ALAMOS GOLD INC. (AGI): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $29.68, ALAMOS GOLD INC. (AGI) is priced for -2.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-24.
Generated: 2026-07-24 · Exported: 2026-07-25 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/AGI
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | AGI |
| Company | ALAMOS GOLD INC. |
| Sector / Industry | Basic Materials |
| Current price | $29.68/sh |
| Composition | Young-Davidson 30% / Island Gold District 46% / Mulatos 27% / Corporate /other (gold-sale prepayment reconciling adj.) -2% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 9.9% |
| Operating margin today | 60.7% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -50.8pp |
| Implied growth | -2.2% |
| Multiple paid | 11x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 6: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage; each 1pp of cost of capital moves the implied operating-profit growth ~5.2pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.70σ |
| cohort percentile (of 78 peers) | 22 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; earnings-power land below the price.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.30x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 2.51x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.17x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.96x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.3%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=17)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $23.07 | 1.29x | yes | FCF base $0.3B, growth 23% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.3%, 5yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $34.20 | 0.87x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 7.0x / 12.0x / 17.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $28.84 | 1.03x | yes | P/E 14x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 10.5x / 14.0x / 16.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 9.21x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $22.78 | 1.30x | yes | BV/sh $10.57, ROE (TTM) 19.9%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $33.08 | 0.90x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $31.04 | 0.96x | yes | Rev $1.8B, growth 23% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.5x / 6.0x / 7.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 6x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $25.32 | 1.17x | yes | EPS $2.11, growth 2% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=7.04 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $7.98 | 3.72x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.42B × (1−19%) / WACC 8.3% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $32.04 | 0.93x | yes | BV $10.57 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 19.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $22.41 | 1.32x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $2.11 × BVPS $10.57) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $19.10 | 1.55x | yes | EBITDA $1.10B × sector EV/EBITDA 8.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $5.63 | 5.27x | yes | FCF $288.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $68.08 | 0.44x | yes | EPS $2.11 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $21.78 | 1.36x | yes | BV $10.57 × (ROIC 17.2% / WACC 8.3%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $6.45 | 4.60x | yes | Revenue $1.81B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $79.13 | 0.38x | yes | EPS $2.11 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $22.81 | 1.30x | yes | EPS $2.11 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net cash | $423.1m |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | -0.47x (net cash) |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | -0.39x (net cash) |
| Interest coverage | 1097.5x |
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 1.7% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- The Island Gold District is now about 46% of revenue and carries a plan to lift group production 46% by 2028 while pulling all-in sustaining costs down 18% from 2025 levels.
- Two seismic events at Young-Davidson cut second-quarter production guidance to 130,000 to 135,000 ounces, roughly 12% below the prior midpoint, and full-year output is now expected below the bottom of the guided range with costs above the top.
- Second-quarter results land in late July with revised full-year guidance attached, the first hard read on whether the second-half recovery management describes is actually arriving.
Bull Case
Most gold companies grow by buying other gold companies. Alamos is trying to do it by finishing a shaft. The Island Gold District, where the Magino mill now runs alongside the Island Gold underground mine, already supplies about 46% of revenue, and it is guided to produce 470,000 to 510,000 ounces in 2028 against 290,000 to 330,000 this year, once the shaft is commissioned, the mill is expanded toward 20,000 tonnes a day and the site is connected to grid power.
Group production is guided to 570,000 to 650,000 ounces this year, 650,000 to 730,000 next year and 755,000 to 835,000 in 2028, with all-in sustaining costs falling from $1,500 to $1,600 an ounce to $1,200 to $1,300 over the same span. Volume rising while unit costs fall is the rarest combination in mining, because the usual way to grow ounces is to process material you previously walked past. Here the extra ounces come out of one district that already has the roads, the power and the mill, so the fixed cost gets spread rather than duplicated.
The cost path is also the competitive argument. Agnico Eagle guides 2026 all-in sustaining costs of $1,400 to $1,550 an ounce and Newmont around $1,680 on a byproduct basis. Alamos begins this year above one of those and ends 2028 below both, if the plan lands roughly where it is drawn.
The company is funding this out of its own pocket rather than the market's. Net cash was $423.1 million at the end of 2025, against about $1.2 billion of total liquidity, and 2025 produced record free cash flow of $352 million on 531,230 ounces sold at an average realized price of $3,372. Operating profit covers the interest bill more than a thousand times over, which is a polite way of saying the debt is a formality rather than a constraint.
What the current gold price does to these economics showed up plainly in the first quarter: revenue of $596.7 million, up 79% on the year, operating profit of $344.8 million, net income of $191.4 million and $242.5 million of cash from operations. That is a business whose revenue nearly doubled without adding a mine.
The bear will point at Young-Davidson, and fairly. But Young-Davidson is guided flat at 155,000 to 175,000 ounces every year through 2028. It is the ballast, not the engine. Losing access to two high-grade stopes there costs a quarter of cash flow and a bruised reputation; it does not touch the shaft, the mill expansion or the grid connection that the next three years actually depend on. The bull case does not need the gold price to keep rising. It needs the price not to collapse in the eighteen months it takes to finish the build.
Bear Case
Strip out the gold price and there is a much smaller company underneath. Today's price is paying about 11 times company-wide operating income, and that operating income arrives on a trailing operating margin around 60.7%. No mining business earns that through a cycle. It is what happens when the selling price of the product runs a long way ahead of the cost of pulling it out of the ground, and the market has noticed: the assumption embedded in the price is that operating profit shrinks about 2.2% a year from here. That is not pessimism. It is the arithmetic of a peak.
Value the same ounces on several years of average profit instead of this year's, and those earnings-power methods leave the price about 2.5 times above where they land. That distance is not a modelling quirk. It is the size of the gap between average-of-the-cycle Alamos and gold-at-record-highs Alamos, and it is the honest measure of how much of today's valuation is borrowed from the commodity rather than earned by the mine plan.
Then there is delivery, which is where the last two months have gone badly. Two seismic events at Young-Davidson, one at an active mining front, damaged infrastructure and cut off access to two higher-grade stopes scheduled for the quarter, and three days of storm-related power outages followed in late May. Second-quarter production guidance came down to 130,000 to 135,000 ounces, about 12% below the prior midpoint, the mining rate at Young-Davidson was reset to roughly 5,000 tonnes a day for the rest of the year, and full-year production is now expected below the bottom of guidance with costs above the top. The chief executive's own summary, that the first half has been challenging, is the mildest available description of a 12% quarterly miss on a plan whose entire appeal is its predictability.
The growth plan and the cost plan are the same plan, which is the structural problem. All-in sustaining costs fall to $1,200 to $1,300 an ounce by 2028 mainly because production rises to 755,000 to 835,000 ounces over the same fixed cost base. Ounces that arrive late do not just delay revenue; they leave the cost per ounce sitting where it is. One slipping schedule moves both lines the wrong way at once.
That build is expensive while it happens. Capital spending is guided at $850 million to $940 million this year excluding $60 million of capitalised exploration, and $800 million to $890 million next year, with initial capital at Lynn Lake raised to $937 million. Record gold prices are not accumulating on the balance sheet; they are being converted into concrete and steel, and the payoff sits in years that have not happened yet.
Shareholders have also been paying for part of it. The share count has grown about 1.7% a year since the end of 2021, so per-share claims on the coming ounce growth are slightly thinner than the headline production figures suggest.
None of this makes the price indefensible. The static lenses do not scream: peer multiples leave the price about 17% above where they land, and the cash-flow methods land about 4% above the price. What it makes the price is conditional. The buyer is underwriting a shaft being commissioned, a mill reaching 20,000 tonnes a day, and gold staying high enough for long enough that the 2028 cost curve arrives before the current margin fades.
Valuation
At $29.68 the market is paying about 11 times company-wide operating income, and what it asks in exchange is modest: the price needs operating profit only to decline about 2.2% a year. That is a five-year view rather than a permanent one, and for a cyclical it is the sensible shape. Trailing operating margin sits around 60.7%, which is not a number any mining company defends across a cycle, so a price that underwrites gentle decline is reading the cycle rather than doubting the company.
Line the methods up and the disagreement is easy to read. Peer multiples put the price about 17% above where they land, and the asset-value methods about 30% above. The cash-flow methods land about 4% above the price, essentially on top of it. And the earnings-power methods leave the price about 2.5 times above where they land, because they capitalise several years of average profit rather than this year's. That last gap is the whole cyclical question expressed as a distance: value the company on the profit it earned across the last cycle and it looks expensive, value it on the profit it earns today and it looks ordinary.
The concrete version of what has to be true is the cost curve. Guidance takes all-in sustaining costs from $1,500 to $1,600 an ounce this year down to $1,200 to $1,300 in 2028, on production rising from 570,000 to 650,000 ounces to 755,000 to 835,000. Two lines moving in opposite directions at once is the thing being paid for, and June's update already pushed this year's production below the bottom of its range and this year's costs above the top. The 2028 figures are unchanged so far, which means the burden has shifted onto 2027 and 2028 rather than disappearing.
Revenue concentration matters to how that risk lands. The Island Gold District is about 46% of revenue, Young-Davidson about 30% and Mulatos about 27%, so the district carrying the growth is also the largest single line already. A problem there would not be a rounding adjustment.
The balance sheet is not where the risk lives. Net cash of $423.1 million makes the company a creditor rather than a debtor, and operating profit covers the interest bill more than a thousand times over. What the balance sheet does not do is make the build free: capital spending of $850 million to $940 million this year, against guided production of 570,000 to 650,000 ounces, is roughly a third of what the company will collect at current prices.
One line moves the wrong way. The share count has risen about 1.7% a year since the end of 2021, so each shareholder's claim on the coming ounces grows a little slower than the ounces do.
Catalysts
The next data point arrives within days. Second-quarter results are scheduled for late July, and they come with revised full-year production and cost guidance attached, which is the part that matters. Management has already said the year will finish below the bottom of the production range and above the top of the cost range; the open question is by how much, and whether the 2027 and 2028 targets survive intact.
The operating detail to watch sits in two places. At Young-Davidson, the mining rate has been reset to roughly 5,000 tonnes a day for the balance of 2026 while ground support is strengthened and the mining sequence is re-cut, with higher rates targeted only after this year. At the Island Gold District, underground mining passed 1,500 tonnes a day in the second quarter against a 2,000 tonne target by year-end, and the Magino mill averaged nearly 9,800 tonnes a day in June against a 10,000 tonne target for the third quarter. Those two throughput numbers are the second-half recovery in its most literal form.
Further out, three commissioning events carry the 2028 plan: the Island Gold shaft, the mill expansion toward 20,000 tonnes a day, and the grid power connection expected by the end of this year. Lynn Lake sits behind them with initial capital now put at $937 million. Each of those has a date attached, and each date is a place where the cost curve either arrives or slips.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- NEM (NEWMONT CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AEM (AGNICO EAGLE MINES LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- B (BARRICK MINING CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- GFI (Gold Fields Limited)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- KGC (KINROSS GOLD CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HMY (HARMONY GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CDE (COEUR MINING, INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- BVN (BUENAVENTURA MINING CO INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Alamos Gold three-year guidance, February 4, 2026 · Alamos Gold operational update, June 18, 2026 · Agnico Eagle and Newmont 2026 guidance · Alamos Gold Q4 and year-end 2025 results, February 18, 2026 · Alamos Gold Q1 2026 results, April 29, 2026 · Alamos Gold segment disclosure