AMETEK, Inc. (AME): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $236.25, AMETEK, Inc. (AME) is priced for +24.8% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AME

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAME
CompanyAMETEK, Inc.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$236.25/sh
CompositionProcess and analytical instrumentation 47% / Aerospace and power 30% / Automation and engineered solutions 24%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)20.7%
Operating margin today25.9%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.2pp
Implied growth24.8%
Multiple paid29x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.18σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)50

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.80x5expensive
Earnings3.30x5expensive
Relative2.89x2expensive
Growth1.15x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$183.681.29xyesFCF base $1.8B, growth 10% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$247.950.95xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 21.5x / 23.5x / 25.5x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 23.23x (blended: static sector reference 18x + trailing (TTM) 35x), scenarios: 19.4x / 23.2x / 27.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.44x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$72.063.28xyesBV/sh $47.64, ROE (TTM) 14.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$87.712.69xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$205.111.15xyesRev $7.6B, growth 10% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 5.9x / 7.1x / 8.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$79.442.97xyesEPS $6.62, growth 8% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=4.19 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$58.494.04xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $1.69B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$90.592.61xyesBV $47.64 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 14.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$84.242.80xyes√(22.5 × EPS $6.62 × BVPS $47.64) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $2.39B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$71.723.29xyesFCF $1703.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$69.453.40xyesSBC-adj FCF $1.66B (FCF $1.70B − SBC $0.05B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$140.941.68xyesEPS $6.62 × (8.5 + 2×8.5%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$17.3613.61xyesBV $47.64 × (ROIC 3.2% / WACC 8.9%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $7.60B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$83.922.82xyesEPS $6.62 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 8.5% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 12.7x
Earnings YieldEarnings$71.573.30xyesEPS $6.62 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Electronic Instruments Group (EIG)operatingenterprise$4.9b$1.4b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Electromechanical Group (EMG)operatingenterprise$2.5b$578.9m operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$2.9b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)1.83x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.48x
Interest coverage23.7x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.3%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Start with the objection, because it is the honest place to start. A company that has completed "15 acquisitions" since the beginning of 2021 is buying a meaningful part of its own growth, and serial acquirers are where accounting flatters and cash does not. The reasonable fear is that the compounding is bought rather than earned. What the data shows is a company that keeps what it buys.

The margin is the evidence. AMETEK turns about 26.2% of revenue into operating profit. In its own instruments cohort, Roper (ROP) is the only comparison that runs higher, at 28.1%; Teledyne (TDY) manages 19.0%, Keysight (KEYS) 18.2%, Fortive (FTV) 17.6%, MKS (MKSI) 13.9% and Sensata (ST) 6.9%. In the electromechanical cohort, Amphenol (APH) reaches 25.8%, Parker-Hannifin (PH) 22.8% and Hubbell (HUBB) 20.6%, with Rockwell (ROK) at 11.0%. A roll-up that dilutes itself does not sit near the top of two different peer groups at once. And the filing is candid about the drag while it happens: 2025 segment margins were reduced by 60 basis points from the dilutive effect of recent deals and another 30 from integration costs, which is what absorbing an acquisition looks like before the improvement arrives.

What management is actually running is stated plainly. The goal of the AMETEK Growth Model, in the company's own words, is "high single digit annual percentage growth in sales and double digit annual percentage growth in earnings per share over the business cycle, strong cash flow generation, and a superior return on total capital". That is a mundane sentence and an unusually specific one. It commits to earnings growing faster than sales, which is only possible if the acquired businesses get better after purchase rather than merely bigger. The electromechanical group's 2025 result is the pattern working: operating income reached "a record $578.9 million for 2025, an increase of $122.4 million or 26.8%", on sales that rose 8% organically with roughly a point of currency help. Profit growing at three times the pace of sales is not something an acquisition delivers on day one.

The capital structure lets this continue without asking anything of shareholders. Borrowings sit at about 1.5 times trailing operating profit and the interest bill is covered around 24 times over, so the acquisition programme is funded out of the business rather than out of new equity: the share count has drifted slightly down over the past four years. Return on equity runs near 14.0% against a cost of equity closer to 9.3%, which is the arithmetic underneath the phrase "compounder" and the reason a book-value-based frame produces a number above book rather than at it. The last acquisition of size, FARO Technologies, was bought in 2025 for "$ 1,023.7 million", funded without disturbing any of that.

Bear Case

Roper, Teledyne, Keysight, Fortive, Amphenol and Parker-Hannifin are not sitting still, and they are shopping in the same aisle. The bear case for a serial acquirer rarely starts with the operations; it starts with the supply of things worth buying. AMETEK's own filing states the dependency directly: "A portion of our growth has been attributed to acquisitions of strategic businesses. We plan to continue making strategic acquisitions", and warns it "may not be able to consummate future acquisitions or successfully integrate recent and future acquisitions". When half a dozen well-capitalised industrials are competing for the same niche instrument makers, the price of the next deal is set by the most optimistic buyer, and the returns on capital that made this model work are decided at purchase rather than afterwards.

Then there is what the shares already assume. At about 31 times operating profit, the market is asking for the current pace of profit growth, running at the fastest rate the business can fund from its own resources, to hold for roughly five and a half years. Of comparable fast growers, only about 28% managed a run of that length. That does not make it implausible. It does mean the price is on the far side of what usually happens, and the sensitivity is unforgiving: a single percentage point of extra cost of capital takes nearly two years off the horizon the price can support.

The methods, taken together, are unusually one-sided. The peer-multiple lenses put the business at roughly a third of where the shares trade. The asset-based lenses land in the same region. The earnings-power lenses, which capitalize what the business currently produces with no growth at all, land furthest away. Only the growth methods reach today's level, and the one that gets there does so by holding an exit multiple flat at today's level across a six-year projection. Every route to this price runs through the assumption that AMETEK keeps compounding. There is no cheap-on-the-assets floor underneath.

Acquisitive companies also carry a specific accounting exposure that does not show up until it does. The annual goodwill test rests on "assumptions and estimates concerning future levels of revenue growth, operating margins, depreciation, amortization and working capital requirements" discounted at a chosen rate, all of them level 3 inputs. That is a valuation performed by the same management whose acquisition record is being judged, and it is the mechanism by which several years of disappointing end-market demand turn into one large write-down years later. The FARO purchase alone placed roughly $250.7 million into customer relationship intangibles, which is a specific bet that acquired customers stay.

Finally, visibility is thinner than the compounding record implies. The company notes that "Visibility into the future performance of certain of our markets is limited (particularly for markets into which we sell through distribution). Our quarterly sales and profits depend substantially on the volume and timing of orders received during the fiscal quarter". A business priced for uninterrupted compounding is being run on order flow it says it cannot forecast well, and short-cycle instrument demand is the first thing industrial customers defer.

Valuation

The unusual feature of this file is how lopsided the methods are. Only the growth-based approaches reach today's level. The peer-multiple and asset-based lenses both put the business near a third of where it trades, and the earnings-power lenses, which capitalize what the company currently produces and credit no growth at all, land furthest below. When only the forward methods reach the price, the premium is a durability premium: the market is paying for compounding that static frames have no way to encode. That is the correct reading here, and it is also the whole risk, because there is no asset floor doing any of the work.

Put a number on the assumption. At $242.03 the shares carry about 31 times company-wide operating profit, which resolves into profit growing at the fastest rate this business can fund internally and holding that rate for roughly five and a half years. About 28% of comparable fast growers sustained a run that long. Against its own record the near-term pace is not the demanding part; the persistence is. The engine's own model that reaches the price gets there by holding an exit multiple flat at today's level across a six-year projection, which is a fair description of what a buyer at this level is agreeing to.

Management has told everyone what it is aiming for. The Growth Model targets "high single digit annual percentage growth in sales and double digit annual percentage growth in earnings per share over the business cycle", and the record supports the claim: guidance has been raised 26 times and reaffirmed twice since 2006, and 2025 set records across sales, operating income, orders and backlog. The important detail is the distance between that target and what the shares assume. High single digit sales growth with double digit earnings growth is a good business. Whether it is a 31 times operating profit business depends entirely on how many years of it the buyer expects to collect.

The cohort makes the quality real without settling the question. AMETEK's 26.2% operating margin on roughly $7.6 billion of revenue is beaten only by Roper (ROP) at 28.1% among the instrument comparisons, and sits above Amphenol (APH) at 25.8% and Parker-Hannifin (PH) at 22.8% in the electromechanical set, on a much smaller revenue base than either. Balance sheet risk is close to absent: borrowings run about 1.5 times trailing operating profit, interest is covered around 24 times, operations generate rather than consume funds, and the share count has drifted down slightly over four years. Nothing about the downside here is a solvency question. It is a duration question, and the duration is the part the price has already spent.

Catalysts

The next scheduled event is close. Second-quarter results are released before the market opens on Tuesday, August 4, 2026, with the call the same morning. Management guided full-year 2026 sales to be up high single digits against 2025, with second-quarter sales expected on the same trajectory. That is the pace the Growth Model calls for, so the print is less about whether the target is met than about the mix underneath it: how much came from volume in the existing businesses and how much from the deals already closed.

Acquisition activity is the other thing worth tracking, and it is the mechanism the model runs on. The company completed FARO Technologies in 2025 for consideration of $1,023.7 million, part of a run of 15 acquisitions since the start of 2021. Because a large share of the compounding record comes from redeploying internally generated funds into these purchases, the announcement pace and the prices paid matter more to the long-run result than any single quarter of organic growth. Nothing new has been announced this month; the capacity to act, given how little of the balance sheet is committed, plainly remains.

Orders and backlog are the leading indicator to watch inside the August release. The 2025 annual report recorded records in both, and short-cycle instrument demand turns before revenue does. If orders soften while sales still look fine, that is the sequence in which a compounding story first shows strain, and it would land against a price that has already assumed the compounding continues.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Electronic Instruments Group (EIG) (reported)

Electromechanical Group (EMG) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

AMETEK earnings call announcement, July 2026 · AMETEK first-quarter 2026 results, May 2026 · AMETEK second-quarter 2026 earnings call announcement, July 2026

View the full interactive AME report on boothcheck