ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (ALNY): what the price requires
At today's price, ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. (ALNY) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~7.1 years. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ALNY
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ALNY |
| Company | ALNYLAM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. |
| Current price | $287.84/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin today | 9.4% |
| Must persist for | 7.1y |
| Multiple paid | 129x operating income |
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.1% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 50% self-funding ceiling; each 1pp moves the implied horizon ~0.8 years.
How unusual the bet is: elevated
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.47σ |
| sustained it ~7.1 years at this level | 22% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
Every valuation family lands below the price. The price therefore requires assumptions beyond what those standard frames encode.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 11.65x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 7.31x | 3 | expensive |
| Relative | 3.29x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 1.28x | 3 | expensive |
Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 9.2%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=16)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $107.37 | 2.68x | yes | FCF base $0.5B, growth 25% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 9.2%, 7yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $225.69 | 1.28x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 75.1x / 78.1x / 81.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 7yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $136.93 | 2.10x | yes | P/E 52.8x (blended: static sector reference 24x + trailing (TTM) 126x), scenarios: 42.2x / 52.8x / 63.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 34.62x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $24.70 | 11.65x | yes | BV/sh $5.75, ROE (TTM) 39.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $56.80 | 5.07x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $302.83 | 0.95x | yes | Rev $3.7B, growth 30% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 8.5x / 10.6x / 12.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $81.55 | 3.53x | yes | EPS $2.33, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=3.60 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $39.07 | 7.37x | yes | BV $5.75 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 39.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $17.36 | 16.58x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.33 × BVPS $5.75) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $61.19 | 4.70x | yes | EBITDA $0.50B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $39.39 | 7.31x | yes | FCF $465.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $11.98 | 24.03x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.12B (FCF $0.47B − SBC $0.35B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median) |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $75.18 | 3.83x | yes | EPS $2.33 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $15.82 | 18.19x | yes | BV $5.75 × (ROIC 25.4% / WACC 9.2%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $108.16 | 2.66x | yes | Revenue $3.71B × sector P/S 4.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $87.38 | 3.29x | yes | EPS $2.33 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $25.19 | 11.43x | yes | EPS $2.33 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $1.9b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -8.21x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -6.49x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 1.7x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 3.6% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Alnylam is the company that turned RNA interference from a Nobel-winning idea into approved medicines, and its lead drug AMVUTTRA is inflecting hard: total TTR net product revenue reached $910 million in the first quarter of 2026, up 153% year over year after the drug's label expanded into heart disease.
- The price is a durability bet, not a value one: at over forty times book value, only the methods that project years of fast growth reach it, so a holder is paying for a platform that compounds, not for the earnings on the page today.
- The defining risk is concentration: the TTR franchise drives the result, so the next readings to watch are whether full-year TTR revenue tracks the reiterated $4.4 billion to $4.7 billion target and how the Phase 3 cardiomyopathy program reads out.
Bull Case
The reason standard valuation lenses underprice Alnylam is that they value a drug company and Alnylam is closer to a platform. RNA interference is a single technology that, once mastered, can be pointed at disease after disease by changing the genetic target while keeping the same delivery chemistry. The company describes its ambition in exactly those terms in its Alnylam 2030 strategy: to "deliver 2+ new transformative medicines beyond TTR with blockbuster potential" and to "expand to 10 tissue types and >40 clinical programs". A pipeline that broad off one validated platform is not what a discounted-cash-flow model built for a single product can capture, which is why the static methods land far below the price.
The platform is now throwing off real money, and fast. First-quarter 2026 total revenue reached $1.17 billion, up 96% year over year, driven by AMVUTTRA following its label expansion. The TTR franchise, AMVUTTRA plus the older ONPATTRO, produced $910 million in net product revenue in the quarter, a 153% increase, and the company reiterated a full-year 2026 TTR target of $4.4 billion to $4.7 billion. The label expansion into ATTR amyloidosis with cardiomyopathy is the key, because the heart-disease population is far larger than the nerve-disease population the drug first served, and the filing flags that this opportunity has "the potential to become a leading therapy for ATTR amyloidosis and to significantly improve our gross margins on product sales and our non-GAAP operating income margin".
Underneath the product engine sits a second, lower-profile income stream: royalties and milestones from drugs Alnylam invented and licensed to larger partners. The collaboration economics are real and tiered, with one agreement paying Alnylam "25% of global annual net sales greater than $500.0 million to $1.50 billion; and 30% of global annual net sales in excess of $1.50 billion", and in 2025 the company recognized "$300.0 million of milestone revenue under our collaboration with Roche". Those payments cost Alnylam almost nothing to earn, because the partner bears the commercial expense, and they grow as the partnered drugs scale. A self-funding product franchise that is inflecting, a deep platform pipeline, and high-margin royalty income on top is the combination the price is paying for, and the recent results show the first leg of it arriving.
Bear Case
The bear case is clearest when you look at where the valuation methods disagree, because the disagreement names the bet precisely. At $278 (as of June 27, 2026), the conservative lenses, those that value Alnylam on assets, on demonstrated earnings power, and on peer multiples, all land far below the price. A free-cash-flow capitalization sits near $27, a book-value-plus-profitability read in the $20s to $50s, and a blended peer-multiple read near $131. Only the methods that project years of 25% to 30% revenue growth reach the price, and even they get there by assuming the growth persists for the better part of a decade. When only the growth methods justify the price, the price is a bet that the compounding continues uninterrupted. The conservative methods are not mispricing the company; they are saying the current earnings do not remotely support the quote, and the entire gap is future growth that has to actually show up.
That future leans heavily on a single franchise, which is the concentration risk the bull case downplays. The TTR products drive the revenue, so the company's fortunes ride on AMVUTTRA maintaining its lead in ATTR amyloidosis, and the filing lists the conditions for that plainly: it must keep "continued regulatory exclusivity and patent protection for AMVUTTRA" and continue "successfully launching, marketing and selling our TTR products". The ATTR cardiomyopathy market that is fueling the growth is also a contested one, with oral competitors already approved and prescribed, and a single drug carrying this much of the value means any setback in efficacy data, label, pricing, or competition hits the whole thesis at once. Diversification beyond TTR is the stated 2030 goal, but it is a goal, not a fact, and the price already credits it.
The balance sheet is healthy but not a fortress, and the dilution is real. Alnylam holds a net cash position near $1.9 billion, which funds the pipeline without forcing a raise, and that is genuine strength for a company still early in profitability. But the share count has been rising about 3.6% a year, driven by stock compensation, so per-share value has to grow faster than the business just to keep pace, and interest coverage is thin at about two times because the profit base is still modest against the convertible debt. None of that threatens solvency. It does mean the bull case has to clear a dilution headwind on top of the growth-durability assumption, and at over forty times book value, the price has priced the platform succeeding broadly, leaving little room for the ordinary stumbles of scaling a franchise and a pipeline at the same time.
Valuation
Today's price is a statement about duration, not about current earnings. At $278.14 Alnylam trades at more than forty times its book value of about $5.75 a share, and at a multiple of trailing earnings that no static method can defend. The cleanest way to read that is through the spread between the methods. The asset, earnings-power, and peer-multiple lenses, which price what Alnylam has demonstrated, sit far below the price, because a company that only recently turned profitable does not have the trailing numbers to support this quote. Only the forward-growth lenses reach it, and the most generous of them, which projects revenue compounding around 30% and applies a high terminal multiple, lands near the price at about $293. The price is therefore a durability premium: it pays for the platform to keep compounding for years, which the static frames structurally cannot value.
The embedded assumption, read off the inversion, is a long runway rather than a margin miracle. The price implies that Alnylam sustains strong growth over roughly a seven-year horizon, the kind of persistence that turns a recently profitable biotech into a large-cap earnings machine. That is a demanding assumption, and the engine flags the inversion's reliability as low precisely because a company at this stage has a short track record of the through-cycle economics the math needs. The honest framing is that the price is underwriting the TTR franchise reaching its multibillion-dollar potential and the broader platform delivering the next wave, with the recent 153% TTR growth as the first evidence that the runway is real rather than hoped for.
Solvency leaves room for the bet to play out without a financing crisis, with one caveat. Alnylam carries net cash near $1.9 billion, so it can fund its deep clinical program internally, and the high-margin royalty and milestone income, including the $300 million Roche milestone recognized in 2025, supplements the product cash flow. The caveat is dilution rather than leverage: the share count is climbing about 3.6% a year, so the per-share value of the franchise has to outgrow the rising count. The balance sheet is not the risk here. The risk is concentration and persistence, the two things the price assumes go right, and the valuation offers little margin if either falters.
Catalysts
Alnylam's first quarter of 2026 was a step-change driven by one expanding franchise. Total revenue reached $1.17 billion, up 96% year over year, beating expectations, and adjusted earnings per share came in at $1.99 against a consensus near $1.43. The engine was the TTR franchise: AMVUTTRA contributed $890 million and ONPATTRO $20 million in net product revenue, together $910 million and up 153% year over year, propelled by AMVUTTRA's label expansion into ATTR amyloidosis with cardiomyopathy. The company reiterated its full-year 2026 TTR revenue target of $4.4 billion to $4.7 billion.
The pipeline news pointed the same direction. A post-hoc analysis of the HELIOS-B study reinforced vutrisiran's cardiovascular benefit, supporting the cardiomyopathy expansion that is driving sales, and enrollment in the TRITON-CM Phase 3 study is running ahead of plan, with the company raising the target from 1,250 to roughly 1,750 patients. The next earnings prints are the read on whether the TTR ramp tracks toward the reiterated full-year target as the cardiomyopathy launch matures, which is the single variable that most determines whether the growth assumption embedded in the price holds. With the franchise this concentrated, each quarterly TTR figure carries more weight than the headline revenue beat.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Alnylam Pharmaceuticals (consolidated) (reported)
- NBIX (NEUROCRINE BIOSCIENCES, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- APLS (APELLIS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AXSM (AXSOME THERAPEUTICS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CORT (CORCEPT THERAPEUTICS INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HRMY (HARMONY BIOSCIENCES HOLDINGS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- FOLD (AMICUS THERAPEUTICS, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ASND (Ascendis Pharma A/S)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BMRN (BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Q1 FY2026 earnings release