Amentum Holdings, Inc. (AMTM): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $20.00, Amentum Holdings, Inc. (AMTM) is priced for -1.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AMTM

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAMTM
CompanyAmentum Holdings, Inc.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$20.00/sh
CompositionCost-plus-fee 62% / Fixed-price 24% / Time-and-materials 13%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.5%
Operating margin today4.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-1.7pp
Implied growth-1.3%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 5: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)33

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset3.40x5expensive
Earnings2.55x4expensive
Relative1.33x2expensive
Growth0.51x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 6.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=14)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$103.430.19xyesFCF base $0.5B, growth 17% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 6.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$39.340.51xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 11.1x / 13.1x / 15.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.3x / 20.0x / 23.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 14x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$9.022.22xyesBV/sh $19.20, ROE (TTM) 4.3%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$5.893.40xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$21.040.95xyesRev $14.1B, growth 17% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.3x / 0.3x / 0.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$9.962.01xyesEPS $0.83, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=11.98 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$0.012000.00xyesNormalized EBIT (latest-period EBIT; under 3y history) $0.17B × (1−30%) / WACC 6.7% → EPV (no growth) (excluded from median)
Residual IncomeAsset$5.063.95xyesBV $19.20 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 4.3% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$18.941.06xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.83 × BVPS $19.20) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.63B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$6.972.87xyesFCF $474.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$5.693.51xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.45B (FCF $0.47B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$26.780.75xyesEPS $0.83 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.264.69xyesBV $19.20 × (ROIC 1.5% / WACC 6.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $14.13B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$31.130.64xyesEPS $0.83 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$8.972.23xyesEPS $0.83 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Digital Solutionsoperatingenterprise$5.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Global Engineering Solutionsoperatingenterprise$8.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$3.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)8.04x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.65x
Share count CAGR (dilution)49.0%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The accounting and the bank account are telling two different stories here, and only one of them is real. Free cash flow ran to roughly three times reported net income last year, and the difference is almost entirely non-cash amortization of intangibles created when the two predecessor businesses were combined. In dollars that was $439 million against $148 million of reported earnings, which for a company carrying real borrowings makes the first number the one worth reasoning from. Methods that read this business through per-share earnings or book returns are, in effect, reading the merger paperwork rather than the operations.

The second thing the earnings line hides is how much of this work is already sold. As of October 3, 2025, the Company had total backlog of $47.1 billion, compared with $45.0 billion as of September 27, 2024, and the filing puts the year-on-year increase at $2.1 billion on new awards net of revenue recognized. A backlog several times annual revenue is not a promise, since government work can be descoped, but it is a very different starting position from a company that has to resell itself every quarter.

The contract mix explains the margin that looks alarming at first glance. Cost-plus-fee work makes up 62% of revenue, with fixed-price at 24% and time-and-materials at 13%. On a cost-plus contract the customer reimburses allowable cost and pays a fee on top, so the reported revenue line is swollen by pass-through spending the company never had a claim on. A 3.6% operating margin computed against that denominator is arithmetic rather than a verdict. It is also the reason the revenue is unusually defensive: on cost-plus work, inflation is largely the customer's problem, not the contractor's.

Management has been using the cash on the least glamorous option available, which is usually the honest signal. Alongside the scheduled quarterly amortization of $9 million on the term loan, the company made voluntary principal payments of approximately $191 million, $250 million and $281 million during 2025. Roughly three quarters of a billion dollars of optional debt reduction in a single year, from a company whose stock the market treats as a growth story, is management telling you where they think the risk actually sits.

The bear is right that leverage is heavy and that returns on the capital deployed have been thin so far. The reply is that both facts are functions of the same event, the combination, and both improve mechanically as the acquired intangibles amortize away and the term loan shrinks. Nothing in this thesis requires the government to spend more money. It requires the company to keep collecting fees on work it has already won and to keep sending the proceeds to lenders.

Bear Case

Amentum did not grow into its current shape. It was assembled, in one transaction, and the terms of that assembly are still the dominant fact about the equity. The share count has risen about 55.7% a year since the end of 2023, which is not ordinary dilution but the stock issued to build the company, and the same transaction brought a secured credit facility and a bond alongside it. Existing holders of the predecessor businesses paid for scale with ownership. What they received in return has to be judged on what the combined entity earns, not on how large it is.

The borrowing side of that construction is expensive and long-dated. In August 2024, the Company also completed an offering of $1,000 million in aggregate principal amount of 7.250% senior notes due August 1, 2032, sitting alongside a term facility that runs to 2031 and is secured by substantially all of our assets. A coupon in the sevens on a government-services contractor is not a distressed rate, but it is a real hurdle: every dollar of operating profit has to clear it before anything reaches shareholders, and it does so for another six years.

Then look at what all of that capital currently earns. Revenue of $14.2 billion produced $502 million of operating profit and $148 million of reported net income. That is a 3.6% operating margin against a government-services peer group where LDOS, the largest peer here, runs 12.0% and CACI runs 9.3%. Contract mix explains part of the gap, since a cost-plus book inflates the revenue denominator, but those peers carry cost-plus books too. The remainder is either integration cost that will fade or a structurally lower-quality contract portfolio, and from outside the two look identical for now.

The price requires the gap to close, and quickly. At $22.55 the market pays about 18 times company-wide operating income, which needs operating profit to compound at roughly 7.1% a year over about five years. Set that beside management's own full-year revenue guidance of $13.95 billion to $14.30 billion, which brackets where the business already is. If revenue is roughly flat and operating profit must compound at that pace, then every bit of the required growth has to come out of margin. That is the whole bet, stated plainly, and it depends on execution rather than on demand.

The concession is genuine: management is paying down debt aggressively rather than buying back stock or chasing acquisitions, and that is the correct priority at this leverage. It has not yet changed the arithmetic. Net debt of $3.5 billion is still 6.97 times operating income, and liquid assets total $428 million against that. A contractor with three years of backlog and a modest margin can service borrowings like these comfortably in normal conditions. What it cannot do is absorb a bad program, a descoped contract and a soft budget year at the same time without the equity taking the entire adjustment.

Valuation

Contract type, not end market, is the right descriptor for this business, and it shapes everything the valuation has to say. Cost-plus-fee work is 62% of revenue, fixed-price 24%, time-and-materials 13%. At $22.55 the market pays about 18 times company-wide operating income, which requires that operating profit compound at roughly 7.1% a year over about five years. Since the revenue base is not being guided upward, the required compounding has to come from the fee side rather than the volume side.

The methods land in two clearly separated groups, and the separation is an accounting artefact rather than a disagreement about the business. The cash-flow methods and the peer-multiple methods reach the price or sit close under it. The methods anchored on the balance sheet and on current earning power land far below, several times below in places. The reason is that the combination loaded the balance sheet with acquired intangibles and loaded the income statement with the amortization of them, so book equity looks large while accounting earnings look small. Any method that divides one by the other produces a return that describes purchase accounting rather than operations.

The reported inputs make the point concrete. Revenue of $14.2 billion produced $502 million of operating profit, a 3.6% operating margin, and reported net income of $148 million. The same period generated $439 million after capital spending, several times that earnings figure, which is the gap amortization creates. Book value per share is $18.81 against reported earnings of $0.60 a share, a spread that says the same thing from the other direction.

Cohort position is where the report has to be careful, because the peer group is not homogeneous. Among the services peers, LDOS runs a 12.0% operating margin and CACI runs 9.3%, both well ahead of this company. Among the engineering peers, the picture is closer: KBR, a peer with comparable end markets, runs 10.0%, while J runs 4.5% and FLR is negative at the operating line. Amentum sits at the bottom of the first group and in the middle of the second, which is a reasonable description of a company that does both kinds of work and has not yet demonstrated which one it will be judged as.

The balance sheet is the constraint that bounds all of it. Net debt of $3.5 billion is 6.97 times operating income, liquid assets total $428 million, and the borrowings run out to 2031 and 2032 rather than coming due soon. Management has been retiring the term loan voluntarily, with payments of approximately $191 million, $250 million and $281 million during 2025 on top of the required $9 million a quarter. That trajectory, sustained, does more for the equity at this leverage than any plausible revenue surprise would.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is the fiscal third quarter, covering the period ended July 3, 2026, with results and a call on August 11, 2026. Two quarters into the fiscal year the company has reaffirmed full-year revenue guidance of $13.95 billion to $14.30 billion at each print. Reaffirmation twice in a row is worth reading literally: it says the top line is behaving as expected and that the year will be decided somewhere below it.

That makes margin and cash conversion the lines to watch in August rather than the revenue headline. Because so much of the revenue arrives on cost-plus terms, the fee rate and the mix between contract types move the profit line far more than volume does, and the amortization drag from the combination unwinds on a schedule rather than in response to anything management does. Both effects show up in the same quarter's operating profit, which is why a print can look flat on revenue and still change the picture materially.

The debt reduction programme is the other thing to track, and it is unusually observable. The company made voluntary term loan principal payments of approximately $191 million, $250 million and $281 million during 2025, on top of the required quarterly amortization. Whether that pace continues through fiscal 2026 is a direct read on how much cash the business is actually generating, since voluntary paydowns are the one use of capital that cannot be funded with an accounting entry.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Digital Solutions (reported)

Global Engineering Solutions (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Amentum fiscal 2026 guidance, reaffirmed Q2 FY2026 · Amentum press release, July 14, 2026 · Amentum Q1 and Q2 fiscal 2026 results releases

View the full interactive AMTM report on boothcheck