APA CORPORATION (APA): what the price assumes

boothcheck covers APA CORPORATION (APA) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/APA

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAPA
CompanyAPA CORPORATION
Sector / IndustryEnergy
Current price$42.61/sh
CompositionOil revenues 65% / Natural gas revenues 9% / Natural gas liquids revenues 7% / Purchased oil and gas sales 19%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Multiple paid6x operating income

The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.29σ
cohort percentile (of 48 peers)10

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset0.86x5justifies
Earnings0.36x4justifies
Relative0.41x5justifies
Growth0.52x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$108.640.39xyesFCF base $4.5B, growth -10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 0.5%, WACC 9.2%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$81.650.52xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 4.0x / 2.4x / 7.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$63.270.67xyesP/E 10x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 7.5x / 10.0x / 12.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 4.57x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$49.560.86xyesBV/sh $22.67, ROE (TTM) 20.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$72.540.59xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$18.312.33xyesRev $9.3B, growth -12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.6x / 1.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$165.550.26xyesEPS $4.73, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.27 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$100.600.42xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $4.10B × (1−21%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$69.950.61xyesBV $22.67 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 20.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$49.120.87xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.73 × BVPS $22.67) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$103.760.41xyesEBITDA $6.01B × sector EV/EBITDA 6.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$140.590.30xyesFCF $4528.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$152.620.28xyesEPS $4.73 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$32.621.31xyesBV $22.67 × (ROIC 13.2% / WACC 9.2%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$31.931.33xyesRevenue $9.32B × sector P/S 1.2x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$177.380.24xyesEPS $4.73 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$51.140.83xyesEPS $4.73 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.3b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.09x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.86x
Interest coverage13.4x
Share count CAGR (dilution)0.9%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Watch where the money goes and you learn what a management team actually believes. APA's policy is set out plainly in the 10-K: the company believes returning "60 percent of free cash flow through dividends and share repurchases creates a good balance for providing near-term cash returns to shareholders". What is left goes against borrowings. That split is the interesting part, because at roughly 6.3 times operating profit almost every claim on this enterprise is being offered at a discount, and management has been buying two of them at once.

Retiring near-term maturities is the less glamorous half and probably the higher-return one. Through April 2026 the company repaid $634 million of maturing bonds and now expects interest expense more than $60 million lower this year than last. That saving is permanent, it does not depend on anyone's view of the oil market, and it lands on the same share count every year from here.

The other half is the stock itself. During the second quarter the company bought 2.8 million shares back, paying $35.25 a share on average. That is a board deploying capital into its own equity at a level it presumably considers a discount to the assets, which is a more informative signal than any slide describing the shares as undervalued.

The producing base supports the policy. First-quarter net income came in at $446 million, or $1.26 per diluted share, U.S. oil production averaged 124,000 barrels a day against a lower February guide, and the company raised its full-year U.S. oil outlook to 122,000 barrels a day. Egypt, long the part of this business investors worried about most, is behaving: the 10-K notes the "balance from this customer was current as of December 31, 2025", ending a stretch of delayed payments.

Then there is the piece that is not a mature-asset story at all. Offshore Suriname, the development carry with TotalEnergies is structured so that the partner funds most of the early bill: "TotalEnergies pays 87.5 percent, and the Company pays 12.5 percent; for the next $5 billion in gross expenditures, TotalEnergies pays 75 percent and the Company pays 25 percent". Behind it sits real acreage, with the company holding "approximately six million net undeveloped acres as of December 31, 2025, in other international locations" including further blocks offshore Suriname and Uruguay. A company priced as a declining asset happens to own a growth option someone else is largely paying to drill.

Bear Case

Two liabilities on this balance sheet are indifferent to the oil price, and they are the reason the discount exists. The first is the cost of tidying up. The auditors flagged it as a critical matter: "At December 31, 2025, the asset retirement obligation (ARO) balance totaled $2,880 million", being the estimated present value of dismantling and clearing the sites the company has produced from, with the North Sea the piece under most scrutiny. The second is the credit support standing behind those commitments, disclosed as "£901 million and $10 million in letters of credit outstanding under these facilities". Neither obligation shrinks when Brent falls. They come due on an engineering schedule, not a commodity one.

Set against that, the funded borrowings look ordinary. Net debt of $4.1 billion runs at about 1.2 times operating profit, and operating profit covers the interest bill 10.7 times over. The trouble is that the numerator is contractual and the denominator is a commodity price. Halve the realized barrel and the ratio does not halve, it roughly doubles, while the cleanup schedule carries on unchanged. That asymmetry is what a cyclical balance sheet means in practice, and it is why the same leverage reads as comfortable in one year and constraining in the next.

The counterparty question sits alongside it. A substantial share of production is sold in Egypt to a state entity, and the language the company uses about collections is careful rather than reassuring: "This improvement follows several periods prior to 2025 during which EGPC payments were delayed and the receivable balance increased." The filing also names the tail risk directly, warning about "resource nationalization, and/or forced renegotiation or modification of the Company's existing contracts with Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC)". Payment timing has improved. Improvement is not the same as structural change.

None of this is an overvaluation argument, and it would be dishonest to force one. Every family of method lands above today's quote. Standard arithmetic does not call this stock expensive; it already trades beneath what a steady 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant. So the bear has a harder job than usual: it has to explain why a market full of people who can run the same sums still pays $36.17. The paragraphs above are the explanation. Reserves deplete on a schedule, the cleanup accrues whether or not the wells earn, and a meaningful slice of the cash flow depends on a sovereign counterparty rather than on a customer who can be sued in a familiar court.

And the buyback has not been compounding anyone's claim. Over the four years to March 2026 the share count has risen about 0.5% a year, which is what happens when stock is issued to buy assets and then repurchased more slowly than it was printed. A holder who assumed the return-of-capital framework was quietly shrinking their denominator has, over that window, been standing still.

Valuation

At $36.17 the market pays about 6.3 times company-wide operating profit. That is low enough that the quote sits beneath what even a steady 5% annual decline in operating profit would warrant, which changes the shape of the usual question. There is no ambitious assumption to interrogate here. There is a floor, and the market has already priced through it.

The methods do not argue. Asset-based approaches, earnings-power approaches, peer multiples and the cash-flow methods all land above today's price, several of them far above it. When every family points the same direction, the disagreement is not among the methods; it is between the methods and the market, and the interesting work is explaining the market rather than the models.

One wrinkle deserves attention before anyone treats the multiple as a straightforward bargain. Egyptian income taxes do not sit below the operating line. The 10-K explains that "Income taxes paid to the Arab Republic of Egypt on behalf of the Contractor are recognized as oil and gas sales revenue and income tax expense", so both revenue and operating profit are grossed up by a tax that then departs at the tax line. Trailing operating profit of $3.4 billion becomes trailing net income of $1.5 billion, and that mechanism is a large part of the gap. How cheap 6.3 times operating profit really is depends on how much of that operating profit is a round trip, which is the genuine question the low multiple poses rather than an answer it supplies.

Balance-sheet capacity is workable rather than plush. Net debt of $4.1 billion sits at roughly 1.2 times operating profit, with interest covered 10.7 times over. Gross borrowings are $4.4 billion, and only $293 million of liquid assets sits behind them, so the flexibility here comes from what the wells produce each quarter rather than from a reserve sitting idle. That distinction matters most in exactly the quarters when it gets tested.

Against the wider exploration and production cohort the multiple sits near the bottom of the range. Part of what makes the comparison awkward is the same gross-up: the reported operating margin reads wider than EOG (EOG) at 29.8% or Coterra (CTRA) at 29.9% for accounting reasons rather than because the barrels are better ones. And the forecasting record is short. Since 2022 the guidance ledger runs 3 raises, 1 cut and 2 reaffirmations, which is too thin to lean on, so the read above rests on the assets and the obligations rather than on management's track record with a range.

Catalysts

First-quarter results, published May 6, 2026, reset the operating picture upward. Net income attributable to common stock was $446 million, or $1.26 per diluted share. U.S. oil production averaged 124,000 barrels a day, ahead of the February guide, on better uptime and continued efficiency gains in the Permian, and the company lifted its full-year U.S. oil outlook to 122,000 barrels a day while reaffirming Egypt gross gas guidance of 540 to 550 MMcf per day.

Cost and capital-structure work runs alongside it. Maturing bonds of $634 million were repaid through April 2026, with interest expense expected to run more than $60 million lower across 2026, and management is targeting $450 million of run-rate controllable spend savings by year-end.

Two dated items frame the rest of the year. The second-quarter supplemental information published on July 8, 2026 disclosed roughly 137 MMcf/d of U.S. natural gas and 12,300 barrels a day of NGL production shut in on weak pricing, alongside 2.8 million shares repurchased at $35.25 a share on average; results follow on August 6, 2026. Further out, the Suriname development is guided to first oil in mid-2028, the point at which several years of exploration spending begin returning barrels instead of consuming capital.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

North Sea (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

APA second-quarter 2026 supplemental information, July 8, 2026 · APA first-quarter 2026 results release, May 6, 2026 · APA first-quarter 2026 earnings call, May 2026

View the full interactive APA report on boothcheck