AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. (AMG): what the price requires
At today's price, AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. (AMG) is priced for +4.3% earnings growth. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AMG
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | AMG |
| Company | AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. |
| Current price | $359.03/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | fee-financial |
| Implied earnings growth | 4.3% |
| Price-to-earnings | 14.1x |
| Earnings yield | 7.1% |
Solve inputs: computed at a 11.5% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on a 5-year median GAAP earnings base; each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied earnings growth ~3.2pp.
Reconcile: at the x-ray's 9.3% required return this reads ~-3.6%/yr; the models below use their own rates.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.50σ |
| cohort percentile (of 49 peers) | 16 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.04x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.24x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 0.73x | 4 | justifies |
| Growth | 0.88x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=14)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $860.43 | 0.42x | yes | FCF base $1.1B, growth 4% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $343.08 | 1.05x | yes | P/E 12x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.1x / 12.0x / 13.9x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA N/Ax |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $296.65 | 1.21x | yes | BV/sh $144.87, ROE (TTM) 18.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $419.49 | 0.86x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $266.85 | 1.35x | yes | Rev $2.1B, growth 4% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.9x / 4.7x / 5.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $853.30 | 0.42x | yes | EPS $24.38, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.37 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $411.82 | 0.87x | yes | BV $144.87 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 18.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $281.90 | 1.27x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $24.38 × BVPS $144.87) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $322.41 | 1.11x | yes | FCF $1055.3M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $235.45 | 1.52x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.83B (FCF $1.06B − SBC $0.22B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $786.66 | 0.46x | yes | EPS $24.38 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $231.57 | 1.55x | yes | Revenue $2.12B × sector P/S 3.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $914.25 | 0.39x | yes | EPS $24.38 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $263.57 | 1.36x | yes | EPS $24.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -12.5% |
Corporate solvency inputs do not resolve from the filings for this fee business (operating income or debt concepts are untagged), so net-debt and coverage lenses are suppressed rather than rendered from artifacts. Share-count CAGR is kept.
Bullet Takeaways
- Affiliated Managers does not run money so much as own slices of firms that do: it holds structured partnership interests in independent boutiques, and its earnings track the fee economics of those Affiliates rather than any single strategy.
- The composition of those fees is the swing factor, and it cuts both ways: 2025 aggregate fees reached $6,167.5 million, up 18%, led by alternatives, while long-only equities bled roughly $9 billion of net outflows in the most recent quarter, so the mix shift toward private markets is the whole bull and the equity erosion is the whole bear.
- Watch the flow profile over the next year: management has framed equity outflows as moderating, and at about 14 times earnings with a share count that has shrunk roughly 12.5% a year, the buyback is doing visible work while the firm waits for the alternatives mix to outweigh the equities drag.
Bull Case
The recent earnings trajectory is the cleanest argument here, because it shows the business model working in the direction management has been pointing it. Aggregate fees across the Affiliates were $6,167.5 million in 2025, an increase of $931.5 million or 18% over 2024, and the 10-K is explicit that the growth came from net client cash inflows "and the addition of assets associated with new partnerships with Affiliates operating in growing areas within alternative strategies." Average assets under management reached a record level, and the most recent quarter carried record net client cash flows of $22.5 billion, concentrated in alternatives. The shape of that growth matters more than the level. Alternatives carry higher and stickier fee rates than long-only equities, so a dollar of new alternatives AUM is worth more in fee earnings than a dollar lost in equities, which is why fees can rise 18% in a year that equities are shedding assets.
The structure is the durable part. AMG owns economic participation in each Affiliate through, in its own description, a "structured partnership interest." It is a holding company that buys revenue-share or profit-share stakes in independent boutiques and lets them keep their own brand, autonomy, and incentives. That design spreads the firm across dozens of strategies and management teams, so no single Affiliate's bad year sinks the consolidated result, and it lets AMG keep adding new partnerships in the corners of the market where money is actually flowing. Most of the fee stream runs through Affiliates accounted for under the equity method, which keeps the parent capital-light: it collects fee streams without consolidating the full cost base of the underlying firms.
Capital allocation is where the bull case turns from steady to compelling. The share count has fallen at roughly 12.5% a year, which is buyback deployment showing up where it cannot be faked, and the firm has continued repurchasing stock through the equity-outflow stretch. At about 14 times earnings, every dollar spent retiring shares buys more earnings power than it would at a richer multiple, so the capital-light fee engine is being funneled into shrinking the share base while the alternatives mix compounds. The earnings-power and asset-value methods both read the price as supported rather than stretched, which means the buyback is being run against a price the fundamentals already defend.
Bear Case
The bear case lives inside one assumption baked into the price: that the fee base keeps growing at all. Today's price implies the firm compounds its fee earnings at roughly 4% a year, which is within what AMG has delivered and modest by the standards of an asset manager, but it is not zero, and the most fragile piece of the mix is the one shrinking. The most recent quarter carried about $9 billion of net outflows in long-only equities even as alternatives drew record inflows. The 4% the price embeds is a net number, and it requires the alternatives engine to keep outrunning the equities drain. If the equity bleed accelerates or alternatives demand cools, the net flow turns and the modest growth the price assumes stops being a floor.
The revenue itself is leveraged to things AMG does not control. Because so much of the fee stream runs through equity-method Affiliates, the consolidated result swings with "average assets under management and the composition of these assets across our equity method Affiliates' investment strategies with different asset-based fee ratios and performance-based fees." Market levels, relative performance, and redemptions all move AUM, and the firm has already taken impairments where "the decline in the fair value was a result of current and projected declines in assets under management that decreased the forecasted revenue associated with the assets." That is the bear in the company's own words: when AUM forecasts fall, the carrying value of the very stakes that generate the fees gets written down. A market drawdown does not just dent a quarter, it lowers the base the whole structure is valued on.
The balance sheet is the constraint that keeps the buyback honest. AMG runs about $2.5 billion of net debt, roughly 2.3 times trailing operating income, and interest expense is not separately broken out, so coverage cannot be read cleanly off the filings. That leverage is manageable while fees grow, but it is the reason the firm cannot simply buy back its way through a prolonged outflow cycle. The capital that retires shares is the same capital that services debt and seeds new Affiliate partnerships, and in a year where equities outflows overwhelm alternatives inflows, those three claims on cash start to compete.
Valuation
Start with what the price is paying for, because it is unusually undemanding for an asset manager. At about 14 times earnings, a 7.2% earnings yield, the price implies the firm grows its fee earnings around 4% a year. Measured against AMG's own record, that pace sits within what it has delivered, and against its fee-financial peers it lands in the lower half of the group on price-to-earnings. The market is not asking this business to accelerate. It is asking it to roughly hold serve.
The methods we use to triangulate agree more than they usually do, which is the signal worth naming. The asset-value lens, built off book value of $144.87 per share and a trailing return on equity near 19%, lands almost exactly at the price. The earnings-power methods, which capitalize the firm's free cash flow, read the price as if there is still room beneath it. Only the relative-multiple lens, pinning AMG to a sector P/E around 12 times, places the price somewhat above where peers trade, and that gap is the closest thing to a caution flag in the spread. Taken together, the price is supported by asset value, earnings power, and growth-discounted cash flow at once; this is a value-and-asset-supported name, not a growth bet riding on a single optimistic method.
Solvency bounds the downside and sharpens the read. AMG carries about $2.5 billion of net debt, roughly 2.3 times trailing operating income, modest enough that leverage is not the story but real enough that it caps how aggressively the firm can lean on buybacks in a bad flow year. The share count has fallen at about 12.5% a year, direct evidence that free cash is being returned rather than hoarded. The decisive fact is the mix: the price assumes 4% net fee growth, and whether the firm clears that bar comes down to alternatives inflows outrunning the long-only equity outflows the most recent quarter put at roughly $9 billion.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 print, reported May 1, is the most relevant recent event and it set records on both sides of the story. Reported diluted EPS came in at $3.84, assets under management reached a record $882 billion, and net client cash flows were a record positive $22.5 billion, led by alternative strategies. Inside that record, long-only equities still shed roughly $9 billion, which is the tension the next several quarters will resolve. Management framed the long-only equity outflows as likely to moderate over the next twelve months, which would improve the overall net flow profile if it holds.
Capital return remains the steadiest catalyst. The firm repurchased about $186 million of stock in the quarter and has targeted roughly $500 million of buybacks for 2026, alongside continued investment in new Affiliate partnerships in growing alternatives strategies. The watch item is straightforward: each subsequent flow report tells you whether alternatives demand is still outrunning the equities drain, and the buyback pace tells you how management is weighing share repurchase against seeding the next generation of Affiliates.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- APAM (Artisan Partners Asset Management Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …professionals; • industry trends towards products, strategies, vehicles or services that we do not offer; • competitive conditions in the investment management and broader financial services sectors; and • investor sentiment and confidence. 35 Table of Contents The table below sets forth changes in our total AUM: For…
- FY2025 10-K: …revenues. We invest thoughtfully to support our investment teams and future growth, while also paying out to stockholders and partners a majority of the cash that we generate from operations through dividends and distributions. We expect to continue to invest in the growth of the business, with a focus on adding new…
- TROW (PRICE T ROWE GROUP INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …clients and their assets or compel us to reduce the fees we charge to clients, thereby reducing our revenues and net income. We are subject to competition in all aspects of our business from other financial institutions. Some of these financial institutions have greater resources than we do and may offer a broader…
- FY2025 10-K: …products. As a result, investment advisors that emphasize passive products have gained and may continue to gain market share from active managers like us. While we believe there will always be demand for strong performing active management, we cannot predict how much market share these competitors will gain.…
- FHI (Federated Hermes, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …human resource management strategies to respond to competition from existing and new market innovations and competitors, which can increase expenses, create risks that such changes will not be successfully implemented, and cause Federated Hermes to not achieve its long-term strategic objectives. Such fee reductions,…
- FY2025 10-K: …uses of treasury stock; Federated Hermes' products, strategies, and other services (as applicable, offerings) and market performance, and Federated Hermes' performance indicators; investor preferences; offering demand, distribution and development and restructuring initiatives and related planning and timing; the…
- BEN (FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …jurisdiction. Our fees and expenses are routinely benchmarked against applicable industry standards. COMPETITION The financial services industry is a highly competitive global environment. Competition is based on various factors, including, among others, business reputation, investment performance, product mix and…
- FY2025 10-K: …we continue to confront the challenges of the current economic and regulatory environments, we remain focused on the investment performance of our products and on providing high quality service to our clients. We continuously perform reviews of our business model. While we remain focused on expense management, we…
- IVZ (Invesco Ltd.)
- FY2025 10-K: …margin (operating income divided by operating revenues) decreased to (10.9)% for the year ended December 31, 2025 from 13.7% in the year ended December 31, 2024 primarily as a result of the $1,794.9 million intangible asset impairment as discussed above. Adjusted operating income increased to $1,557.8 million for the…
- FY2025 10-K: …performance-vested awards are excluded from diluted EPS share calculations as the designated contingency was not met. 16. SEGMENT AND GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION The company has one operating segment, investment management. The company's CODM is the President and Chief Executive Officer as he assesses the company's…
- SEIC (SEI INVESTMENTS COMPANY)
- FY2025 10-K: …a lower price point or deliver innovative client experiences that we might find difficult to match under our existing cost, regulatory and operating framework. If we fail to compete effectively against these emerging players, we could lose market share to firms that are not as burdened by regulation or that benefit…
- FY2025 10-K: These initiatives might not generate meaningful revenue or profit for several years, if at all, and their ultimate viability is uncertain. If our strategic expansions or innovations are not executed effectively, or if they fail to resonate with target customers, we could divert management attention and capital without…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
AMG Q1 2026 earnings release, May 1, 2026 · AMG Q1 2026 earnings call, May 1, 2026