Arista Networks, Inc. (ANET): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $195.08, Arista Networks, Inc. (ANET) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~11.3 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ANET
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ANET |
| Company | Arista Networks, Inc. |
| Sector / Industry | Technology |
| Current price | $195.08/sh |
| Composition | Product 84% / Service 16% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 37.8% |
| Operating margin today | 42.8% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -5.0pp |
| Must persist for | 11.3y |
| Multiple paid | 58x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 4: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.7% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 31.7% self-funding ceiling.
How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.47σ |
| cohort percentile (of 188 peers) | 89 |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore sits beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 5.08x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 4.42x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 2.86x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 2.14x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $91.27 | 2.14x | yes | FCF base $5.9B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $116.13 | 1.68x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 55.7x / 57.7x / 59.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $123.10 | 1.58x | yes | P/E 39.41x (blended: static sector reference 28x + trailing (TTM) 66x), scenarios: 31.5x / 39.4x / 47.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 31.31x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $31.94 | 6.11x | yes | BV/sh $10.71, ROE (TTM) 27.6%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $56.15 | 3.47x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $68.90 | 2.83x | yes | Rev $9.7B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 9.6x / 12.0x / 14.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $67.36 | 2.90x | yes | EPS $2.91, growth 23% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.85 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $9.35 | 20.86x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $2.49B × (1−20%) / WACC 9.2% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $48.05 | 4.06x | yes | BV $10.71 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 27.6% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $26.48 | 7.37x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.91 × BVPS $10.71) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $68.24 | 2.86x | yes | EBITDA $4.24B × sector EV/EBITDA 20.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $46.25 | 4.22x | yes | FCF $5278.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $42.24 | 4.62x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $4.81B (FCF $5.28B − SBC $0.47B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $93.90 | 2.08x | yes | EPS $2.91 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $8.80 | 22.17x | yes | BV $10.71 × (ROIC 7.6% / WACC 9.2%) (excluded from median) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $46.27 | 4.22x | yes | Revenue $9.71B × sector P/S 6.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $101.04 | 1.93x | yes | EPS $2.91 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 23.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 34.7x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $31.46 | 6.20x | yes | EPS $2.91 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Arista Networks (consolidated) | operating | enterprise | 9.0B reported-currency | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $12.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -3.70x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -2.97x (net cash) |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -0.1% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- One software code base running across the entire switch line is the structural advantage, and it shows up as a 43.1% operating margin against CSCO at 23.4% and FTNT at 31.1% on their own filed numbers.
- Concentration is the specific vulnerability: the FY2025 10-K discloses that one end customer accounted for 26% of total revenue and another for 16%, so more than four dollars in ten depend on two buyers.
- Second-quarter results land August 4, 2026, measured against a full-year revenue target management raised to about $11.5 billion in May.
Bull Case
Forty-three cents of every revenue dollar reaches operating profit here. For a company that ships metal boxes with fans in them, that is not a normal outcome. Cisco Systems (CSCO), selling roughly six times the revenue, converts 23.4%. Fortinet (FTNT) manages 31.1%, F5 (FFIV) 24.7%, Palo Alto Networks (PANW) 9.6%, and Extreme Networks (EXTR) 3.2%, each from its own filed figures. Arista's 43.1% is the highest in that group by a wide margin, and the reason is architectural rather than commercial.
The company writes one operating system and runs it across the whole product line. A capability built for a hyperscaler's core switch shows up on a campus switch without a separate engineering program, and a defect fixed once is fixed everywhere. Competitors who grew by acquisition carry several code bases and pay the integration tax on every release. That is the mechanism behind the margin, and the FY2025 10-K puts the outcome plainly: "Market research confirms that we continue to be a leader in high-speed Ethernet switching".
Competitor risk factors are usually the most candid documents in an industry, and Extreme Networks (EXTR) obliges. Its 10-K names Arista at the head of the list of firms whose products it competes against, and describes that group as having "longer operating histories, greater name recognition, larger customer bases, broader product lines". Being the company a rival warns its own shareholders about is a position that has to be earned in the field, one displacement at a time.
Demand is currently arriving from the part of the market with the deepest pockets. The 10-K segments the customer base into "Cloud and AI Titans, AI and Specialty Providers, and Enterprise", and the first category is doing the heavy lifting. Trailing revenue reached $9.71 billion, and the March quarter grew 35.1% on the year while management raised the full-year target. Growth of that shape at that scale is rare in networking hardware, where the historical pattern is share fights at flat industry revenue.
The financial position matches the operating one. There is no funded debt to service, so none of the growth has been rented from lenders. The share count has been essentially flat across four years, which in fast-growing technology is close to an anomaly; the usual pattern is a share base that creeps upward and quietly taxes every per-share figure. Return on book value runs at 27.6%. Whatever else is arguable about this company, the capital has been raised internally and kept there.
Bear Case
Eleven years is the number that matters, and nobody at the company has forecast it. That is roughly how long operating profit would have to compound at the fastest rate the business can fund out of its own earnings for today's price to make sense. Not three, and not five. Among comparable fast-growing companies, only about 7% sustained that kind of level for a decade. The assumption is also touchy: take one percentage point off the growth rate and the run has to last about a year and a half longer to reach the same destination.
The most fragile piece of that assumption is not the engineering. It is the buyer list. The FY2025 10-K discloses that sales to one end customer represented 26% of total revenue in 2025 and sales to another represented 16%. Two customers, more than four dollars in every ten. The same filing states that such customers "could continue to cancel, delay, reduce or otherwise modify their purchase commitments with little or no notice to us". An eleven-year compounding run is being underwritten by the capital budgets of two firms with no contractual obligation to keep spending.
The margin half of the assumption is under separate pressure. The 10-K names supply chain inflation and material scarcity, specifically "the recent tightening of supply conditions in the memory market", as a continuing drag on gross margin, and cost of revenue rose $725.2 million, or 28.9%, during 2025. Management has said the constraints spanning wafers, memory, CPUs and optical components could persist for one to two years. Demand that cannot be shipped is not revenue, and components that cost more are not margin.
Deferred revenue rose by $2.5 billion last year, tied to product contracts that carry acceptance terms and to support agreements. That single line supplied much of the operating cash the company reported, which raises a fair question about what the trailing figure is really measuring. It is customer money arriving before the revenue is earned: a fine problem to have in an upswing and an unpleasant one in a downswing, because the same mechanism that swells collections while orders climb reverses when they stop.
Then there is the plain arithmetic. None of the standard methods reach the price: not the asset-based lenses, not the earnings-power ones, not peer multiples, not the cash-flow projections. The closest of them is the forward-growth group, and today's price is still near double where those land. They reach even that by assuming the enterprise multiple the market applies today survives untouched seven years out, which is a forecast about investor mood rather than about switches. If growth decelerates toward what the rest of the cohort delivers, the multiple compresses, and the compression does the damage long before anything operational goes wrong.
Valuation
The price here is a statement about duration far more than about rate. At $174.13 the market pays roughly 54 times what the company earns in operating income, and that multiple resolves into an assumption that operating profit keeps compounding at close to the fastest pace the business can self-fund for roughly eleven and a half years. The rate on its own is not the stretch. Arista has delivered rates in that neighborhood. Eleven consecutive years of it is a different proposition.
The right reference for that is how often it has happened elsewhere. Among comparable fast-growers, roughly 7% sustained this kind of level for about a decade. Against its own cohort the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, well past the upper quartile rather than inside it. Those two references, taken together, are why the embedded assumption reads as the most demanding end of the scale rather than as merely a rich one.
The methods used to triangulate barely disagree in this case, which is itself informative. Every family lands below today's price: asset-based, earnings power, peer multiples and forward growth alike. The nearest of them is the forward-growth family, and it reaches its number by holding today's enterprise multiple flat through a seven-year projection. That is an assumption about how the market will feel seven years from now, not a finding about the business.
Concretely, then: 43.1% of trailing revenue converts to operating income today, and the price does not ask for that figure to improve. It asks for the revenue underneath it to keep compounding near its ceiling for more than a decade while the margin holds. Cohort context sharpens the ask. CSCO converts 23.4% at about six times the revenue base; Ubiquiti (UI) posts 35.8% at under a third of it. Arista's margin already leads that group, so the requirement is not to catch anybody. It is to stay in front for more than a decade, while two customers decide their own capital plans one budget cycle at a time.
The balance sheet neither helps nor hinders that. Carrying no funded debt means no leverage amplifies a bad year and no interest bill needs covering, and a share count that has barely moved in four years means the growth was financed internally. It bounds the downside cleanly. What it cannot do is shorten the horizon.
Catalysts
Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 4, 2026, after the close. The March quarter is the bar: revenue of $2.709 billion, up 35.1% on the year, with $1.69 billion of cash generated from operations. Growth at that rate on a base approaching $11 billion of annualized revenue is the reason the multiple is where it is, and any deceleration will be read as the first data point in a longer trend rather than as noise.
Management moved the full-year 2026 revenue target up to approximately $11.5 billion from a prior figure of about $10.5 billion, and raised the 2026 AI revenue objective to $3.5 billion. A raise of that size mid-year is a genuine signal about order flow. It also raises the bar the August print has to clear, since guidance revisions cut both ways and the market has already paid for the higher number.
The constraint worth watching sits on the supply side rather than the demand side. Management has described shortages across wafers, memory, CPUs and optical components, with lead times extending well beyond a year and the situation expected to run one to two years. The company has also said it expects one or possibly two additional customers to reach 10% of total revenue during the year. That second item is the one to track most closely: it is the only development that would materially change the concentration arithmetic underneath the whole story.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Arista Networks (consolidated) (reported)
- CSCO (CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of Contents CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) 3. Revenue (a) Disaggregation of Revenue We disaggregate our revenue into groups of similar products and services that depict the nature, amount, and timing of revenue and cash flows for our various offerings. The sales cycle,…
- FY2025 10-K: 2023 was $ 37 million , $ 58 million and $ 73 million, respectively, and was included in product revenue in the Consolidated Statement of Operations. 77 Table of Contents CISCO SYSTEMS, INC. Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements (Continued) Minimum future rentals on noncancelable operating leases as of July 26,…
- UI (UBIQUITI INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and the Company's user community where customers can interface directly with our R&D, marketing, and support teams. Our technology platforms were designed from the ground up with a focus on delivering highly-advanced and easily-deployable solutions that appeal to a global customer base. 4 Table of Contents We offer a…
- FY2025 10-K: …of these factors and other risks. Key Components of Our Results of Operations and Financial Condition Revenues We operate our business as one reportable and operating segment. Further information regarding Segments can be found in Note 13, "Segment Information, Revenues by Geography and Significant Customers," to our…
- EXTR (EXTREME NETWORKS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and solutions from Arista Networks Inc., CommScope Holding Company, Inc., Fortinet, Inc., and Ubiquiti Inc. Most of these competitors have longer operating histories, greater name recognition, larger customer bases, broader product lines and substantially greater financial, technical, sales, marketing and other…
- FY2025 10-K: …protect our proprietary rights as fully as in the United States. Competition The market for network switches, routers and software (including analytics) which is part of the broader market for networking equipment, is extremely competitive and characterized by rapid technological progress, frequent new product…
- FFIV (F5, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Resellers and technology partners . Historically, our ability to compete with much larger companies has been strengthened through partnerships with large systems and software vendors. Currently, we partner with many technology partners and public cloud providers who resell our products. We have ongoing partnerships…
- FY2025 10-K: …and services, sales and marketing expenses, research and development expenses, general and administrative expenses, restructuring charges, and provision for income taxes, all of which are presented in the Consolidated Income Statements. Other segment items primarily include interest income, interest expense, and…
- FTNT (Fortinet Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: Point, Cisco, CrowdStrike, F5 Networks, HPE, Huawei, Microsoft, Netskope, Palo Alto Networks, SonicWALL, Sophos, and Zscaler. Some of our existing and potential competitors' competitive advantages include: • greater name recognition and/or longer operating histories; • larger sales and marketing budgets and resources;…
- FY2025 10-K: …Inc. ("Palo Alto Networks"), SonicWALL, Inc. ("SonicWALL"), Sophos Group Plc ("Sophos") and Zscaler, Inc. ("Zscaler"). We believe we compete favorably based on our products' security performance, throughput, reliability, breadth and ability to work together, our ability to add and integrate new networking and…
- PANW (Palo Alto Networks Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …strategy combines various products and services into a tightly integrated architecture for more secure, faster, and cost-effective outcomes. Network Security Our network security platform is designed to deliver complete zero trust solutions to our customers. The platform includes: • Secure Access Service Edge…
- FY2025 10-K: …portfolio. Based on investment positions as of July 31, 2025, a hypothetical 100 basis point increase in interest rates across all maturities would result in a $132.3 million decline in the fair market value of the portfolio. Such losses would only be realized if we sold the investments prior to maturity. Conversely,…
- HPE (HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …innovation. Our primary competitors are other infrastructure and cloud management software technology vendors, such as Broadcom, Cisco Systems Inc., Dell Technologies Inc., IBM, NetApp Inc., Nutanix, and Pure Storage and public cloud vendors like Amazon Web Services, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure. Our strategy is…
- FY2025 10-K: Zerto Disaster Recovery. Networking The Networking segment develops and sells high-performance networking and security products and services that empower customers of all sizes to build scalable, reliable, secure, agile, and efficient automated networks. Our platforms are purpose-built using AI to deliver secure and…
- SMCI (SUPER MICRO COMPUTER, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in December 2017. During his career at Deloitte, he served a wide range of public and private technology companies and has experience working on risk and compliance issues. Mr. Angel is a CPA (inactive status) and a member of the AICPA. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Business Administration degree from the…
- FY2025 10-K: Consolidated Statements of Operations 60 Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income 61 Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity 62 Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows 63 Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements 65 SMCI | 2025 Form 10-K | 55 Table of Contents Report of Independent Registered Public…
Article Insight (Recent News Sentiment)
Sentiment score: 75.00 (MEDIUM confidence) FUD/Hype: HYPE_DETECTED (Both articles highlight positive analyst ratings and price targets, contributing to a bullish sentiment without substantial new information.) Claim alignment: ALIGNED
These articles collectively signal continued positive sentiment surrounding Arista Networks, primarily driven by analyst upgrades and price target revisions.
Globe and Mail
- Scope: Reports on bullish analyst ratings for both Arista Networks and Datadog.
- Data: Bank of America Securities maintains a Buy rating on ANET with a $179.00 price target.
- Verdict: Validates existing bullish consensus, but offers no new fundamental insight.
Motley Fool
- Scope: Discusses the reasons behind Arista Networks’ recent stock price increase.
- Data: The article does not provide specific data points, only noting the stock’s rise.
- Verdict: Irrelevant to the core thesis, lacking specific financial data or analysis.
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Arista Q1 2026 earnings release, May 5, 2026 · Arista Q1 2026 earnings call, May 5, 2026 · Arista press release, July 6, 2026 · Arista Q1 2026 earnings release and call, May 5, 2026