire industry, and Artisan's highest-margin assets sit squarely in the path of it.
That dependency interacts badly with the firm's own model. The 10-K lists the forces that move AUM: "industry trends towards products, strategies, vehicles or services that we do not offer; competitive conditions in the investment management and broader financial services sectors; and investor sentiment and confidence." The same revenue-share comp structure that protects margins on the way down also means the firm cannot cut its way to growth; if revenue keeps drifting lower, so does the variable dividend that makes the stock attractive to income buyers. Diluted EPS from continuing operations already eased to $0.76 from $0.82 a year earlier, and the quarterly dividend of $0.77 is funded out of that earnings stream, so a sustained AUM decline pressures both the earnings and the payout at once.
The new growth narrative carries its own execution risk. Credit and alternatives are genuinely growing, but they are a smaller share of a book still dominated by equities, and building a private equity real estate platform through the Grandview acquisition is a different business with a longer fee-realization timeline than the public-equity flagship strategies. The bear does not need Artisan to fail; it needs the equity outflows to keep outrunning the credit inflows. Against a fee-financial cohort that includes Federated Hermes, T. Rowe Price, and SEI, Artisan trades at the low end on price-to-earnings precisely because the market is pricing the secular pressure on active equity, not missing it.
Valuation
A capital-light fee business is worth the earnings it throws off, not its book value, and Artisan trades at about 12 times earnings, an 8.2% earnings yield. Inverted, that price embeds fee earnings growing only about 1.7% a year, a pace well within what the firm has delivered. The market is not asking Artisan to grow into its multiple; it is pricing a business it expects to roughly tread water, with the secular drag on active equity offset by enough credit and alternatives growth to keep earnings from falling. The whole valuation question is whether 1.7% is too pessimistic for a firm adding fee streams or about right for one losing its best assets.
The methods agree the price is undemanding and disagree only on how undemanding. Every family of valuation method sits above the price: the earnings-power lens reads it at roughly 0.8 times, the relative and asset lenses lower still, near 0.6 to 0.8 times, and the forward-growth methods lowest of all. When all four families say a stock is cheap, the disagreement is between the methods and the market, and here the market is applying a discount for AUM risk that the trailing-earnings methods do not. There is no premium to defend in this name; there is a discount to judge. The price reflects skepticism about the equity franchise, and the bull-bear divide is entirely about whether that skepticism is warranted.
Solvency is a non-issue and the capital-return story is the point. Net debt of $190 million is under half a year of operating income, interest coverage is near 47 times, and the firm carries essentially no leverage risk. What matters for a fee manager is the payout: the variable dividend is funded directly from earnings, so the buyer is underwriting the AUM trajectory more than the balance sheet. Against the fee-financial cohort, Artisan's low multiple is the market's price for an equity-heavy book in secular outflow, and the valuation rests on whether the credit and alternatives platforms can change that mix faster than the equity strategies erode it.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report set the current frame. Artisan posted revenue of $303 million, up from $277 million a year earlier, with net income of $58 million and diluted EPS from continuing operations of $0.76, down from $0.82. AUM ended the quarter at about $173 billion, down from roughly $180 billion, on $3.1 billion of net outflows concentrated in equity strategies. The quarterly dividend was declared at $0.77. The print was mixed: rising revenue against falling per-share earnings and continued equity outflows.
The constructive signals were in the non-equity book. The firm reported net inflows in 13 strategies, including about $250 million into a sustainable emerging market strategy and $800 million into credit, its 15th consecutive quarter of positive credit flows. It also closed the Grandview Property Partners acquisition, onboarded the team, and set up for a flagship private equity real estate fund later in the year. These are the diversification catalysts that determine whether the fee base broadens beyond active equity.
The forward watch items are the monthly AUM disclosures and net-flow trajectory, which for an asset manager arrive between earnings prints and move the stock directly, and the launch and fundraising pace of the new real estate fund. Because the dividend is variable and tied to earnings, the flow data is the leading indicator for the payout, and the balance between equity outflows and credit and alternatives inflows is the single number that will define the next several quarters.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- FHI (Federated Hermes, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …human resource management strategies to respond to competition from existing and new market innovations and competitors, which can increase expenses, create risks that such changes will not be successfully implemented, and cause Federated Hermes to not achieve its long-term strategic objectives. Such fee reductions,…
- FY2025 10-K: …uses of treasury stock; Federated Hermes' products, strategies, and other services (as applicable, offerings) and market performance, and Federated Hermes' performance indicators; investor preferences; offering demand, distribution and development and restructuring initiatives and related planning and timing; the…
- TROW (PRICE T ROWE GROUP INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …clients and their assets or compel us to reduce the fees we charge to clients, thereby reducing our revenues and net income. We are subject to competition in all aspects of our business from other financial institutions. Some of these financial institutions have greater resources than we do and may offer a broader…
- FY2025 10-K: …products. As a result, investment advisors that emphasize passive products have gained and may continue to gain market share from active managers like us. While we believe there will always be demand for strong performing active management, we cannot predict how much market share these competitors will gain.…
- IVZ (Invesco Ltd.)
- FY2025 10-K: …margin (operating income divided by operating revenues) decreased to (10.9)% for the year ended December 31, 2025 from 13.7% in the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily as a result of the $1,794.9 million intangible asset impairment as discussed above. Adjusted operating income increased to $1,557.8 million for the…
- FY2025 10-K: …performance-vested awards are excluded from diluted EPS share calculations as the designated contingency was not met. 16. SEGMENT AND GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION The company has one operating segment, investment management. The company's CODM is the President and Chief Executive Officer as he assesses the company's…
- AMG (AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Affiliates may not, in particular investment strategies such as passively managed products, including ETFs, which typically carry lower 5 Table of Contents fee rates. Certain Affiliates offer their investment management services to the same client types and, from time to time, may compete with each other for clients.…
- FY2025 10-K: …$105.4 billion or 15% driven by a combination of investment performance generated across our Affiliates, net client cash inflows, and the addition of assets associated with new partnerships with Affiliates operating in growing areas within alternative strategies. C lient demand for alternative strategies continued in…
- JHG (JANUS HENDERSON GROUP PLC)
- FY2025 10-K: …returns for comparable passively managed products or as a consequence of regulatory intervention. Fee reductions on existing or future new business, as well as changes in regulations pertaining to fees, could adversely affect our results of operations and financial condition. Additionally, we compete with investment…
- FY2025 10-K: …or negatively affect our revenue. Management and performance fees are generated from a diverse group of funds and other investment products and are the primary drivers of our revenue. We believe that the more diverse the range of investment strategies from which management and performance fees are derived, the more…
- CNS (COHEN & STEERS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in salaries of $2.2 million, partially offset by lower amortization of restricted stock units of $6.3 million. Distribution and service fees expense increased from the year ended December 31, 2024, primarily due to $9.9 million of expenses related to the UTF rights offering and higher average assets under management…
- FY2025 10-K: …through AI capabilities, automation and digital wealth and distribution tools, as well as growing client interest for enhanced digital interaction with their investment portfolios, may require us to adapt our strategy, business and operations to address these trends and pressures. Our competitive position may weaken…
- SEIC (SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …a lower price point or deliver innovative client experiences that we might find difficult to match under our existing cost, regulatory and operating framework. If we fail to compete effectively against these emerging players, we could lose market share to firms that are not as burdened by regulation or that benefit…
- FY2025 10-K: These initiatives might not generate meaningful revenue or profit for several years, if at all, and their ultimate viability is uncertain. If our strategic expansions or innovations are not executed effectively, or if they fail to resonate with target customers, we could divert management attention and capital without…
- SF (STIFEL FINANCIAL CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …leading to price competition and decreased trading margins. Our trading margins have been further compressed by the shift from high- to low-touch services over time, which has created additional competitive pressure. We believe that price competition and pricing pressures in these and other areas will continue as…
- FY2025 10-K: …our competitors. See "Item 1 - Business - Competition" of this Form 10-K for additional information about our competitors. We compete directly with other national full-service broker-dealers, investment banking firms, commercial banks, and investment managers, and to a lesser extent, with discount brokers and dealers…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
APAM Q1 2026 results, April 2026