Addus HomeCare Corp (ADUS): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $118.76, Addus HomeCare Corp (ADUS) is priced for +5.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADUS

Headline

FieldValue
TickerADUS
CompanyAddus HomeCare Corp
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$118.76/sh
CompositionPersonal Care 77% / Hospice 18% / Home Health 5%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)1.7%
Operating margin today9.8%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.1pp
Implied growth5.3%
Multiple paid16x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 9: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.63σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)27

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF; asset-based/earnings-power land below the price.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.09x5expensive
Earnings1.77x5expensive
Relative0.79x2justifies
Growth0.94x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$194.420.61xyesFCF base $0.2B, growth 20% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$126.030.94xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 12.2x / 14.2x / 16.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 18x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 14.7x / 18.0x / 21.3x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 12x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$57.782.06xyesBV/sh $59.80, ROE (TTM) 8.9%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$56.802.09xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$98.041.21xyesRev $1.4B, growth 20% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.2x / 1.5x / 1.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 12x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$124.510.95xyesEPS $5.42, growth 23% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.97 (Undervalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$32.443.66xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $0.10B × (1−23%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$56.632.10xyesBV $59.80 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 8.9% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 5.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$85.401.39xyes√(22.5 × EPS $5.42 × BVPS $59.80) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.16B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$77.661.53xyesFCF $137.4M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$67.081.77xyesSBC-adj FCF $0.12B (FCF $0.14B − SBC $0.02B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$174.890.68xyesEPS $5.42 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$15.587.62xyesBV $59.80 × (ROIC 2.3% / WACC 8.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $1.45B × sector P/S 2.5x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$186.770.64xyesEPS $5.42 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 23.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 34.5x
Earnings YieldEarnings$58.592.03xyesEPS $5.42 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Personal Careoperatingenterprise$1.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Hospiceoperatingenterprise$263.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value
Home Healthoperatingenterprise$71.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net cash$5.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)-0.05x (net cash)
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)-0.04x (net cash)
Interest coverage12.1x
Share count CAGR (dilution)3.5%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The objection to owning this company fits in one sentence: it is a line item in a state budget. Personal care is 77% of revenue, most of it paid by Medicaid programmes, and the 10-K does not soften the concentration: "operations in Illinois, which represented 42.1 % and 51.5% of our net service revenues for the years ended December 31, 2025 and 2024, respectively. One payor client, the Illinois Department on Aging, accounted for 18.1 % and 21.0% of net service revenues". A single legislature deciding to save money is the whole bear case in one move. What the record shows is that the legislature has been moving the other way, and for a reason that is not political generosity.

The mechanism is worth spelling out because it is unusual. Illinois does not just set what Addus is paid; it sets what Addus must pay. The 10-K records a rate of $29.63 an hour effective January 1, 2025 that "required a minimum wage of $18.00 per hour for direct service workers", and then a further step, with the fiscal 2026 state budget including "an increase in hourly rates for in-home care services to $30.80, effective January 1, 2026. This rate sustains a minimum wage of $18.75 per hour" for those same workers. The state raises the reimbursement and the wage floor together. That is an unglamorous arrangement, and it is also a hedge: the largest cost in the business moves with the largest revenue line by legislative design rather than by negotiation.

It has been showing up in the numbers. "Gross profit, expressed as a percentage of net service revenues, increased from 47.0% for the year ended December 31, 2024 to 48.7% for the year ended December 31, 2025". Nearly two points of gross profit in a labour business where wages are the cost of goods sold is not a small move, and it happened in a year the same filing describes as difficult on the cost side.

Why the state keeps paying is the more durable part of the argument. An hour of care in someone's home is cheaper than a day in a facility, and the demographics pushing demand are not sensitive to sentiment. That shows in the segment mix rather than in a forecast: Addus is 77% personal care, 18% hospice and 5% home health, and the parts of the business connected to keeping people out of institutions are the parts that grew.

The trailing economics land in a defensible spot within the cohort rather than at an extreme. Addus converts 9.2% of revenue into operating profit on about $1.45B of trailing sales. Aveanna (AVAH) converts 10.9% on $2.52B while growing 20.5%, and Chemed (CHE), the closest listed hospice comparison, 12.9% on $2.54B while growing 2.1%. At the weaker end, AdaptHealth (AHCO) manages 2.2% on $3.29B and Brookdale (BKD) 1.1% on $3.15B with revenue slightly down. Addus is neither the cheapest operator nor the most profitable, but it is one of the few in this group growing and earning at the same time, and it does so with operating profit covering interest about 10 times over and without consuming cash.

Bear Case

Federal policy is the variable with the most leverage here, and it moved last year. The 10-K states that budget reconciliation legislation enacted on July 4, 2025 "is expected to decrease federal Medicaid spending, including as a result of changes to Medicaid eligibility policies and changes to Medicaid financing mechanisms, such as limitations on provider tax arrangements". Provider taxes are how many states manufacture the share of Medicaid spending that draws down federal matching funds. Restrict them and a state's capacity to fund home care shrinks without any legislator voting to cut home care. The pressure arrives one budget cycle later, through a rate that does not rise rather than a programme that gets cancelled, which is much harder for a company to protest and much easier for a market to underestimate.

Concentration turns that general risk into a specific one. Illinois was 42.1% of net service revenues last year and its Department on Aging alone 18.1%, and the risk factors carry the matching warning that "Future efforts to reduce the costs of the Illinois Department on Aging programs could adversely affect our service revenues and profitability." A company with a fifth of its revenue from one government agency does not have customers in the ordinary sense. It has an appropriation.

The price does not obviously reflect that. At roughly 17 times company-wide operating income, the multiple sits at the very top of the peer distribution, well past the upper quartile, for a business whose largest payor is a state facing the same federal squeeze as every other state. The growth the price requires, about 6.9% a year at the operating line, is not itself demanding and sits inside what Addus has recently delivered. The demand is that it continue without a year of flat reimbursement, and reimbursement is the one input management does not set. The arithmetic amplifies the point: each additional percentage point of required return moves the growth the price needs by roughly 6.5 points, so a change in how the market prices policy risk does far more damage here than a change in operations would.

Look at the capital and the picture gets harder. Addus has built itself by acquisition, and the balance sheet shows it: book value is about $60.38 a share, but return on invested capital runs near 2.3% and return on equity around 8.9%, which is below the roughly 9.3% cost of equity applied to a business like this. That combination is what a serial acquirer looks like when the prices paid have been full. It also explains why the approaches anchored on capital and on realised profit sit so far under today's level: the price stands about 100% above where the asset value methods land and about 69% above the earnings power methods. The share count has grown about 3.5% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is part of how the acquisitions were paid for.

Wage economics cut both ways and the filing says so. Management notes that rate increases "may not be sufficient to offset increases to operating expenses", and adds that these factors "had an unfavorable impact on our financial results during the year ended December 31, 2025". The reimbursement-and-wage-floor pairing that protects the spread in a good year offers no protection when a state raises the wage without raising the rate, and nothing obliges it to do both.

The bull answer is that home care is cheaper than institutional care and that states know it. That is true and it is why the business exists. It does not follow that the rate rises every year, and the peer set shows what happens to operators whose reimbursement stalls: AdaptHealth (AHCO) converts 2.2% of $3.29B into operating profit with revenue up 1.2%, and Brookdale (BKD) 1.1% of $3.15B with revenue slightly lower. Neither of those companies decided to become less profitable. Their payors decided for them.

Valuation

Begin with the demand $114.62 places on the business. The price capitalises company-wide operating income at roughly 17 times, and holding that requires operating profit to compound about 6.9% a year through a five-year stage before settling at a 4% long-run pace, discounted at a cost of capital near 8.6%. Measured against what Addus has recently delivered, that rate is unremarkable. The awkward part is where the multiple sits relative to the companies it is measured against: at the very top of the peer distribution, well past the upper quartile, in an industry where nobody else is being paid that way.

Those two observations are not in conflict; they are describing different things. The growth being asked for is ordinary. The willingness to pay 17 times for it in home care is not. Which one turns out to matter depends on whether reimbursement stays orderly, and that is a policy question rather than an operating one.

The methods sort accordingly. Peer multiple approaches land about 8% above the price and the forward cash-flow methods about 7% above it, so on both of those readings today's level is roughly fair. The asset value methods sit far below, with the price about 100% above where they land, and the earnings power methods about 69% above. The last group deserves an explanation rather than a shrug. One of them normalises operating profit across five years, adds back one-time charges and capitalises the result with no growth at all. Averaging across five years for a company that has been buying businesses throughout means the normalised figure reflects a smaller Addus than the one that exists now. It reads low for a structural reason, but it also measures something the growth methods do not: what the price would look like if acquisitions stopped.

Two filing-reported inputs carry the operating side of the calculation. The first is conversion, which has been improving: "Gross profit, expressed as a percentage of net service revenues, increased from 47.0% for the year ended December 31, 2024 to 48.7% for the year ended December 31, 2025". The second is the price and cost of an hour of care, both set in the same document. Illinois moved to "an increase in hourly rates for in-home care services to $30.80, effective January 1, 2026. This rate sustains a minimum wage of $18.75 per hour" for direct service workers. Revenue per hour and cost per hour are therefore both legislated, and the difference between them is the margin the model is extrapolating.

Cohort position is where the multiple looks most exposed. Addus converts 9.2% of about $1.45B of revenue into operating profit. Chemed (CHE) converts 12.9% of $2.54B, Aveanna (AVAH) 10.9% of $2.52B while growing 20.5%, and Encompass Health (EHC) carries a 10.0% profit margin on $6.06B. Addus is not the standout operator in that group on either growth or conversion, which makes a top-of-distribution multiple a statement about expected policy stability rather than about demonstrated performance.

The balance sheet is not the risk. Funded borrowings are small next to a year of operating profit, that profit covers interest about 10 times over, and the business generates cash rather than consuming it. What the balance sheet does reveal is how the company grows: the share count has risen about 3.5% a year over the four years to March 2026, and return on invested capital of roughly 2.3% against book value of about $60.38 per share is the arithmetic of buying revenue rather than building it. That is the trade a holder is making at this multiple.

Catalysts

The next dated event is close and the bar is a recovery rather than a repeat. Addus releases second-quarter results after the close on Monday, August 3, 2026, with the conference call the following morning.

The first quarter is why that matters. Net service revenues rose 7.7% to $363.6 million and diluted earnings per share came to $1.36 against $1.16 a year earlier, but both figures landed below what analysts had been carrying, with the revenue estimate at $373.5 million and the per-share estimate at $1.58. Growth continued; it simply did not arrive at the pace the market had assumed. Underneath the headline, personal care rose 8.8% to $281.1 million with organic growth of 6.5%, hospice rose 7.1% to $65.8 million, and home health fell 7.0% to $16.7 million.

That mix is the thing to watch in August. Home health is the smallest segment and the only one contracting, so it changes little by itself, but the split between organic and acquired growth in personal care changes a great deal. Organic growth of 6.5% against total segment growth of 8.8% means roughly a quarter of the increase came from businesses that were bought rather than built, and the multiple being paid for the company rests on the first number continuing. The other line worth reading is any commentary on state rate schedules for the coming fiscal year, since the federal Medicaid changes enacted in July 2025 work through state budgets with a lag and the second half of 2026 is when those budgets get written.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Personal Care (reported)

Hospice (reported)

Home Health (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Addus HomeCare earnings release schedule, July 20, 2026; Addus HomeCare first quarter 2026 results, May 4, 2026 · Addus HomeCare earnings release and conference call announcement, July 20, 2026 · Addus HomeCare first quarter 2026 results, May 4, 2026

View the full interactive ADUS report on boothcheck