AAR CORP (AIR): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $133.19, AAR CORP (AIR) is priced for today's economics sustained for ~5.6 years. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Exported: 2026-08-31 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AIR

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAIR
CompanyAAR CORP
Sector / IndustryIndustrials
Current price$133.19/sh
CompositionParts Supply 45% / Repair, Engineering, and Software 33% / Government programs 12% / Mobility Systems 3% / Component repair programs 6% / Distribution of C&E inventory 1%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)2.7%
Operating margin today7.4%
Margin compression (value-band)-4.7pp
Must persist for5.6y
Multiple paid25x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.8% cost of capital; growth searched up to the 25% self-funding ceiling.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 225 peers)67

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.39x4expensive
Earnings1.69x2expensive
Relative1.51x2expensive
Growth0.95x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.0%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$63.412.10xyesFCF base $0.1B, growth 19% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.0%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$151.760.88xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 450.3x / 452.3x / 454.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 22x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 17.9x / 22.0x / 26.1x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 30.8x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$50.872.62xyesBV/sh $42.71, ROE (TTM) 11.0%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$55.322.41xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$140.690.95xyesRev $3.3B, growth 19% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.3x / 1.6x / 1.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$58.322.28xyesEPS $4.86, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=14.15 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$56.182.37xyesBV $42.71 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 11.0% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.2%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$68.341.95xyes√(22.5 × EPS $4.86 × BVPS $42.71) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.01B × sector EV/EBITDA 14.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$0.0113319.00xyesFCF $62.1M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity (excluded from median)
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$0.0113319.00xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.04B (FCF $0.06B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ (excluded from median)
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$156.820.85xyesEPS $4.86 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $3.31B × sector P/S 2.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$182.250.73xyesEPS $4.86 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$52.542.54xyesEPS $4.86 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Parts Supplyoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Repair & Engineeringoperatingenterprise$884.9mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Integrated Solutionsoperatingenterprise$695.3mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Expeditionary Servicesoperatingenterprise$100.7mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$809.9m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)3.75x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.29x
Interest coverage3.4x
Share count CAGR (dilution)2.6%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Aviation aftermarket businesses divide neatly into two kinds. One sells hours of skilled labor in a hangar, which is honest work at thin returns. The other sells parts, which is inventory, distribution rights and pricing power. AAR has spent the last several years walking from the first toward the second, deliberately. It sold the Landing Gear Overhaul business to GA Telesis for "net proceeds of $48 million", bought Triumph's product support operation with debt financing, picked up the maintenance-planning software firm Aerostrat for "$19.0 million", and in fiscal 2026 alone "completed one acquisition in our Parts Supply segment and three acquisitions in our Repair, Engineering, and Software segment". Portfolio surgery of that scale is usually a sign of a company that knows exactly which of its businesses it likes.

The results say the surgery is working where it should. Parts Supply produced third-party sales of $1,487.7 million in fiscal 2026 and $186.2 million of operating income from them, an 18.8% increase driven by new-parts distribution rather than by used material. Distribution rights matter more than they sound: an exclusive agreement to sell an original manufacturer's parts into the aftermarket is a position a competitor cannot simply price against, because they cannot get the part. The 10-K attributes the year's improvement squarely to that activity, noting that "growth of our new parts Distribution activities contributed to exceptional profitability improvements".

The demand underneath it is not a forecast so much as a fleet census. The filing sets out what actually drives the business: sales are "generally affected by such factors as the number, type and average age of aircraft in service, the levels of aircraft utilization", and the company states plainly that it believes "long-term commercial aftermarket growth trends are favorable". Aircraft that stay in service longer need more parts and more repairs, and the constraint on new deliveries has kept older airframes flying. That is the tailwind, and it is measurable rather than aspirational.

The government leg does something different and useful: it decouples part of the revenue from the airline cycle. Sales to the company's major government customers ran to $787.8 million in fiscal 2026, against $687.6 million and $576.1 million in the two prior years, roughly 23.8% of total sales. Those are multi-year sustainment contracts rather than discretionary airline spending, and they kept growing through a period when commercial demand was uneven.

The honest limit on the bull case is where the profitability actually sits today. HEICO converts 23.5% of revenue into operating profit and TransDigm 46.5%; StandardAero, the closest structural comparison in scale and mix, manages 9.0%. AAR is closer to StandardAero than to either of them. The bull argument is not that it deserves the TransDigm end today. It is that the mix is moving in that direction under management that has already sold the businesses that were holding it back, and that fiscal 2026 operating income rose $92.6 million, or 50.0%, on the prior year as the reshaped portfolio started to show.

Bear Case

What today's valuation depends on is not a product launch or a contract award. It is a rate, held for a very long time. The level embeds operating profit compounding at the fastest pace the business can fund out of its own operations, sustained for roughly eight years. Set that against the company's own record and the problem is visible immediately: the assumed pace runs well above what AAR has actually delivered over its history. This is not a business that has compounded profit at extraordinary rates. It is a business that has just had two very good years after selling its worst assets, and the valuation extrapolates the two good years, not the decade.

History is unkind to that extrapolation in general, not just here. Of comparable fast-growing companies, only about 19% sustained a comparable pace over roughly that span. The multiple, meanwhile, sits at the very top of its peer distribution, well beyond the upper quartile. Being the most expensive name in a cohort is defensible when the business is the best in the cohort. On operating profitability AAR is not: HEICO converts 23.5% of revenue into operating profit and TransDigm 46.5%, while AAR runs closer to StandardAero's 9.0%.

The second dependency is debt, and it is the one that removes the margin for error. Net borrowings are about $810 million, roughly 4.6 times operating profit, and interest is covered about 2.4 times. That last figure is the one to watch. Coverage at that level is serviceable while the business is growing and unforgiving if it is not, and it constrains the very thing the growth assumption relies on, which is buying more businesses. The Triumph product support deal was "funded with debt financing", and the share count has risen about 2.6% a year over four years. Growth acquired with borrowed money and issued shares is not the same as growth generated by the assets already owned, and only the second kind justifies a premium multiple.

Concentration is the third pressure point, and it runs in an unexpected direction. Roughly a quarter of sales come from a small set of government customers. Those relationships look stable until they are competed. The 10-K is direct about the mechanics: government customers "may turn to commercial contractors, rather than traditional defense contractors, for certain work, or may utilize set asides such as small business, women-owned, or minority-owned contractors or determine to source work internally rather than use us", and the company notes it is "also impacted by bid protests from unsuccessful bidders on new" awards. A single re-competition can move a quarter of the revenue base in a way no airline customer ever could.

Underneath all of it, the commercial side is cyclical in the ordinary way. The filing warns that "A slowdown in the global economy, or a recession, would negatively impact the commercial aviation" market, and aftermarket parts demand follows flight hours with a short lag. Line up the ways of valuing this business and the split is clear. What the assets and the returns earned on them support, and what current earnings capitalized without growth support, both come out near half of where the shares change hands. Peer multiples land about at it. Only projections that carry recent growth forward for years reach it. The premium is entirely a bet on persistence, and persistence is the one thing the record does not yet evidence.

Valuation

Two clocks are running here and it is worth setting them side by side before anything else. Measured over the twelve months through February, the market is paying about 34 times what this business earned at the operating line. Fiscal 2026 then closed at the end of May and was materially better than that trailing window: operating income rose $92.6 million, or 50.0%, over the prior year. Both statements are true, and the difference between them is exactly one very strong quarter. A reader who takes the trailing multiple as the whole answer is looking at a photograph of a moving object.

Even on the improved base the demand embedded in the level is unusual. To earn a normal return from here, operating profit has to keep compounding at the fastest rate the business can self-fund, and it has to do so for something like eight years. Each percentage point of cost of capital shifts that required runway by roughly two years, so the figure should be treated as a description of the shape of the bet rather than a measurement. The shape is what matters: this is not a demand for one good year, it is a demand for most of a decade of them.

Two reference points say how demanding that is. Against the company's own record, the assumed pace runs well above what AAR has historically delivered. Against the peer group, the multiple sits at the very top of the distribution, well past the upper quartile. Against history more broadly, roughly a fifth of comparable fast-growing companies sustained that pace across that span. None of those is a prediction. Together they describe a level that requires the next several years to look nothing like the several before them.

The methods used to triangulate the business split along an informative line. Value the assets and the returns actually earned on them and the shares land near half of today's level. Capitalize current earnings with no growth assumed and the answer is similar. Apply the peer group's own multiples and the shares land close to where they trade, which is the honest reading of a business whose cohort is expensive too. Only the projection-based methods reach the price, and they do it by carrying the recent seventeen percent cash-flow growth rate forward across six years. That is the whole disagreement in one sentence: the static lenses price what the business is, the forward lenses price what it has lately been doing, and the shares are priced on the second.

Leverage is what turns that from an interesting debate into a real risk. Net borrowings of about $810 million work out to roughly 4.6 times operating profit, and interest is covered about 2.4 times over. Neither number is alarming for a company growing this fast; both become uncomfortable quickly if it stops. Meanwhile the share count has risen about 2.6% a year over four years, so per-share progress has had to overcome dilution rather than being helped by retirement. The buyer at this level is paying a premium multiple for a leveraged, acquisitive compounder in an industry that has cycles, and the premium leaves very little room for the cycle to arrive on schedule.

Catalysts

Fiscal 2026 closed on May 31 and the results landed on July 21, 2026. Fourth-quarter sales were $928 million, up 26% on the year, of which 13% was organic rather than acquired. That split is the number worth keeping. A company assembling itself through acquisitions can show almost any growth rate it likes; the organic half is the part that tells you the underlying business is expanding. Adjusted EBITDA for the quarter was $116 million, up 27%, and adjusted diluted earnings were $1.53 a share, up 32%.

For the full fiscal year, adjusted operating profit reached 10.2% of sales against 9.6% the year before, adjusted EBITDA was $401.1 million, or 12.1% of sales, and adjusted diluted earnings came to $5.05 a share against $3.91. Those are the company's own adjusted measures rather than reported figures, and the gap between the two is where acquisition and transaction costs live, so they flatter the picture by design. The direction, though, is not in dispute: profitability rose while the company was digesting four acquisitions, which is the harder version of that trick.

Guidance for fiscal 2027 is unusually specific for the first quarter and vaguer for the year. Management pointed to first-quarter sales growth, excluding the Legacy Commercial Programs unit being wound down, of 21% to 23%, with adjusted EBITDA of 12.25% to 12.75% of sales, and to low double-digit to low-teens sales growth for the full fiscal year. Two other items give that outlook something to stand on: a $305 million award to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps C-40A fleet, and the April acquisition of Aircraft Reconfig Technologies, which brings an FAA Organization Designation Authorization into the engineering business and lets AAR approve certain modifications itself rather than waiting on the regulator.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Parts Supply / Repair & Engineering (reported)

Integrated Solutions (reported)

Expeditionary Services (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Q4 FY2026 results release, July 21, 2026

View the full interactive AIR report on boothcheck