Arista Networks, Inc. (ANET): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $195.08, Arista Networks, Inc. (ANET) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~11.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ANET

Headline

FieldValue
TickerANET
CompanyArista Networks, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$195.08/sh
CompositionProduct 84% / Service 16%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)37.8%
Operating margin today42.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.0pp
Must persist for11.3y
Multiple paid58x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 4: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 11.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 31.7% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.47σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)89

Valuation X-Ray

Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset5.08x4expensive
Earnings4.42x4expensive
Relative2.86x5expensive
Growth2.14x3expensive

Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=16)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$91.272.14xyesFCF base $5.9B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$116.131.68xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 55.7x / 57.7x / 59.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr
Relative ValuationRelative$123.101.58xyesP/E 39.41x (blended: static sector reference 28x + trailing (TTM) 66x), scenarios: 31.5x / 39.4x / 47.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 31.31x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$31.946.11xyesBV/sh $10.71, ROE (TTM) 27.6%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$56.153.47xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$68.902.83xyesRev $9.7B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$67.362.90xyesEPS $2.91, growth 23% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.85 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$9.3520.86xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.49B × (1−20%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$48.054.06xyesBV $10.71 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$26.487.37xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.91 × BVPS $10.71) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$68.242.86xyesEBITDA $4.24B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$46.254.22xyesFCF $5278.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$42.244.62xyesSBC-adj FCF $4.81B (FCF $5.28B − SBC $0.47B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$93.902.08xyesEPS $2.91 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$8.8022.17xyesBV $10.71 × (ROIC 7.6% / WACC 9.2%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$46.274.22xyesRevenue $9.71B × sector P/S 6.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$101.041.93xyesEPS $2.91 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 23.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 34.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$31.466.20xyesEPS $2.91 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Arista Networks (consolidated)operatingenterprise9.0B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$12.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-3.70x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-2.97x (net cash)
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.1%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Forty-three cents of every revenue dollar reaches operating profit here. For a company that ships metal boxes with fans in them, that is not a normal outcome. Cisco Systems (CSCO), selling roughly six times the revenue, converts 23.4%. Fortinet (FTNT) manages 31.1%, F5 (FFIV) 24.7%, Palo Alto Networks (PANW) 9.6%, and Extreme Networks (EXTR) 3.2%, each from its own filed figures. Arista's 43.1% is the highest in that group by a wide margin, and the reason is architectural rather than commercial.

The company writes one operating system and runs it across the whole product line. A capability built for a hyperscaler's core switch shows up on a campus switch without a separate engineering program, and a defect fixed once is fixed everywhere. Competitors who grew by acquisition carry several code bases and pay the integration tax on every release. That is the mechanism behind the margin, and the FY2025 10-K puts the outcome plainly: "Market research confirms that we continue to be a leader in high-speed Ethernet switching".

Competitor risk factors are usually the most candid documents in an industry, and Extreme Networks (EXTR) obliges. Its 10-K names Arista at the head of the list of firms whose products it competes against, and describes that group as having "longer operating histories, greater name recognition, larger customer bases, broader product lines". Being the company a rival warns its own shareholders about is a position that has to be earned in the field, one displacement at a time.

Demand is currently arriving from the part of the market with the deepest pockets. The 10-K segments the customer base into "Cloud and AI Titans, AI and Specialty Providers, and Enterprise", and the first category is doing the heavy lifting. Trailing revenue reached $9.71 billion, and the March quarter grew 35.1% on the year while management raised the full-year target. Growth of that shape at that scale is rare in networking hardware, where the historical pattern is share fights at flat industry revenue.

The financial position matches the operating one. There is no funded debt to service, so none of the growth has been rented from lenders. The share count has been essentially flat across four years, which in fast-growing technology is close to an anomaly; the usual pattern is a share base that creeps upward and quietly taxes every per-share figure. Return on book value runs at 27.6%. Whatever else is arguable about this company, the capital has been raised internally and kept there.

Bear Case

Eleven years is the number that matters, and nobody at the company has forecast it. That is roughly how long operating profit would have to compound at the fastest rate the business can fund out of its own earnings for today's price to make sense. Not three, and not five. Among comparable fast-growing companies, only about 7% sustained that kind of level for a decade. The assumption is also touchy: take one percentage point off the growth rate and the run has to last about a year and a half longer to reach the same destination.

The most fragile piece of that assumption is not the engineering. It is the buyer list. The FY2025 10-K discloses that sales to one end customer represented 26% of total revenue in 2025 and sales to another represented 16%. Two customers, more than four dollars in every ten. The same filing states that such customers "could continue to cancel, delay, reduce or otherwise modify their purchase commitments with little or no notice to us". An eleven-year compounding run is being underwritten by the capital budgets of two firms with no contractual obligation to keep spending.

The margin half of the assumption is under separate pressure. The 10-K names supply chain inflation and material scarcity, specifically "the recent tightening of supply conditions in the memory market", as a continuing drag on gross margin, and cost of revenue rose $725.2 million, or 28.9%, during 2025. Management has said the constraints spanning wafers, memory, CPUs and optical components could persist for one to two years. Demand that cannot be shipped is not revenue, and components that cost more are not margin.

Deferred revenue rose by $2.5 billion last year, tied to product contracts that carry acceptance terms and to support agreements. That single line supplied much of the operating cash the company reported, which raises a fair question about what the trailing figure is really measuring. It is customer money arriving before the revenue is earned: a fine problem to have in an upswing and an unpleasant one in a downswing, because the same mechanism that swells collections while orders climb reverses when they stop.

Then there is the plain arithmetic. None of the standard methods reach the price: not the asset-based lenses, not the earnings-power ones, not peer multiples, not the cash-flow projections. The closest of them is the forward-growth group, and today's price is still near double where those land. They reach even that by assuming the enterprise multiple the market applies today survives untouched seven years out, which is a forecast about investor mood rather than about switches. If growth decelerates toward what the rest of the cohort delivers, the multiple compresses, and the compression does the damage long before anything operational goes wrong.

Valuation

The price here is a statement about duration far more than about rate. At $174.13 the market pays roughly 54 times what the company earns in operating income, and that multiple resolves into an assumption that operating profit keeps compounding at close to the fastest pace the business can self-fund for roughly eleven and a half years. The rate on its own is not the stretch. Arista has delivered rates in that neighborhood. Eleven consecutive years of it is a different proposition.

The right reference for that is how often it has happened elsewhere. Among comparable fast-growers, roughly 7% sustained this kind of level for about a decade. Against its own cohort the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, well past the upper quartile rather than inside it. Those two references, taken together, are why the embedded assumption reads as the most demanding end of the scale rather than as merely a rich one.

The methods used to triangulate barely disagree in this case, which is itself informative. Every family lands below today's price: asset-based, earnings power, peer multiples and forward growth alike. The nearest of them is the forward-growth family, and it reaches its number by holding today's enterprise multiple flat through a seven-year projection. That is an assumption about how the market will feel seven years from now, not a finding about the business.

Concretely, then: 43.1% of trailing revenue converts to operating income today, and the price does not ask for that figure to improve. It asks for the revenue underneath it to keep compounding near its ceiling for more than a decade while the margin holds. Cohort context sharpens the ask. CSCO converts 23.4% at about six times the revenue base; Ubiquiti (UI) posts 35.8% at under a third of it. Arista's margin already leads that group, so the requirement is not to catch anybody. It is to stay in front for more than a decade, while two customers decide their own capital plans one budget cycle at a time.

The balance sheet neither helps nor hinders that. Carrying no funded debt means no leverage amplifies a bad year and no interest bill needs covering, and a share count that has barely moved in four years means the growth was financed internally. It bounds the downside cleanly. What it cannot do is shorten the horizon.

Catalysts

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 4, 2026, after the close. The March quarter is the bar: revenue of $2.709 billion, up 35.1% on the year, with $1.69 billion of cash generated from operations. Growth at that rate on a base approaching $11 billion of annualized revenue is the reason the multiple is where it is, and any deceleration will be read as the first data point in a longer trend rather than as noise.

Management moved the full-year 2026 revenue target up to approximately $11.5 billion from a prior figure of about $10.5 billion, and raised the 2026 AI revenue objective to $3.5 billion. A raise of that size mid-year is a genuine signal about order flow. It also raises the bar the August print has to clear, since guidance revisions cut both ways and the market has already paid for the higher number.

The constraint worth watching sits on the supply side rather than the demand side. Management has described shortages across wafers, memory, CPUs and optical components, with lead times extending well beyond a year and the situation expected to run one to two years. The company has also said it expects one or possibly two additional customers to reach 10% of total revenue during the year. That second item is the one to track most closely: it is the only development that would materially change the concentration arithmetic underneath the whole story.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Arista Networks (consolidated) (reported)

Article Insight (Recent News Sentiment)

Sentiment score: 75.00 (MEDIUM confidence) FUD/Hype: HYPE_DETECTED (Both articles highlight positive analyst ratings and price targets, contributing to a bullish sentiment without substantial new information.) Claim alignment: ALIGNED

These articles collectively signal continued positive sentiment surrounding Arista Networks, primarily driven by analyst upgrades and price target revisions.

Globe and Mail

Motley Fool

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Arista Q1 2026 earnings release, May 5, 2026 · Arista Q1 2026 earnings call, May 5, 2026 · Arista press release, July 6, 2026 · Arista Q1 2026 earnings release and call, May 5, 2026

View the full interactive ANET report on boothcheck