Amrize Ltd (AMRZ): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $43.82, Amrize Ltd (AMRZ) is priced for +20.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AMRZ

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAMRZ
CompanyAmrize Ltd
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$43.82/sh
CompositionCement (Building Materials) 37% / Aggregates and other construction materials (Building Materials) 39% / Interproduct revenues (Building Materials) -5% / Building Envelope 28%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)14.9%
Operating margin today15.5%
Margin compression (value-band)-0.6pp
Implied growth20.6%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 11% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 79 peers)39

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.57x5expensive
Earnings5.59x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.15x4expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$56.350.78xyesFCF base $1.3B, growth 5% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.7%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$44.820.98xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.6x / 9.6x / 11.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 15.1x / 18.0x / 20.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$30.011.46xyesStage 1: -3% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$26.391.66xyesBV/sh $23.54, ROE (TTM) 10.4%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$27.891.57xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$33.131.32xyesRev $12.6B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$3.9411.12xyesNormalized EBIT (latest-period EBIT; under 3y history) $0.71B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.7% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$28.171.56xyesBV $23.54 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 10.4% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 6.7%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$35.651.23xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.40 × BVPS $23.54) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $3.02B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$16.522.65xyesFCF $1314.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$5.148.53xyesEPS $2.40 × (8.5 + 2×-3.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$9.554.59xyesBV $23.54 × (ROIC 3.1% / WACC 7.7%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $12.57B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$25.951.69xyesEPS $2.40 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Building Materialsoperatingenterprise8.5B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value
Building Envelopeoperatingenterprise3.3B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$5.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.83x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.03x
Interest coverage6.3x
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Cement and crushed stone are among the few products whose economics are decided by geography rather than by brand. A ton of aggregate is worth very little at the quarry gate and rather less than the cost of trucking it a hundred miles, so in practice every quarry owns a circle drawn around itself. That is why the competitor list is short at the top. Amrize names it plainly: Our principal competitors in the United States are Cemex, Buzzi-Unicem, Heidelberg Materials and CRH, as well as numerous local and regional players. The barrier is not technology and it is not capital. It is permitted reserves near where people are actually building, and nobody is issuing many new permits.

What the separation from Holcim produced is unusual for the sector: one company spanning the heavy end and the finished end of the same building. The larger part sells cement, aggregates and ready-mix into construction sites. The other part is a building-products business in its own right, since Our Building Envelope segment offers advanced roofing and wall systems, including single-ply membranes, insulation, shingles, sheathing, waterproofing and protective coatings, along with adhesives, tapes and sealants. Roofing does not behave like cement. Most of it is replacement work on buildings that already exist, which arrives whether or not anyone breaks ground on a new one.

The return data is where this gets interesting, because it is not yet flattering. Amrize earns a 12.1% operating margin. Two peers show what the same kind of assets can do. MLM runs a 22.1% operating margin. VMC, another aggregates-led peer, runs 20.6%. That gap is not proof the rock is worse. It is a mix-and-cost story: a heavier weighting to cement, which is more capital-hungry and more energy-exposed than aggregates, plus a cost base built for a division of a European parent rather than for a standalone North American operator. The first quarter as an independent company pushed in the right direction, with Building Materials revenue up 12.9% and margin expansion behind it.

Capital allocation began in the same quarter and began conventionally. The board declared a first quarterly dividend of $0.11 a share and authorized a $1.0 billion repurchase program. Against $27.2 billion of market value that authorization is not a gesture. It represents most of a year's free cash flow being pointed at the share count rather than at another acquisition, which for a serial acquirer's former subsidiary is a meaningful change of habit.

The bear objection is that none of this has been demonstrated by this management team in this configuration, and that objection is fair. What has been demonstrated is the asset base underneath it. Quarries and cement plants were assembled over decades, and they cannot be reproduced by anyone simply willing to spend money, because the binding constraint is permits and proximity rather than capital.

Bear Case

The most useful sentence in Amrize's first annual report as a public company is a disclaimer: We have limited operating history as a standalone company. A few quarters of independent results is not a track record. It is a sample. The price being paid for that sample assumes it is representative of the better part of the next decade.

At $49.25 the market pays about 25 times company-wide operating income. Growth alone cannot bridge a gap that size, because the growth rate in the arithmetic is already pinned at the fastest pace the business could fund out of its own cash generation. So the demand becomes persistence instead: that pace held for roughly eight and a half years. Of comparable fast-growing companies that faced the same test, only about 19% sustained it that long. This is not a rate problem. It is a stamina problem.

The methods used to value the business disagree more than usual, and the split is informative. Peer multiples and the growth-based cash-flow methods reach the price. The methods anchored on book value and on current earning power land at roughly a third of it. One figure explains the divide: return on equity of 5.9% against a cost of equity above nine. A business earning less on its book than shareholders require will always look expensive through an asset lens, and the bull case has to argue that the figure is temporarily depressed rather than structural.

Two disclosures complicate the temporarily-depressed story. The first is that this industry is cyclical by construction, which the company states without hedging: A majority of our revenues is from customers who are in industries and businesses that are cyclical in nature and subject to changes in general economic conditions. The second is that the roofing business, which is supposed to be the half that does not follow the construction cycle, went backwards last year. Building Envelope Segment Adjusted EBITDA decreased $38 million in 2025 , or 4.9% , compared to 2024, and the filing attributes the decline to lower volumes and pricing. Something close to a quarter of the company shrank while the price assumed a decade of compounding.

Leverage is moderate rather than dangerous, and that is the honest concession. Net debt of $5.38 billion is 3.97 times operating income, and interest is covered 6.3 times over. That balance sheet survives an ordinary downturn without drama. What it does not do is protect the multiple. If the runway shortens from eight-and-a-half years to four, the borrowings remain perfectly serviceable and the equity still reprices, because at 25 times operating income the overwhelming majority of the value sits in the years furthest out, and those are the years a shortened runway removes first.

Valuation

What $49.25 buys here is time rather than growth. The price works out to about 25 times company-wide operating income, and at that level the arithmetic stops resolving by asking for a faster growth rate, because the rate is already set at the ceiling the business could fund from its own operations. What it asks for instead is persistence. Comparable fast-growers have held that kind of pace for roughly eight and a half years only about 19% of the time.

The ways this business gets valued split into two camps, and the split is the information. Peer multiples land within about a quarter of the price. The growth-based cash-flow methods land within a few percent of it, but only by holding today's exit multiple flat all the way out, which is an assumption rather than a finding. The methods anchored on book value and on current earning power land at roughly a third of it. So the price is defensible on the forward frames and indefensible on the backward ones, which is the ordinary signature of a business the market believes sits near the bottom of its earnings cycle rather than the top.

The reported inputs are straightforward. Revenue of $11.15 billion, operating income of $1.36 billion, and a 12.1% operating margin. The mix behind that runs roughly three parts heavy materials to one part envelope: The proportion of revenues related to the Building Materials segment and Building Envelope segment was 72.1% and 27.9% , respectively, in 2025 , compared to 71.2% and 28.8% , respectively, in 2024. Cost of revenues rose only 1.7% on the year, so whatever pressure 2025 carried came from volumes and pricing rather than from input costs.

Against its cohort the picture is mixed in a way that is worth reading carefully. On the heavy-materials side the peer comparison is unflattering: CRH, the closest competitor by scale, earned a 14.1% operating margin last year. On the envelope side it runs the other way. OC, the largest peer in that group, ran a 0.7% operating margin, while AWI, a much smaller specialist peer, earned 25.9%. Amrize sits in the middle of a cohort whose two ends are very far apart, which is exactly what happens when one company owns a quarry business and a roofing business at the same time.

Solvency is the least interesting part of this story, and saying so is itself informative. Net debt of $5.38 billion is 3.97 times operating income, interest is covered 6.3 times over, and the business is not consuming cash. There is no refinancing cliff shaping the analysis and no dilution to clear, so the entire question rests on whether the operating line can climb toward what the price already assumes. The first independent quarter moved that way, with Building Materials revenue up 12.9%. One quarter is one quarter.

Catalysts

Second quarter results arrive after the U.S. market closes on August 6, 2026, with the call the following morning. The first quarter set the reference point: revenue grew 4.7% to $2.2 billion, and Building Materials carried it with revenue up 12.9% and margin expansion behind that.

Management reaffirmed full-year 2026 guidance at that print, calling for revenue growth of 4% to 6% and adjusted EBITDA growth of 8% to 11%, with the PB Materials acquisition named as a driver of the earnings half. The distinction between the two ranges is the part that matters. Guidance that puts earnings growth meaningfully ahead of revenue growth is guidance for margin repair, and margin repair is the specific thing the current price needs to see happen year after year.

Capital return started in the same quarter, which for a company this new is its own signal. The board declared a first quarterly dividend of $0.11 a share and authorized a $1.0 billion share repurchase program. Whether that authorization converts into an actual falling share count is worth tracking, because a buyback announcement and a buyback are different events, and only one of them shows up in per-share results.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Building Materials (reported)

Building Envelope (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Amrize press releases, 2026 · Amrize Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · Amrize press release announcing Q2 2026 results date, 2026

View the full interactive AMRZ report on boothcheck