ARTIVION, INC. (AORT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $26.77, ARTIVION, INC. (AORT) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~13.0 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AORT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAORT
CompanyARTIVION, INC.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$26.77/sh
CompositionAortic stent grafts 36% / On-X 23% / Surgical sealants 17% / Other products 2% / Preservation services 22%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)4.9%
Operating margin today4.4%
Margin expansion (value-band)+0.5pp
Must persist for13.0y
Multiple paid79x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.15σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)100

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.09x2expensive
Earnings0
Relative0
Growth1.24x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.4%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=5)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$20.691.29xyesFCF base $0.0B, growth 17% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.4%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$27.500.97xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 58.5x / 60.5x / 62.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 4.0x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.142.93xyesBook value floor: BV/sh $9.14, ROE negative
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$8.233.25xyesBook value with convergence: BV/sh $9.14, ROE converges to ke
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$21.621.24xyesRev $0.5B, growth 17% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 2.3x / 2.8x / 3.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$0.00noNegative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0
Margin TrajectoryGrowthnoMargin ramp: -1% → 12% over 7yr, rev growth 17% (input: historical growth; tapered)
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.012677.00xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.02B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.4% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAssetno
Graham NumberAssetno
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.03B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarningsno
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarningsno
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $0.47B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarningsno
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Medical Devicesoperatingenterprise$345.8mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Preservation Servicesoperatingenterprise$95.5mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$289.8m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)17.77x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)14.04x
Interest coverage0.9x
Share count CAGR (dilution)4.9%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The income statement describes an ordinary business, and the business is not ordinary. Trailing operating margin runs at 6.5%. Very little of what remains survives the trip to the bottom of the statement, so return on book value comes in at 2.6%. Read those two figures on their own and you would conclude that Artivion sells something unremarkable at unremarkable prices. What it actually sells is implantable hardware for acute aortic dissection, a condition where the alternative to the device is often death, and the FDA approved its AMDS prosthesis on the strength of a trial reporting a 72% reduction in all-cause mortality at thirty days and a 54% reduction in major adverse events. None of that pricing power is visible in a 6.5% operating margin.

The category tells you what devices like this are worth at the gross line. Edwards Lifesciences (EW) reports gross margin of 77.9%, AtriCure (ATRC) 75.6%, and LeMaitre Vascular (LMAT) 72.4%, each on its own filed figures. That is the economics of implantable cardiovascular hardware. The distance between category-level gross economics and Artivion's reported operating margin is where the money goes: clinical trials, regulatory filings, and the field organization it takes to get a device onto a hospital's shelf and into a surgeon's hands.

LeMaitre Vascular is the instructive comparison, because it shows what a small vascular device maker looks like once it stops spending at that rate. LMAT earns 28.5% operating margins on $256 million of revenue. Artivion runs a revenue base close to twice that size at a fraction of the profitability. The bull case does not require the company to invent anything further. It requires the company to stop paying for what it has already invented.

The portfolio underneath is broader than the aortic story suggests. Stent grafts are 36% of revenue, On-X mechanical valves 23%, preservation services 22% and surgical sealants 17%. The 10-K describes the On-X line as covering aortic and mitral heart valves plus an ascending aortic prosthesis, with distribution of carbon dioxide diffusion catheters and sutures for mitral chordal replacement alongside. Preservation services processes donated cardiac and vascular tissue, which is a genuinely hard business to replicate: it requires donor supply, processing capacity, and a regulatory record nobody builds quickly.

June's approval changed the commercial mechanics rather than the science. Under the prior humanitarian device exemption, a hospital had to obtain institutional review board sign-off before implanting the device, and management had already flagged procurement friction as the reason placements were running behind. That gate is now gone. Removing an administrative barrier from a product whose clinical case is already made is the least expensive growth available to a company in this position.

Bear Case

Operating income covers the interest bill 1.1 times. That one ratio governs more of this story than any product in the catalogue does. Net debt sits near 5.7 times operating income before tax, and the borrowing is not cheap: the FY2025 10-K reports a stated rate of 8.74% on the term loan facility with an effective rate of 9.38%, 7.49% on the revolving facility, and $100.0 million of 4.25% convertible senior notes issued in June 2020. A company earning barely more than what it owes its lenders has no shock absorber, and every operating disappointment lands directly on the equity.

The equity has been absorbing the difference in another way as well. The share count has grown roughly 5.7% a year over four years. The 10-K discloses 916,000 shares granted to employees and officers during 2025 under performance and restricted awards, with an aggregate grant date value of $24.1 million, tied to revenue growth and profitability targets. Holders are paying for this expansion in two currencies at the same time, and only one of them shows up in the interest line.

Then the guidance moved the wrong way. Management lowered its full-year 2026 revenue expectation, pointing to weaker stent graft sales in both international markets and the United States, and to delays placing AMDS starter sets because of hospital procurement processes. Procurement friction is a solvable problem. It is also a plain reminder that a clinically superior device does not walk itself into a hospital budget, and that the timing of a launch is decided by purchasing committees rather than by trial data.

The tissue business carries its own drag and its own open question. Revenues from tissue processing fell 3% during 2025, which the 10-K attributes primarily to a backlog of tissues awaiting release following the 2024 cybersecurity incident. The same filing notes a proposed rule that has sat on the federal regulatory agenda since 2019 under which certain of its preserved tissue products could be reclassified and require a premarket approval application, with the agency deciding how long the products could continue to be supplied during that review.

All of this sits beneath a price paying roughly fifty times company-wide operating income. What that price asks for is growth held at the fastest rate this business can fund from its own earnings, sustained for something over a decade, and only about 14% of comparable fast-growing companies held that kind of level across a full decade. The multiple sits at the very top of the medical device peer distribution. A capital structure this tight is an unusual place from which to underwrite a decade-long compounding run, because the years in which the thesis gets tested are precisely the years in which refinancing terms matter most.

Valuation

Two figures define what is being underwritten. Today's price works out to roughly fifty times company-wide operating income, and inverted, it requires operating profit to compound at the fastest pace the business can self-fund for about 11.5 years. Trailing operating margin is 6.5%, which means most of that compounding has to arrive through profitability rather than through volume alone.

The references make the assumption demanding rather than impossible. The near-term pace is inside what the company has recently delivered, so the growth rate itself is not the stretch; the duration is. Against the device peer group, the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. And among comparable fast-growers, only about 14% sustained a level like this for a decade. The overall read is a high bar, one step below the most extreme end of the scale.

The methods used to triangulate divide sharply and all in one direction. Asset value, earnings power and peer multiples land far below today's price. Only the forward-growth methods reach it, and the nearest of them clears it only by assuming the enterprise multiple investors apply now survives untouched through a six-year projection, with cash flow compounding at the rate the company has grown historically. The meaning of that pattern is specific: this is a bet on durable compounding that the static frames structurally cannot price, not a bet those frames have examined and found cheap.

The peer cohort makes the required improvement concrete. Artivion converts 6.5% of revenue into operating income. Edwards Lifesciences (EW) manages 21.4%, Boston Scientific (BSX) 18.4%, Globus Medical (GMED) 17.2%, LivaNova (LIVN) 13.4% and Merit Medical (MMSI) 12.2%, all on their own filed figures, while LMAT reaches 28.5% on roughly half Artivion's revenue base. The company sits at the bottom of its peer group on profitability while carrying the highest multiple in it. Whether the first of those facts is temporary is the entire investment question, and the answer is a matter of execution rather than of arithmetic.

Solvency is what separates this from most premium-multiple stories. Net debt near 5.7 times operating income before tax, interest covered 1.1 times, and a share count climbing about 5.7% a year leave very little room between a disappointing year and a financing conversation. Management's longer record with its own forecasts is strong, with twenty-two raises and three reaffirmations since 2006 against a single withdrawal, so this year's reduction runs against the pattern rather than with it. Thin coverage does not make the thesis wrong. It shortens the number of quarters available in which to be wrong.

Catalysts

The defining event arrived on June 29, 2026, when the FDA approved the premarket approval application for the AMDS Hybrid Prosthesis. The approval covers acute Debakey Type I aortic dissections presenting with clinical or radiographic malperfusion, which the company estimates at roughly 60% of all Debakey Type I dissections, and rests on the PERSEVERE trial, which at thirty days showed a 72% reduction in all-cause mortality and a 54% reduction in primary major adverse events including stroke, dialysis-requiring renal failure and myocardial infarction. The commercially important detail is procedural: hospitals no longer need institutional review board approval to implant the device, a requirement that came with the earlier humanitarian exemption.

That approval landed after a first quarter that the market did not like. Revenue rose 18% on a reported basis to $116.3 million, but management lowered its full-year 2026 revenue and profitability targets, attributing the change to lower-than-expected stent graft sales in international markets and the United States and to delayed AMDS starter set placements caused by hospital procurement hurdles. The stock reacted to the guidance rather than to the growth.

That sets up a clean test over the next two reports. The procurement obstacle management named in May is precisely what the June approval removes, so the placement rate for AMDS starter sets is the single most informative line to watch. Alongside it sits the stent graft line, which is 36% of revenue and the source of the shortfall, and the tissue processing business, which is still working through the release backlog left by the 2024 cybersecurity incident. One of those three explains whether the reset guidance was conservatism or a trend.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Medical Devices (reported)

Preservation Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Artivion announcement, June 29, 2026 · Artivion first quarter 2026 results, May 2026 · Artivion FY2025 10-K

View the full interactive AORT report on boothcheck