AUTOLIV, INC. (ALV): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $122.07, AUTOLIV, INC. (ALV) is priced for -1.6% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ALV

Headline

FieldValue
TickerALV
CompanyAUTOLIV, INC.
Sector / IndustryConsumer Cyclical
Current price$122.07/sh
CompositionAirbag, Steering Wheels (including Corporate and Other) 68% / Seatbelt Products (including Corporate and Other) 32%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)3.6%
Operating margin today9.2%
Margin compression (value-band)-5.6pp
Implied growth-1.6%
Multiple paid11x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.28σ
cohort percentile (of 212 peers)19

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.29x5expensive
Earnings1.54x4expensive
Relative0.68x3justifies
Growth1.05x4expensive

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.6%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=16)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$286.150.43xyesFCF base $0.8B, growth 6% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.6%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$148.810.82xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 7.6x / 9.6x / 11.6x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$180.200.68xyesP/E 20x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 16.8x / 20.0x / 23.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 13x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowth$42.742.86xyesStage 1: -5% for 5yr, Stage 2: 3.5% perpetual
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$94.771.29xyesBV/sh $34.00, ROE (TTM) 25.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$159.610.76xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$95.821.27xyesRev $11.1B, growth 6% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 0.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$72.751.68xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.83B × (1−34%) / WACC 7.6% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$140.880.87xyesBV $34.00 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 25.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$80.541.52xyes√(22.5 × EPS $8.48 × BVPS $34.00) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$174.600.70xyesEBITDA $1.12B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$87.001.40xyesFCF $757.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$7.1117.17xyesEPS $8.48 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$13.129.30xyesBV $34.00 × (ROIC 2.9% / WACC 7.6%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$226.910.54xyesRevenue $11.08B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$91.681.33xyesEPS $8.48 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Automotive Safety Systemsoperatingenterprise10.8B reported-currencywithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.7b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)2.49x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)1.63x
Interest coverage9.9x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Read Autoliv through the ratios alone and it looks like an ordinary parts maker: single-digit operating profitability, revenue that rises and falls with how many cars the world builds, customers holding most of the negotiating leverage. What that reading misses is that the product is not optional. Airbags and seatbelts go into a vehicle because regulators and crash-test rating programs require them, and the supplier of those parts occupies a position most component makers never come close to. The 10-K states it without decoration: "Autoliv holds a leading position in both airbags and steering wheels, with a combined market shares of around 44%."

The demand math has two independent legs, which a straight cyclical framing collapses into one. The first is how many vehicles get built, and over the long run that leg is unexciting: "LVP, has increased at an average annual growth rate of around 1.9%". The second is how much safety content each of those vehicles carries, and that one moves on regulation and crash-test ratings rather than on consumer demand. The filing describes rising installation rates for inflatable curtains, side airbags, knee airbags and front-center airbags, and locates the biggest opportunity in medium- and low-income markets where the average content per vehicle is still low. A supplier with a growth leg that responds to tightening rules is a different instrument from one that only grows when car sales do.

The evidence for the second leg is in the recent numbers. In the March 2026 quarter organic sales grew while global vehicle production was shrinking, and India alone grew organically by 38%, which the 10-Q attributes to rising safety content in Indian vehicles alongside local production growth. Profitability moved with it: full-year 2025 operating margin reached 10.1% on a GAAP basis against 9.4% the year before. On a book value of $35.07 a share the business earns a trailing return on equity of 26.9%. That is not commodity-supplier economics, and the revenue base is no longer a European bet: "Europe, the Americas and Asia, each accounting for approximately 29%, 32% and 39%, respectively, of the Company's 2025 total sales".

Capital discipline sits underneath all of it. Autoliv runs to a stated ceiling on borrowing and finished the year well inside it: "At December 31, 2025, the leverage ratio was 1.1x." against a long-term limit of 1.5x and a stated intention of holding a strong investment-grade profile. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 9.8 times over. And the share count has come down about 3.8% a year across the four years to March 2026, which is the one form of capital return that cannot be announced without also being executed.

Bear Case

Autoliv is walking out of the best profitability of its recent stretch into a year its own planning assumes will shrink. Full-year 2025 operating margin was 10.1% on a GAAP basis, up from 9.4% the year before. The March 2026 quarter gave part of that back, with the 10-Q reporting that "Operating margin was 8.6%". And the assumption for global light vehicle production this year has since been cut to a decline of roughly 2.5%, from roughly 1%. Extrapolating from a cycle high is how auto suppliers get mispriced in both directions, and the direction here is downhill.

The second problem is contractual rather than cyclical. Customer agreements "range from one year to the life of the model, which is generally four to seven years" and are often reopened before they end, and annual concessions are simply the terms of trade in this industry. The 10-K is explicit that "Price reductions are generally higher on newer products with strong volume growth compared to older products". Cost programs therefore have to run every year just to hold position. The uncomfortable corollary is that the newest volume, in China and India, is exactly where the givebacks bite hardest, and that newest volume is what the growth case leans on.

The content leg carries its own warning, written by the company. On the possibility that penetration trends stall, the risk factor concludes that "the average value of passive safety systems per vehicle could decline". Chinese domestic brands are now the majority of Autoliv's sales in that market, and whether vehicles built for that market carry the same value of safety content as the ones built for Europe is a question the mix shift has only started to answer.

Now put that against what the price asks. At about 10.6 times operating profit, the price is consistent with operating profit declining no faster than about 1.5% a year. That is a low hurdle, which is the honest reason the bear here is not an overvaluation argument. The hurdle assumes the profit base is durable rather than cyclical, and if a run of falling vehicle production pulls trailing operating profit back toward its multi-year average, the multiple the market is willing to pay usually compresses in the same stretch. The two move together, and they move the same way. Operating conditions are already noisier than the 2025 result suggests: "customer call-off volatility increased in the fourth quarter and remained higher than pre-pandemic levels". What the bear is not is a solvency story. The 10-K reports for concentration that "In 2025 : No individual customer representing 10 % or more.", borrowings are modest against operating profit, and interest is covered many times over. The risk is to the earnings base, not to the company.

Valuation

The price is not asking for much. At $117.50 the shares change hands at about 10.6 times operating profit, which inverts to company-wide operating profit falling about 1.5% a year over five years. For a supplier whose product is regulated into essentially every vehicle sold, that is a low bar, and measured against Autoliv's own record the near-term pace sits inside what it has already delivered. The demand, such as it is, is on persistence rather than on the rate.

What stands out is the direction of the disagreement among the methods. Peer-multiple approaches land well above today's price, by the widest gap in the set: put on sector multiples, this business fetches considerably more than it does. The cash-flow methods land just under the price. Book-value-plus-profitability sits a little further under, and the no-growth earnings-power lens, which averages five years of operating income, adds back one-time charges, credits no growth and capitalizes what is left, sits furthest under of all. Nothing here puts the price beyond what a standard method supports. That is the shape of a value read rather than a growth bet, and the argument it frames is about how much a cyclical profit stream is worth, not about whether the profit is there.

Against its own comparison group the position is not subtle. Autoliv turns about 9.3 cents of each revenue dollar into operating profit. Lear manages 3.6 on more than twice the revenue, Aptiv 5.4, BorgWarner 4.4 and Phinia 7.3. Yet the multiple the market applies to Autoliv sits in the lower half of that peer range. Better conversion of revenue into profit at a cheaper multiple is the entire argument, and the reason it exists is that the market is discounting the durability of the profit rather than doubting that it was earned.

The inputs underneath are ordinary and checkable. Trailing operating profit runs about $1.0 billion on roughly $11.0 billion of revenue. For the March 2026 quarter the company reported net sales of $2,753 million, up 6.8%, of which 0.8% was organic. Capital spending net of disposals ran at 3.9% of sales in 2025 against 5.4% the year before, as several footprint projects in Europe and the Americas finished.

Borrowings of about $1.75 billion, net of what the company holds, come to roughly 1.7 times trailing operating profit, and operating profit covers interest about 9.8 times. Autoliv's own leverage measure finished the year well inside its stated ceiling: "At December 31, 2025, the leverage ratio was 1.1x." against a long-term limit of 1.5x. Share count has fallen about 3.8% a year over the four years to March 2026, so each remaining share owns more of whatever the cycle delivers. For a business whose revenue is set by how many vehicles the world assembles, the financing is the part that is not in dispute; what the price is arguing about is how much of 2025's profitability survives a smaller production year.

Catalysts

The second-quarter report landed on July 17 and it split cleanly into good execution against a worse backdrop. Sales reached $2.8 billion, up 3% on the year, with organic growth of 1.0% against a global light vehicle production decline of 0.3%, so the company outgrew its market by 1.3 percentage points. Operating cash flow improved to $434 million from $277 million, the strongest second quarter the company has recorded, helped by working capital normalizing.

The backdrop is where the news was. Autoliv now assumes global light vehicle production falls about 2.5% in 2026, against the roughly 1% decline it had been planning for. It held its own expectations for the year in place anyway: organic sales growth of about flat, operating cash flow of about $1.2 billion, capital expenditure below 5% of sales, and a margin target of 10.5% to 11% stated on the company's own adjusted basis. Holding a flat top line while the market underneath contracts by that much is the specific thing to check in the next two prints.

Two structural items are now in motion. Autoliv intends to discontinue manufacturing in Turkey by 2028, moving that production into other facilities in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, affecting about 2,200 employees and expected to deliver roughly $40 million of annual pretax savings, beginning in 2027 and reaching full run rate in 2028. And the China mix keeps shifting: Chinese domestic brands now account for 55% of Autoliv's sales in that market, against 40% a year earlier. The first is a cost story with a date attached. The second decides what the content-per-vehicle leg is actually worth.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Automotive Safety Systems (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Autoliv second-quarter 2026 financial report, July 17, 2026 · Autoliv FY2025 10-K, non-GAAP reconciliation table · Autoliv Q1 2026 Form 10-Q · Autoliv FY2025 10-K

View the full interactive ALV report on boothcheck