Alkermes plc. (ALKS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $46.10, Alkermes plc. (ALKS) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~8.7 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ALKS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerALKS
CompanyAlkermes plc.
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$46.10/sh
CompositionU.S. 93% / Ireland 0% / Rest of world 7%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Must persist for8.7y
Multiple paid75x operating income

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: elevated (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+1.40σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)99

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset10.82x3expensive
Earnings6.93x3expensive
Relative2.24x3expensive
Growth1.21x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=12)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$35.131.31xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 12% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$48.350.95xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 62.7x / 64.7x / 66.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelative$20.582.24xyesP/E 51.89x (blended: static sector reference 24x + trailing (TTM) 117x), scenarios: 43.1x / 51.9x / 60.7x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 30.61x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$4.2610.82xyesBV/sh $10.78, ROE (TTM) 3.7%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$2.6617.33xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$38.181.21xyesRev $1.7B, growth 12% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.8x / 4.6x / 5.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$6.656.93xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.23B × (1−21%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$2.0122.94xyesBV $10.78 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 3.7% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 2.4%/yr (excluded from median)
Graham NumberAsset$9.604.80xyes√(22.5 × EPS $0.38 × BVPS $10.78) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$6.427.18xyesEBITDA $0.14B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$7.676.01xyesFCF $221.6M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.041152.50xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.10B (FCF $0.22B − SBC $0.12B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$0.32144.06xyesEPS $0.38 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$0.6867.79xyesBV $10.78 × (ROIC 0.5% / WACC 7.9%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelative$39.761.16xyesRevenue $1.67B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$4.1111.22xyesEPS $0.38 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

Only one reportable economic unit is present in the current topology source. Consolidated operating lenses remain available, but there is no multi-unit decomposition.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Alkermes (consolidated)operatingenterprise$1.5bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$868.4m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)9.37x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)7.41x
Interest coverage2.0x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

One income statement here is carrying two very different businesses, and the blend understates both. On one side sit approved neuroscience medicines that generate real revenue and real profit: the company turned $1.56 billion of revenue into $147.6 million of operating profit over the trailing year, and it did that while funding a full clinical programme out of the same line. On the other side sits alixorexton, an oral orexin 2 receptor agonist now in phase 3 for narcolepsy. Every dollar spent on that programme lands in operating expense today and creates nothing the accounts recognise as an asset. A trailing margin of 9.9% is therefore not a statement about how profitable the commercial franchise is. It is a statement about how much of that franchise's profit is being reinvested.

The reinvestment is concentrated rather than scattered, which matters. The 10-K attributes the rise in development spending to specific studies: the Vibrance-3 phase 2 clinical study, costs related to the completion of our Vibrance-1 and Vibrance-2 phase 2 studies, startup costs related to planning for our phase 3 clinical program and costs related to our long-term extension study for the product. That is one asset being pushed through a sequence, not a portfolio of small bets. The company also reported in July that interim results from the long-term extension study showed improvements in wakefulness sustained through week 24 in both narcolepsy type 1 and type 2, with safety data collected through May 12, 2026. Durability of effect is the thing an orexin programme has to prove beyond the first few weeks.

What that drug would be worth if it works is visible in the neighbourhood rather than in a forecast. Harmony Biosciences (HRMY), a narcolepsy-focused business, converts 21.1% of $899 million of revenue into operating profit and grew 20.7% over its trailing year. Jazz Pharmaceuticals (JAZZ), the incumbent in the same indication, runs a $4.44 billion revenue base. Narcolepsy is a chronic condition with a small, well-identified patient population and specialist prescribers, which is the profile where a differentiated oral agent takes share quickly and holds price.

The commercial base is not standing still while this happens either. Its medicines sit in psychiatry and addiction, where the company competes on formulation and administration rather than on molecule, and it retains royalty and manufacturing revenue from licensees using its delivery technology. Those revenues are contractual, and the filing is direct that Royalties earned on our licensees' net sales of products using our proprietary technologies and our licensed product were recognized in the period such products were sold by our licensees, which is to say they arrive without Alkermes carrying the commercial cost.

The balance sheet supports the wait. Operating income covers the interest bill about 7.1 times over, the company is not consuming cash, and the share count has risen only about 0.6% a year over the past four years, so the trial programme is being funded from operations rather than from shareholders. Management has guided to revenue above $1.7 billion for 2026, and it has reaffirmed its outlook far more often than it has revised it in either direction. A company that can pay for its own phase 3 is a company that does not have to accept bad terms if the data are good.

Bear Case

Start with who else is selling into these markets, because the commercial base is where the money currently comes from and it is under attack from every direction at once. In schizophrenia and bipolar disorder the company lists the competing products by name: ILIFY ASIMTUFII; CAPLYTA; RYKINDO; UZEDY; risperidone; quetiapine; olanzapine; and ziprasidone, and warns that A number of companies currently market and/or are developing products to treat schizophrenia and/or bipolar I disorder that may compete with and negatively impact future sales of ARISTADA, ARISTADA INITIO and LYBALVI. The last four entries in that list are generic names rather than brands. In addiction, the company says plainly that Increased competition may lead to reduced unit sales of VIVITROL and increased pricing pressure. And one revenue line has already gone: Though we no longer receive royalties from INVEGA SUSTENNA in the U.S., the company notes, which is the sound a licensed franchise makes when it ends.

The pipeline that is supposed to replace all of that is one molecule. Alixorexton is, in the company's own careful wording, a novel, investigational, oral, selective orexin 2 receptor agonist. Investigational is the operative word. The filing does not soften what that means: We have incurred, and we will continue to incur, substantial expenses for preclinical testing, clinical trials and other activities related to our clinical development programs, and Our preclinical and clinical development efforts may take several years or more. Phase 2 results in a small, well-selected population are a weak predictor of phase 3 results in a broad one, and tolerability signals in a new drug class tend to surface with longer exposure in larger populations, which is precisely what a phase 3 programme supplies.

Now the price. At $52.87 the market values Alkermes at roughly 68 times the operating income the business currently produces, and the arithmetic that supports that multiple needs operating profit compounding at the fastest rate the company can self-fund for about 8.4 years. Measured against its peer group, the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, beyond the upper quartile. Of comparable fast-growers used as the reference, only about 23% were still running at that pace that far out. And the sensitivity is unkind: a single percentage point of growth that fails to appear adds roughly 2.4 years to the horizon already embedded in the quote.

More telling is that no standard valuation approach reaches the current level. Book-value methods, methods that capitalise current earnings power, and peer multiples all land below it, and even the forward-growth methods fall short. The closest of them gets there only by assuming the market still pays the same rich multiple of cash earnings six years from now, which is not a projection about the business so much as a projection about sentiment. Every one of those methods is valuing the commercial franchise, because that is the only thing with a track record to value. The distance between them and the quote is what the market is paying for a drug that has not yet completed a phase 3 trial.

The dependency runs the other way too. Approved-product revenue includes royalty and manufacturing streams the company does not control, and it states the risk directly: Our arrangements with licensees are critical to successfully commercializing and/or bringing to market products, so a licensee's commercial decisions land on Alkermes' revenue line without Alkermes having a vote. If alixorexton disappoints, the shares fall back on a base business facing generic competition in one market and branded competition in the other, and no valuation method in use reaches even today's price on that base alone.

Valuation

No standard method reaches this price. That is the most important fact in the section, and it should be said before any of the numbers. Book value, current earnings power, peer multiples and forward-growth cash flows all land below where the shares trade, which means the quote is not a stretched version of any conventional frame. It sits outside all of them.

The reason is not mysterious, and it is worth being explicit rather than mystical about it. Every one of those methods is built on the record of the commercial business, and at $52.87 the market carries Alkermes at roughly 68 times the operating income that business currently earns. Getting there requires operating profit to compound at the quickest rate the company can fund from its own cash for about 8.4 years, computed at a 7.6% cost of capital. Against the peer group, the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution; of comparable fast-growers used as the reference, roughly 23% were still going at that pace that far along. This is a demanding read on the commercial franchise alone, which is precisely why the commercial franchise alone is not what is being bought.

What has to be true is therefore not a margin target but a clinical outcome, and the trailing figures show why. Over the last twelve months the company earned a 9.9% operating margin on $1.56 billion of revenue. That margin is suppressed by design: the annual report ties the increase in development spending to the Vibrance-3 phase 2 clinical study, costs related to the completion of our Vibrance-1 and Vibrance-2 phase 2 studies, startup costs related to planning for our phase 3 clinical program and the long-term extension work. Standard cash-flow methods have no way to price a binary outcome, so they price the base and stop. Reading the resulting distance as an error would be a mistake in the other direction; the distance is a measurement of what the market is paying for the trial.

The peer set frames both ends of the range. Exelixis (EXEL) converts 39.4% of revenue into operating profit and Indivior (INDV) 25.8%, so a mid-cap neuroscience company with a marketed portfolio can clear well above where Alkermes sits at 9.9%. Harmony Biosciences (HRMY), whose business is narcolepsy, runs 21.1% on $899 million of revenue. At the other end, Jazz Pharmaceuticals (JAZZ) was slightly negative at 0.9% and Supernus (SUPN) at negative 7.8% over their trailing years, which is what specialty pharma looks like when a franchise rolls over. Both outcomes are live here.

Solvency is the part of this that is not in question, and it matters more than usual because the story requires time. Operating income covers the interest bill about 7.1 times over, the business is not consuming cash, and the share count has grown only about 0.6% a year across the past four years, so the phase 3 programme is being paid for out of operations rather than out of new equity. The programme's cost is already inside the reported margin. What is not inside any reported number is its result, and that is the whole of the valuation question here.

Catalysts

The financial calendar is the smaller of the two calendars that matter. Alkermes reports second-quarter results before the open on Tuesday, July 28, 2026, with a call that morning. Management has guided to full-year 2026 revenue above $1.7 billion, and the useful detail in the print will be the split between the commercial franchise's performance and the development spending running against it, since the second determines how much of the first reaches the operating line.

The clinical calendar is where the value moves. Alixorexton is in the phase 3 Brilliance studies in narcolepsy type 1 and type 2, with a separate phase 2 study, Vibrance-3, running in idiopathic hypersomnia. In July the company reported an interim analysis from its open-label long-term extension study covering patients who had completed the two phase 2 trials, showing sustained improvement in wakefulness, daytime sleepiness, cognition and fatigue at week 24, with safety data through May 12, 2026. Additional Vibrance-1 extension data were presented at the American Academy of Neurology annual meeting this year.

For a reader deciding what to watch, the ranking is straightforward. Long-term safety at scale is the risk that has historically ended orexin programmes, so each extension update carries more information than a quarterly revenue beat. Phase 3 readouts from the Brilliance studies are the event that resolves the gap between what every valuation method says about the commercial business and what the shares actually cost. Everything reported on July 28 is, in that light, a description of how long the company can keep funding the wait.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Alkermes (consolidated) (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Alkermes results announcement, July 14, 2026 · Alkermes long-term extension interim analysis announcement, July 2026 · Alkermes first quarter 2026 earnings call, May 2026 · Alkermes press release, July 14, 2026 · Alkermes phase 3 initiation announcement, 2026 · Alkermes AAN 2026 data presentation announcement, 2026

View the full interactive ALKS report on boothcheck