AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (AMRX): what the price requires
At today's price, AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (AMRX) is priced for +7.9% growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AMRX
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | AMRX |
| Company | AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. |
| Current price | $17.21/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin needed | 3.3% |
| Operating margin today | 14.5% |
| Margin compression implied | -11.2pp |
| Implied growth | 7.9% |
| Multiple paid | 19x operating income |
The operating-margin requirement is derived from the framework's value band at year 11, a separately labeled basis from the headline growth/duration solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~6.9pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | +0.35σ |
| cohort percentile (of 113 peers) | 36 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | — | 0 | — |
| Earnings | 1.44x | 1 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.27x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=3)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $15.02 | 1.15x | no | FCF base $0.3B, growth 8% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $18.05 | 0.95x | no | Exit EV/EBITDA: 16.5x / 18.5x / 20.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $13.11 | 1.31x | yes | P/E 30.71x (blended: static sector reference 24x + trailing (TTM) 46x), scenarios: 25.7x / 30.7x / 35.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $14.17 | 1.21x | no | Rev $3.0B, growth 8% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $4.44 | 3.88x | no | EPS $0.37, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=23.18 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $0.73 | 23.58x | no | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.21B × (1−3%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $13.95 | 1.23x | yes | EBITDA $0.44B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.68 | 25.31x | yes | FCF $240.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median) |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $0.01 | 1721.00x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.21B (FCF $0.24B − SBC $0.03B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $11.94 | 1.44x | yes | EPS $0.37 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $37.04 | 0.46x | no | Revenue $3.05B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $13.88 | 1.24x | no | EPS $0.37 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $4.00 | 4.30x | no | EPS $0.37 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $2.4b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 5.76x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.60x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 2.3% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Amneal is shifting from a low-margin generics maker into a higher-value specialty and biosimilars company, and the single number that captures the transition is the specialty segment growing 23%, led by newer branded products in women's health, ADHD, and Parkinson's.
- The defining risk is leverage: net debt sits near $2.4 billion, roughly 5.5 times operating income, the legacy of building the business with borrowed money, and deleveraging only works if adjusted EBITDA keeps climbing.
- What to watch is the biosimilar ramp the bull case leans on, with management targeting $1.0 to $1.3 billion of biosimilar revenue by 2030 and multiple annual launches, against full-year 2026 revenue guidance of $3.05 to $3.15 billion.
Bull Case
The single most decisive metric in this story is the specialty segment's growth, because it is the evidence that Amneal is climbing out of the commodity end of pharma. Specialty grew 23% in the most recent quarter, driven by newer branded products in women's health, ADHD, and Parkinson's disease, with strong uptake of CREXONT and rapid adoption of Brekiya for cluster headaches. That matters because generics is a brutal business: the filing describes competitors who "offer substitutes for branded pharmaceutical products at significantly lower prices" and rivals with "significantly greater financial, R&D, marketing, and other resources than we do." A growing specialty franchise with branded, harder-to-substitute products is how a generics maker escapes that race to the bottom, and the 23% print says the escape is underway.
The overall results show the model converting to profit, not just revenue. The most recent quarter delivered net revenue of $723 million, up 4%, with adjusted EBITDA up 19% and margin expansion, alongside GAAP net income of $62 million. Adjusted EBITDA growing nearly five times faster than revenue is exactly the signature of a mix shift toward higher-margin specialty products, and it is what makes the deleveraging story credible: every incremental EBITDA dollar both improves the margin and chips away at the debt ratio.
The biosimilars pipeline is the multi-year growth vector layered on top. Management has framed biosimilars as a future growth driver projected to contribute $1.0 to $1.3 billion to 2030 revenue, supported by a plan for multiple annual launches. Biosimilars are a structurally attractive adjacency for a company that already knows how to manufacture complex generics at scale: they face fewer competitors than small-molecule generics, carry better economics, and address a growing slice of drug spending as more biologics lose exclusivity. For a company the market is only asking to grow mid-single-digits, a credible billion-dollar biosimilar ramp is upside the price does not fully demand.
Bear Case
Begin with the qualitative reality before the ratio: Amneal built its transformation on borrowed money, and the debt is now the gravity the equity story has to overcome. The company carries net debt near $2.4 billion against trailing operating income of about $435 million, roughly 5.5 times, and the filing's debt schedule shows the structure plainly, including a "Term Loan Due 2028" of more than $2.3 billion that anchors the obligations, with a repricing amendment to the 2032 term loan executed in early 2026. A leveraged specialty pharma is a fine thing while EBITDA is rising; it becomes a problem the moment growth stalls, because the debt does not flex and the interest does not wait. The deleveraging thesis is real, but it is a thesis, not a fact, and it depends on the specialty and biosimilar ramps continuing without interruption.
The price-to-fundamentals picture is consistent with that tension rather than wildly out of line, which is what makes the bear case structural rather than a valuation scream. At about 18 times operating income, the price embeds roughly 6.5% annual operating growth, within what the company has recently delivered. The earnings-power and peer-multiple lenses both read the price as modestly above what the current business supports. So the bear is not that Amneal is grossly overvalued; it is that the price already credits a smooth continuation of the mix shift, leaving little cushion if the specialty launches mature, if a key product faces unexpected competition, or if the biosimilar launches slip.
The competitive backdrop is the variable that can break the growth assumption. Generics remains the larger part of the business, and the filing is candid that competitors may "develop products and/or processes competitive with, or superior to, ours," while Amneal may not always "successfully develop or introduce new products, on a timely basis or at all." Specialty and biosimilars are harder to commoditize, but they are also harder and more expensive to develop, and they attract better-resourced rivals. The bear thesis is that a debt-laden company executing a difficult, multi-year transition, against larger competitors and with limited margin for error, is priced for the transition to go right at every step.
Valuation
At the current price the market pays about 18 times company-wide operating income, which inverts to roughly 6.5% operating growth a year for five years. Against Amneal's own recent record that pace is within reach; the demand is in its persistence through a transition from generics toward specialty and biosimilars, not in an unusually high rate. The price is asking the mix shift to keep working, which is a reasonable bet given the recent prints, but it is a bet on execution continuing rather than on a low hurdle.
The methods we use to triangulate are thin here, and what they show points the same way. The earnings-power lens reads the price modestly above what current operating earnings support, and the peer-multiple lens, comparing Amneal to other drug manufacturers, reaches a similar conclusion. There is no deep asset floor and no growth-method windfall in the picture; the price is justified chiefly on where comparable companies trade. That makes this a relative-value name whose support rests on the peer multiple holding and the EBITDA trajectory continuing, rather than on an asset or earnings cushion beneath the current level.
Solvency is the load-bearing constraint and belongs in the close. Net debt near $2.4 billion, about 5.5 times operating income, is the number that governs the equity, because at that leverage the path of EBITDA decides everything: rising EBITDA deleverages the company and lifts the equity, while a stall does the reverse with force. The share count has crept up around 2% a year, a mild dilution rather than aggressive issuance, so the capital structure is being managed through earnings growth rather than equity raises. The decisive fact is not the modest growth the price requires; it is that a 5.5-times-levered company has to keep its specialty and biosimilar engines running to make the debt shrink instead of bite, and the valuation already assumes it will.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 print was a clean beat that supported the raised outlook. Amneal reported net revenue of $723 million with GAAP net income of $62 million and diluted EPS of $0.19, while adjusted EBITDA rose 19% to $202 million, with revenue up 4%, margin expansion, and specialty-product momentum. For discipline, the $0.27 adjusted EPS the company highlights is a non-GAAP measure; the GAAP figures are the ones this report is built on. Management affirmed full-year 2026 guidance of $3.05 to $3.15 billion in net revenue, $740 to $770 million in adjusted EBITDA, and $350 to $400 million in operating cash flow.
The forward catalysts are the biosimilar launches and the deleveraging they fund. Management detailed multi-year targets with biosimilars projected to contribute $1.0 to $1.3 billion to 2030 revenue and plans for multiple annual launches, the growth vector the price increasingly leans on. On the sell side, UBS initiated coverage with a Buy and a $19 target, while others sit closer to $16 to $17, a spread that reflects differing confidence in how fast biosimilars and specialty scale. The watch list is the cadence of biosimilar approvals and launches, continued specialty growth from CREXONT and Brekiya, and the leverage ratio falling as adjusted EBITDA climbs.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
F-67 (reported)
- TEVA (TEVA PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES LIMITED)
- FY2025 10-K: …in violation of such laws, whether carried out in the United States or elsewhere in connection with the conduct of our business have exposed us, and may further expose us, to significant liability for violations of the FCPA or other anti-corruption laws. In 2016, we paid a monetary fine for FCPA violations and…
- FY2025 10-K: …of the product in the U.S. On January 13, 2025, we announced we entered into a collaboration agreement with Formycon for the commercialization of FYB203, Formycon's biosimilar candidate to Eylea ® (aflibercept) in Europe (excluding Italy), the United Kingdom, Switzerland and in Israel, for the treatment of…
- VTRS (Viatris Inc)
- FY2025 10-K: …extension study for EFFEXOR® required for approval in Japan. The Company also filed applications to the Japan Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for approval of EFFEXOR SR Capsules (venlafaxine hydrochloride), a serotonin-noradrenaline reuptake inhibitor to treat adults with generalized anxiety disorder, an…
- FY2025 10-K: Information Statement included as Exhibit 99.1 to the Report on Form 8-K filed by Upjohn Inc. with the SEC on August 6, 2020, and incorporated herein by reference . ^ 2.2(a) Separation and Distribution Agreement, dated as of July 29, 2019, by and between Pfizer Inc. and Upjohn Inc., filed as Exhibit 2.2 to the Report…
- OGN (Organon & Co.)
- FY2025 10-K: …things, (i) extended the maturity of the U.S. Dollar Term Loan Facility to May 17, 2031, (ii) extended the maturity of the revolving credit loans made under the Revolving Credit Facility to December 2, 2027, (iii) increased the maximum amount of the Revolving Credit Facility by $ 300 million and decreased the…
- FY2025 10-K: …prostate and Propecia ® (finasteride), used for the treatment of male pattern hair loss. Research and Development As part of our growth strategy, we will opportunistically identify scientific collaborations and acquisitions to complement our women's health portfolio and/or expand our general medicines portfolio with…
- BHC (Bausch Health Companies Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …our products as the result of the concentration of sales to wholesalers; • the effect of fluctuations in inventory levels or buying patterns by our large distributor and retail customers; • the decline in pricing and/or volume of our products under our distribution agreements with other companies; • risks associated…
- FY2025 10-K: …bhc:BauschLombMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2024-12-31 0000885590 bhc:IncrementalTermLoanBDueMay2027Member bhc:BauschLombMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2025-12-31 0000885590 bhc:IncrementalTermLoanBDueMay2027Member bhc:BauschLombMember us-gaap:SecuredDebtMember 2024-12-31 0000885590…
- PRGO (Perrigo Company plc)
- FY2025 10-K: …to the end of the period for which net sales are being measured. Notable new product launches in the year ended December 31, 2025 include Phenylephrine No Drip Nasal Spray, IBU/APAP Dual Active and the Trios TM program launch in CSCA and CSCI line extensions in the Bronchostop ® 5 in1 products, flavor roll outs in…
- FY2025 10-K: …D. Ashford Chairman of the Board Orlando D. Ashford /s/ Bradley A. Alford Director Bradley A. Alford /s/ Julia Brown Director Julia Brown /s/ Kevin Egan Director Kevin Egan /s/ Adriana Karaboutis Director Adriana Karaboutis /s/ Jeffrey B. Kindler Director Jeffrey B. Kindler /s/ Albert A. Manzone Director Albert A.…
- INDV (Indivior Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …0001625297 2025 FY FALSE one one .6667 http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#CostOfGoodsAndServicesSold http://fasb.org/us-gaap/2025#ResearchAndDevelopmentExpenseExcludingAcquiredInProcessCost iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares xbrli:pure indv:productLine indv:segment indv:plan indv:claim indv:state…
- FY2025 10-K: …ceased all detailing of the product in that year, though it remains available for sale. Launch of SUBLOCADE in the U.S. The FDA approved SUBLOCADE (buprenorphine extended-release injection for subcutaneous use ) in November 2017 and we launched sales of this product in 2018. As the first monthly buprenorphine-based…
- CPRX (CATALYST PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …that affects more than 50 million individuals globally, 80% of whom live in developing countries. An estimated 1.7% of U.S. adults have been diagnosed with the condition. From prominent historical figures to friends or family members, most people probably know someone affected by epilepsy. The FDA approved FYCOMPA®…
- FY2025 10-K: …agreement with KYE for this product, we will supply product to KYE and also receive sales milestones and sales royalties based on net revenues from sales of the product in Canada. FYCOMPA® On December 17, 2022, we entered into an agreement with Eisai Co., Ltd. (Eisai) for the acquisition of the U.S. rights to…
- PBH (PRESTIGE CONSUMER HEALTHCARE INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …0001295947 2025 FY FALSE Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss) and Comprehensive Income (Loss) Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss) and Comprehensive Income (Loss) Consolidated Statements of Income (Loss) and Comprehensive Income (Loss) iso4217:USD xbrli:shares iso4217:USD xbrli:shares xbrli:pure pbh:segment…
- FY2025 10-K: …The 67 RSUs provide for accelerated vesting if there is a change of control, as defined in the 2005 Plan and the 2020 Plan. The RSUs granted to employees generally vest either ratably over three years or in their entirety on the three-year anniversary of the date of the grant. Upon vesting, the units will be settled…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Amneal Q1 2026 results, May 2026 · Amneal 10-K and subsequent events · analyst notes, 2026