AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (AMRX): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $17.44, AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (AMRX) is priced for +6.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AMRX

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAMRX
CompanyAMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$17.44/sh
CompositionAffordable Medicines - Oral solid 24% / Affordable Medicines - Auto-injector 8% / Affordable Medicines - Transdermal 6% / Affordable Medicines - Injectable 5% / Affordable Medicines - Biosimilar 3% / Affordable Medicines - Oral liquid 2% / Affordable Medicines - Other dosage forms 8% / Affordable Medicines - International 0% / Specialty - Central nervous system 11% / Specialty - Hormonal / allergy 5% / Specialty - Other therapeutic classes 1% / Specialty - License agreement 0% / AvKARE - Distribution 14% / AvKARE - Government 9% / AvKARE - Institutional 1% / AvKARE - Other 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.1%
Operating margin today14.6%
Margin compression (value-band)-11.5pp
Implied growth6.3%
Multiple paid18x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.33σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)32

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by earnings-power and relative-multiple value, while asset-based lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.57x4expensive
Earnings1.13x1expensive
Relative1.20x2expensive
Growth0

Families that justify the price: Earnings, Relative Families that call it expensive: Asset

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=7)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$5.263.32xnoFCF base $0.1B, growth 9% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$17.521.00xnoExit EV/EBITDA: 15.7x / 17.7x / 19.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$14.021.24xyesP/E 24x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 19.9x / 24.0x / 28.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 16x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$5.333.27xyesBV/sh $0.10, ROE (TTM) 476.5%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$348.800.05xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$15.031.16xnoRev $3.1B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.5x / 1.8x / 2.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$5.763.03xnoEPS $0.48, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=17.70 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$1.0916.00xnoNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.22B × (1−2%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$9.291.88xyesBV $0.10 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 476.5% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$1.0616.45xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.48 × BVPS $0.10) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$15.071.16xyesEBITDA $0.45B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.011744.00xyesFCF $127.8M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.011744.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.09B (FCF $0.13B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$15.491.13xyesEPS $0.48 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.07249.14xyesBV $0.10 × (ROIC 5.1% / WACC 7.9%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$39.050.45xnoRevenue $3.12B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$18.000.97xnoEPS $0.48 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$5.193.36xnoEPS $0.48 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
F-67operatingenterprise1.7B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.4b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)5.49x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)5.38x
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.1%
Burning cashno

Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Mature is the stage label, and it should change what a reader counts as success. A mature drug business is not supposed to reinvent itself. It is supposed to replace revenue that decays with revenue that does not, faster than the decay arrives. Judged on that test, 2025 was a workmanlike year. Specialty revenue rose $82.8 million, and the company attributes the move to two named products: increases of $58.1 million and $23.7 million of CREXONT ® and UNITHROID ® , respectively. AvKARE added $81.8 million on top of that. Neither line is dramatic. Both are exactly the kind of increment that keeps a mature business from shrinking.

The durability argument sits in the generics arm, and it rests on manufacturing difficulty rather than scale. Amneal states the strategy plainly: it develops products that have substantial barriers-to-entry due to complex drug formulations or manufacturing. The pipeline reflects that choice, since the segment closed the year with 61 products with a pending ANDA and another 43 products in various stages of development in our pipeline, 95% of which are non-oral solid products. Injectables, transdermal patches, inhalation products and biosimilars are all harder to copy than a tablet. The practical consequence is fewer competitors per approval, and fewer competitors is what slows the price decay that defines commodity generics.

CREXONT is the cleanest example of a revenue stream that compounds rather than erodes. Insurance coverage, not prescribing enthusiasm, is the gate on a Parkinson's therapy, because a patient cannot fill what the plan will not pay for. The 10-K records that gate opening: CREXONT ® was added to three large national formularies, which expanded total U.S. insurance coverage from about 30% of covered lives at the end of 2024 to over 50% at the end of 2025. Roughly doubling the covered population inside a single year does not show up fully in that year's revenue. It shows up in the years after it.

Two more optional lines sit behind that. The FDA approved both biologics license applications for Boncresa ® , a biosimilar referencing Prolia ® , and Oziltus ® , a biosimilar referencing XGEVA ®, adding bone-health products to an oncology biosimilar book the company began commercializing in 2022, and recent respiratory approvals are meant to further strengthen our entry into complex inhaled and respiratory drug delivery. At a $5.9 billion market capitalization, neither needs to become large to matter.

What makes any of this bankable is that the operating business converts. Trailing revenue of $3.05 billion produced $424 million of operating income, a 14.5% operating margin. Set that beside the cohort: VTRS runs a 1.0% operating margin, PRGO is loss-making at the operating line, and TEVA is modestly ahead of Amneal. Free cash flow, the money left over once the plants and the equipment have been paid for, came to $240.8 million. Amneal is not the most profitable generics operator in its peer set, but it is nearer the top of that set than the bottom, and it is producing cash while carrying real debt. The bear is right that the leverage is heavy. The bull answer is that heavy leverage against a stable, cash-generating book is a very different proposition than heavy leverage against a shrinking one, and the 2025 revenue line grew.

Bear Case

Two future revenue streams are doing the heavy lifting in today's price, and they are not equally sturdy. The first is Specialty, where CREXONT's coverage expansion is real, observable and already disclosed. The second is the generics book simply holding its ground while Specialty compounds. The second assumption is the fragile one, and it covers the larger half of the company.

Start with what the price requires. At $17.93 the market is paying about 19 times company-wide operating income, which needs operating profit to compound at roughly 9.2% a year over about five years. The rate on its own is not exotic, and Amneal has delivered comparable growth recently. The persistence is the demand. Five consecutive years of high single-digit operating-profit growth from a business whose largest segment sells generics assumes that serious price erosion stays away for the whole window.

The filing does not describe that as a remote scenario. Amneal's own risk section says that when new entrants arrive, in some instances, price declines have exceeded 90%, and that competition has resulted in a significant decline in our revenue and gross margin from time to time. Concentration sharpens the point: our significant product families (defined as our top five products by annual revenue including both our Affordable Medicines and Specialty segments) accounted for 25% of our consolidated net revenue. A quarter of the revenue base sits in five products, and each of those is one competitor away from a materially different price.

Leverage is what turns a revenue disappointment into an equity problem. Trailing operating income is $424 million against an enterprise valued near $8.1 billion, so shareholders stand behind lenders on a business where borrowed money is the larger claim. Net debt of $2.37 billion is 5.6 times operating income. Take a tenth off the operating line and the borrowings do not move; the equity absorbs the whole adjustment. The share count has been drifting the wrong way as well, up about 2.3% a year since early 2022, so per-share progress requires the operating line to outrun the count before it does anything for a holder.

None of the standard ways of valuing this company reaches the current price. The peer-multiple methods land roughly a third below it and the earnings-power methods roughly half below, so the premium is not defended by any conventional frame. It is defended by the expectation of five more good years in a row. The bull answer is that complex formulations erode more slowly than commodity tablets, which is true and is exactly why almost the whole pipeline sits outside oral solids. The bear answer is that the language about post-entry price collapse was written by this company about its own markets, and complex products arrive at the same place once the second and third filers show up.

Valuation

Start with what $17.93 has to assume. The price works out to about 19 times company-wide operating income, and running that multiple backwards gives an operating-profit growth requirement of roughly 9.2% a year over about five years. Read the two halves separately, because they carry different weight. The rate sits inside what Amneal has recently delivered. The persistence is the part being paid for.

Every family of method used to triangulate the business lands below the quoted price, which is unusual enough to state plainly. The peer-multiple lens, which prices Amneal off what the market pays for comparable earnings and EBITDA streams, sits roughly a third under today's price. The lens built on current earning power sits roughly half under. Nothing in that pattern says the price is wrong. It says the price is not supported by any of the static frames, so the support has to come entirely from the forward story.

The reported inputs underneath those readings are unremarkable and reasonably clean. Trailing revenue of $3.05 billion produced operating income of $424 million, a 14.5% operating margin. The 2025 revenue growth came from identifiable places rather than mix noise, with Specialty up $82.8 million on increases of $58.1 million and $23.7 million of CREXONT ® and UNITHROID ® , respectively and AvKARE up $81.8 million. Free cash flow, the money left over once the plants and the equipment have been paid for, came to $240.8 million.

Cohort position is where the premium becomes legible. VTRS runs a 1.0% operating margin and PRGO is loss-making at the operating line, while TEVA, the largest peer in the set, sits ahead of Amneal at a 16.2% operating margin. The generics peer group is, on the whole, either shrinking or barely profitable, which is exactly why a mid-teens operating result paired with a growing branded book gets paid a premium multiple at all. It also means the comparison set supplies very little cushion: if Amneal's own decay curve steepens, the peers are not a floor, because most of them already sit below the level Amneal is being credited for.

The balance sheet decides how much of that premium is survivable. Net debt of $2.37 billion works out to 5.6 times operating income, which is real leverage for a company whose largest segment sells into a market where competition erodes value fast. Liquid assets total $198 million, so a bad year gets absorbed by the revolver rather than by the cushion. The maturity question, at least, has been pushed out, since On February 2, 2026, the Company entered into a repricing amendment to the Term Loan Credit Agreement governing the Term Loan Due 2032 lowered the spread again on borrowings that now run to 2032. What refinancing does not change is the arithmetic underneath it, where the operating line has to keep compounding for the equity to compound, and a share count rising about 2.3% a year means it has to compound slightly faster than the headline suggests.

Catalysts

The near-term calendar is dense. Amneal reports second quarter 2026 results on July 30, 2026. The first quarter print in May set the bar: net revenue of $723 million, up 4% against the prior-year quarter, with Specialty revenue up 23%. Management reaffirmed its full-year 2026 net revenue guidance range of $3.05 billion to $3.15 billion at that print.

Two regulatory events in July give the second half its shape. On July 17, 2026 the FDA approved additional strengths and vial presentations of Amneal's iohexol injection, the imaging contrast agent, with commercial launch planned for the third quarter. Iohexol is the kind of product the complex-injectables strategy exists to serve: difficult to manufacture, sold into hospital systems, and not something a competitor replicates in a quarter.

The larger option was accepted for review nine days earlier. On July 8, 2026 the FDA accepted two abbreviated applications for a generic tirzepatide autoinjector developed with Adalvo, with Amneal leading commercialization. Acceptance is not approval, and the path for a first generic of a blockbuster metabolic drug delivered by autoinjector is measured in years and litigation rather than quarters. The capability, at least, is not hypothetical: auto-injector products already account for roughly 8% of company revenue, so the manufacturing question is settled even though the legal and regulatory ones are not.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

F-67 (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Amneal investor relations calendar, July 2026 · Amneal Q1 2026 earnings release, May 7, 2026 · Amneal press release, July 17, 2026 · Amneal press release, July 8, 2026

View the full interactive AMRX report on boothcheck