ALAMOS GOLD INC. (AGI): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $37.46, ALAMOS GOLD INC. (AGI) is priced for +5.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AGI

Headline

FieldValue
TickerAGI
CompanyALAMOS GOLD INC.
Sector / IndustryBasic Materials
Current price$37.46/sh
CompositionYoung-Davidson 30% / Island Gold District 46% / Mulatos 27% / Corporate /other (gold-sale prepayment reconciling adj.) -2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)11.3%
Operating margin today60.7%
Margin compression (value-band)-49.4pp
Implied growth5.5%
Multiple paid14x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 6: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.3% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.64σ
cohort percentile (of 79 peers)24

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.64x5expensive
Earnings3.23x4expensive
Relative1.48x5expensive
Growth1.21x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=17)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$22.141.69xyesFCF base $0.3B, growth 23% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.5%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$41.870.89xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.0x / 15.0x / 20.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelative$30.021.25xyesP/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10.1x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$22.811.64xyesBV/sh $10.59, ROE (TTM) 19.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$33.131.13xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$31.081.21xyesRev $1.8B, growth 23% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.5x / 6.0x / 7.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$25.321.48xyesEPS $2.11, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=8.88 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$7.794.81xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.42B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.5% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$32.081.17xyesBV $10.59 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$22.421.67xyes√(22.5 × EPS $2.11 × BVPS $10.59) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelative$19.131.96xyesEBITDA $1.10B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$5.646.64xyesFCF $288.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarningsno
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$68.080.55xyesEPS $2.11 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$21.361.75xyesBV $10.59 × (ROIC 17.2% / WACC 8.5%)
P/Sales SectorRelative$6.465.80xyesRevenue $1.81B × sector P/S 1.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$79.130.47xyesEPS $2.11 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$22.811.64xyesEPS $2.11 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$423.1m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.47x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.39x (net cash)
Interest coverage1097.5x
Share count CAGR (dilution)1.7%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

A gold miner's advantage is almost never the gold. It is the geometry of getting it out, and at Alamos that geometry is about to change. Sinking of the Island Gold shaft reached its planned depth of 1,381 metres in the first quarter of 2026, with commissioning expected in early 2027. A shaft replaces the slow, diesel-burning business of trucking ore up a ramp with hoisting it straight to surface. The same orebody, the same grades, a materially lower cost per tonne. Island Gold District already supplies about 46% of revenue, more than Young-Davidson at roughly 30% or Mulatos at roughly 27%, so an improvement there moves the whole company rather than a corner of it.

That is the difference between growth a miner has to buy and growth it already owns. Company guidance calls for 570,000 to 650,000 ounces in 2026, rising to 46% production growth by 2028 with all-in sustaining costs falling nearly 20%, and roughly one million ounces a year by 2030 as the Island Gold District expansion and Lynn Lake both come in. Nothing in that requires a takeover, a financing, or a discovery. It requires construction crews to finish what is already permitted and paid for in part.

The construction risk is real, and it is the honest counter to this case. NEM's own annual report puts the industry version of it plainly: development projects could experience unexpected problems and delays during permitting, development, construction and mine start-up. What separates this program from the generic version is where it sits. Ontario, Manitoba and Mexico are jurisdictions with functioning mining codes and no history of surprising foreign owners, which removes the category of risk that decides most gold project outcomes before the geology gets a vote.

Capital discipline shows up in the small print. The quarterly dividend was raised 60% to 4 cents a share alongside first-quarter results, at a moment when nearly every dollar of cash flow has a construction site waiting for it. Companies mid-build usually do the opposite. Revenue grew about 23% over the trailing year, and the balance sheet still carries net cash rather than net borrowings.

The strongest part of the case, though, is what today's price does not ask for. At $29.59 the market pays roughly eleven times the operating profit reported in the last annual filing, and the trajectory that fits that price is a decline of about 2.3% a year for five years. The company's own guidance is for production to grow 46% by 2028. Those two statements cannot both be right. A buyer here is not paying for the plan; they are paying a price that works if the plan quietly fails, which is an unusual place to start.

Bear Case

The balance sheet looks clean and is carrying more weight than it appears. Net cash sat near 423 million dollars at the last annual balance sheet date and 459.5 million dollars at the end of the first quarter, with total liquidity around 1.2 billion dollars. Now set the construction schedule beside it. Capital spending for 2026 alone is guided at 850 to 940 million dollars excluding exploration, and Lynn Lake still carries 871 million dollars of initial capital from 2026 onward after its budget rose for a larger mill and a construction delay caused by the 2025 Manitoba wildfires. The program is larger than the cash pile. What actually funds it is the gold price.

Which is the problem, because the gold price stopped cooperating. Bullion has fallen roughly 28% from the record set on January 29, 2026 to near 4,038 dollars an ounce by mid-July, its worst quarterly decline since 2013. The first quarter realized 4,829 dollars an ounce and still produced only 101.7 million dollars of free cash flow, because 183.5 million dollars went into the ground as capital spending in the same three months. Run that quarter again at a materially lower metal price and the free cash flow line goes to zero or through it, with the construction commitments unchanged.

The operating gap is wider than the headline suggests. First-quarter all-in sustaining costs came in at 1,862 dollars an ounce against full-year guidance of 1,500 to 1,600, and production of 123,900 ounces represented barely a fifth of the low end of the full-year range. Both are explained by the same thing, a year designed to be back-weighted around the shaft ramp-up, but that explanation is also the risk: the entire 2026 guidance rests on a second half that has not happened yet, delivered by a project in commissioning. NEM's annual report describes what usually intervenes: projects could experience unexpected problems and delays during permitting, development, construction and mine start-up.

The valuation carries the same dependency. The methods that reach today's price are the ones that credit the forward plan, while the approaches that simply capitalize the cash the business currently produces land far below it, because a company mid-build produces very little spare cash by construction. That is not an accounting quirk. It is the actual position: today's business, valued on today's output, does not support today's price, and the gap is the expansion.

Nothing here threatens survival. There is no maturity wall, no covenant to breach, no forced equity issue in sight. The fragility is subtler and more common: a builder at a falling metal price eventually has to choose between finishing on schedule and keeping the balance sheet intact, and the choice usually arrives at the worst point in the cycle rather than the best.

Valuation

Today's price and the company's own plan tell opposite stories, and reconciling them is the whole valuation question. At $29.59 the market pays roughly eleven times the operating profit reported in the last annual filing, and the trajectory that fits that multiple is operating profit falling about 2.3% a year for five years. Management guides to 46% production growth by 2028 at nearly 20% lower all-in sustaining costs. The market is not pricing that plan. It is pricing a slow fade.

The methods used to triangulate the shares line up along that same fault. The cash-flow and growth approaches land essentially where the stock trades, because they credit the forward production profile. The price sits about 17% above where the peer-multiple methods land and about 30% above the asset-value methods. Furthest away are the earnings-power methods, with the price roughly two and a half times where they come out, and the reason is mechanical rather than mysterious: those approaches capitalize the free cash the business currently generates, and a company spending 850 to 940 million dollars on construction this year generates very little of it. Value the company as it stands and you get one answer. Value the company it is building and you get another. The price sits with the second.

The implied fade should be held loosely. Each percentage point added to the assumed cost of capital moves that implied trajectory by roughly five points, so the number describes a direction rather than a measurement, and small changes in the discount assumption swing it more than any operating variable does.

Against the wider gold cohort the shares sit in the lower half of the peer multiple range, which is a reasonable place for a mid-sized producer whose growth is still in the form of concrete and steel rather than ounces. Comparisons within that cohort are worth treating carefully; CDE, for instance, ran a 38.7% operating margin over the trailing year on revenue that more than doubled, and neither figure is a comment on Alamos so much as a reminder that everything in this sector moved at once when the metal did.

The balance sheet is the reason none of this is urgent. Net cash near 423 million dollars, no interest burden worth discussing, and roughly 1.2 billion dollars of liquidity at the end of the first quarter mean the construction program can absorb a weak year without a financing. What it cannot absorb indefinitely is a metal price that stays down through commissioning, and that is the variable the price is silently taking a view on.

Catalysts

The operational milestone worth tracking is already half-complete. Shaft sinking at Island Gold reached its planned depth of 1,381 metres during the first quarter of 2026, with commissioning expected in early 2027. Everything in the cost guidance for the next two years runs through that piece of infrastructure working as designed.

Second-quarter results are due after the close on July 29, 2026, with the call the following morning. Three lines matter. The realized price per ounce, against 4,829 dollars in the first quarter. All-in sustaining costs, which ran 1,862 dollars an ounce in the first quarter against full-year guidance of 1,500 to 1,600 dollars. And the pace of capital spending, with Lynn Lake alone planned at 140 to 160 million dollars for 2026. Production for the year was always designed to be second-half weighted, so the question is not whether the first half looked light but whether the ramp is arriving on schedule.

The metal supplies the backdrop and, for a company in the middle of a build, most of the funding. Gold has fallen about 28% from its January 29, 2026 record to near 4,038 dollars an ounce in mid-July, the sharpest quarterly decline since 2013, on rising bond yields and a firmer dollar. A producer with a finished mine can wait out a move like that. A producer with 850 to 940 million dollars of capital to place this year has less room to wait.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Core business (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Alamos Gold Q1 2026 results, April 29, 2026; Alamos Gold three-year guidance, February 4, 2026 · Alamos Gold Q1 2026 results, April 29, 2026 · Alamos Gold three-year operating guidance, February 4, 2026 · Alamos Gold Q1 2026 results, April 29, 2026; Alamos Gold three-year operating guidance, February 4, 2026 · spot gold market data, July 13, 2026 · Alamos Gold notice of second quarter 2026 results, June 30, 2026

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