AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC (ADP): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $287.48, AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC (ADP) is priced for +12.3% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADP

Headline

FieldValue
TickerADP
CompanyAUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$287.48/sh
CompositionEmployer Services 68% / PEO Services 32%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)12.6%
Operating margin today26.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-13.5pp
Implied growth12.3%
Multiple paid20x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 8.9% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

ReferenceValue
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)27

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.92x4expensive
Earnings2.03x4expensive
Relative2.01x2expensive
Growth0.96x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=13)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$306.020.94xyesFCF base $5.6B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.9%, 5yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$298.380.96xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 194.9x / 196.9x / 198.9x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 35x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 29.4x / 35.0x / 40.6x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 55x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$120.112.39xyesBV/sh $15.18, ROE (TTM) 73.2%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$527.340.55xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$231.191.24xyesRev $21.9B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 4.4x / 5.2x / 6.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$131.282.19xyesEPS $10.94, growth 10% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=2.71 (Overvalued)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarningsno
Residual IncomeAsset$199.721.44xyesBV $15.18 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 73.2% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$61.134.70xyes√(22.5 × EPS $10.94 × BVPS $15.18) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $0.59B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$145.191.98xyesFCF $5441.2M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$138.592.07xyesSBC-adj FCF $5.20B (FCF $5.44B − SBC $0.24B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$253.161.14xyesEPS $10.94 × (8.5 + 2×9.6%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAssetno
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $21.95B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$156.811.83xyesEPS $10.94 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 9.6% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 14.3x
Earnings YieldEarnings$118.272.43xyesEPS $10.94 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Employer Servicesoperatingenterprise$14.8bwithheldunresolved no unit value
PEO Servicesoperatingenterprise$7.1bwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$772.7m
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.17x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.13x
Interest coverage12.5x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-1.1%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Most companies would like to hold other people's money and cannot. Running payroll means collecting from the employer before the employees and the tax authorities get paid, and that timing gap leaves a balance sitting on the books. ADP invests it. The FY2025 10-K describes the method without drama: the client funds investment strategy is "structured to allow us to average our way through an interest rate cycle by laddering the maturities of our investments" out to five years in the extended portfolio and out to ten years in the long one. The laddering is the part that matters. It means the interest line does not reprice with the front of the curve each quarter; it drifts, which converts a rate-sensitive asset into something closer to an annuity with a long memory.

The client base behaves the way that structure implies. "Based on our retention levels in fiscal 2025, our client retention is estimated at approximately 13 years in Employer Services, and approximately 6 years in PEO." Thirteen years is not a customer relationship in the ordinary sense. It is an installed base. Payroll sits underneath almost every other system a company runs, feeding the general ledger, the benefits carriers and the tax filings, and the cost of leaving is counted in reconciliations rather than license fees. The same 10-K notes that some products are sold under longer-term contracts with "initial terms typically ranging from two to seven years", so a meaningful share of the base is contractually parked before retention behaviour even enters the picture.

That combination produces unusual returns on very little invested capital. Trailing operating margin runs at 27.7% on roughly $21.6B of revenue. Book value is only about $15.78 a share, so return on equity comes out near 68%. The high return says less about brilliance than about what the business owns: contracts, code, compliance infrastructure and a trust structure, not factories. The 10-K makes the last of those explicit, noting that "the ADP Client Trust and ADP Trust Bank provide client funds with a level of protection that most competitors cannot offer". Regulatory apparatus is a strange thing to call a moat, but a competitor cannot buy one, and a client who has already routed its tax remittances through it has little reason to test an alternative.

Placed against the cohort, the shape is distinctive rather than dominant on any single line. Paychex (PAYX) earns a higher operating margin, 36.9%, on $6.3B of trailing revenue, and grew 16.4% over the last year. Paycom (PAYC) and Paylocity (PCTY) are smaller and faster than ADP on revenue, growing 9.4% and 11.3%, on operating margins of 28.3% and 21.3%. Workday (WDAY), the largest of the group by revenue at $9.9B, converts far less of it, at a 10.4% operating margin. Retention across the group is genuinely high; Paylocity's own 10-K reports revenue retention "greater than 92% in each of fiscal 2023, 2024 and 2025". The bull argument is not that ADP wins any of those comparisons. It is that no one else is running $21.6B of revenue at a 27.7% margin with a 13-year average client life and a regulated funds business attached.

Growth arrives from several directions at once, which is what makes it steady rather than spectacular. The FY2025 10-K attributes the year's revenue increase to "new business started from new business bookings, strong client retention, an increase in zero-margin benefits pass-throughs, an increase in pricing, an increase in interest on funds held for clients". Two of those cost nothing to deliver. Pricing on an installed base of that duration compounds without a salesperson, and the interest line compounds without a client. Management has been returning the result rather than hoarding it: the share count has fallen about 1.1% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is buyback deployment showing up in the one place it cannot be dressed up.

Bear Case

Two of the drivers underneath ADP's recent results are running near the top of their cycles at the same time, and neither is under management's control. The first is employment. The 10-K states it directly: "Our business is also impacted by employment levels across our clients, as we have varied contracts throughout our business that blend base fees and per-employee fees." Per-employee fees fall when clients shed staff, and they fall without a single client leaving, which is why 13-year retention is a weaker defence than it sounds. The second is interest. A downturn hits both at once, and the filing says so: "When there is a reduction in employment levels due to a slowdown in the economy, the Company may experience a decline in client fund obligations". The invested balance shrinks in the same quarter the fee line softens, and the interest income earned on it shrinks with it.

That matters because the price is not asking for anything dramatic; it is asking for something uninterrupted. At $250.09 the market is capitalising company-wide operating income at roughly 17 times, which requires operating profit to compound at about 7.8% a year and to keep doing it across a five-year run. On its own recent record ADP has grown operating profit nearer 6.6%. The gap is a little over a point, and that is precisely the difficulty. The demand is not heroic, it is relentless: five consecutive years without a soft one, in a business whose own filing lists interest on client funds and zero-margin benefits pass-throughs among the drivers of the last good year. If growth settles at the recent pace instead, the multiple has to absorb the shortfall, and the peer-multiple and earnings-power approaches both land far below today's price.

The arithmetic is also unusually sensitive to the required return. One additional percentage point of cost of capital raises the growth rate the price needs by roughly 5.4 points, which is a large answer to a small input. Practically, that means the assumption doing the most work here is not ADP's execution but the discount rate the market applies to it, and that rate is not something the company can defend by selling more payroll.

Regulation sits on the same pressure point. The risk factors note that "Changes in laws or regulations could also cause us to modify our client funds investment strategy, which may reduce the interest income earned on such funds." A rule change to how client money may be invested would not touch a single client relationship and would still remove revenue that carries almost no cost, which is the worst kind of revenue to lose.

On competition, the filing is honest to the point of dryness: "We know of no reliable statistics by which we can determine the number of our competitors", though it believes it is among the largest providers in the world. The cohort numbers say the field is not standing still. Paychex (PAYX) grew revenue 16.4% over the last year at a 36.9% operating margin, both ahead of ADP on the growth line and on conversion. Paycom (PAYC) and Paylocity (PCTY) are compounding at 9.4% and 11.3% from smaller bases, and TriNet (TNET), the closest listed comparison to the co-employment side, shrank 2.4% with a 3.2% profit margin, which is a fair indication that PEO economics are the harder half of ADP's business rather than the easier one.

The bull answer to all of this is real: the base is sticky, the pricing is contractual, and the interest exposure is laddered specifically so that no single year of rates decides the outcome. That is true, and it slows the damage rather than preventing it. A ladder that averages a rising rate cycle into the results on the way up averages a falling one into them on the way down. What the price is buying is five years of that averaging going the right way, on a business that has recently grown operating profit slightly slower than the price requires.

Valuation

Begin with what $250.09 has to assume. The price capitalises company-wide operating income at about 17 times, and carrying that forward requires operating profit to grow roughly 7.8% a year before settling into a 4% terminal pace, discounted at a cost of capital near 9%. Against ADP's own recent record of about 6.6%, the required rate is not extreme. What makes it demanding is that the pace has to hold across a five-year run rather than show up in one good year. Relative to the payroll and human capital cohort the multiple itself sits in the lower half of the peer range, so what is being paid for here is not obviously a crowd effect.

The methods used to triangulate that price disagree in a readable pattern. The cash-flow approaches land closest, with today's price about 8% above the middle of that group, and the two discounted cash flow constructions inside it actually reach past the price. Everything else sits well below. The peer multiple methods place the price about 58% above where they land, and the asset value and earnings power methods put it 70% to 80% above. That configuration, where only forward cash-flow methods reach the price and the static frames do not, describes a durability premium. The trailing methods can only value what ADP has already earned; none of them has a mechanism for a client that stays 13 years and absorbs an increase along the way.

The size of that premium is easiest to see with growth switched off. Over the trailing year ADP produced free cash flow of 5.45 billion dollars. Capitalise that at a 9.3% cost of equity, assume the business never grows again, and roughly two fifths of today's share price is left over as payment for growth that has not yet happened. One discounted cash flow construction does reach today's level, and it is worth knowing how. It starts from a free cash flow base of 5.6 billion dollars, grows it 7% a year, settles at 4% in perpetuity and discounts at 8.9%. Neither input is aggressive on its own. They simply both have to hold for the length of the projection.

Two filing-reported inputs sit underneath all of it. The first is contract duration: some products are sold under agreements with "initial terms typically ranging from two to seven years", which is why the revenue base is steady enough for a cash-flow lens to be the right one here at all. The second is where last year's margin came from. "Employer Services' margin increased in fiscal 2025 due to contributions from operating efficiencies for costs of servicing and implementing our clients on growing revenue, and client funds interest revenues". Efficiency and interest are not the same quality of margin. One persists; the other is on loan from the rate cycle.

Cohort position sharpens the picture without settling it. Paychex (PAYX) converts 36.9% of $6.3B of revenue into operating profit and grew 16.4%; ADP converts 27.7% of $21.6B and grows slower. Scale is what ADP has and Paychex does not, and margin is the reverse. Workday (WDAY), with $9.9B of trailing revenue and a 10.4% operating margin, shows what the same market looks like when the operating model is still being paid for.

The balance sheet is not what decides this one. Operating profit covers interest expense about 14.8 times over, funded debt is small next to a single year's operating profit, the business is not consuming cash, and the share count has fallen about 1.1% a year over the four years to March 2026. Whatever goes wrong at this price will show up as a multiple that compressed, not as a company that ran out of room.

Catalysts

The next dated event is close. ADP reports its fiscal fourth quarter and full fiscal 2026 before the market opens on July 29, 2026, with a call the same morning. The company no longer distributes results over a newswire and posts them to its investor relations site instead, so the release itself is the event rather than the wire crossing.

April's third-quarter print is the reason the bar is where it is. Revenue rose 7% to $5.9 billion, net earnings rose 9%, and GAAP diluted earnings per share rose 10% to $3.38 for the quarter. Management then raised its fiscal 2026 targets, moving to revenue growth of 6% to 7% and diluted earnings per share growth of 10% to 11% for the full fiscal year. Raising a full-year target with one quarter left is a narrow commitment, which makes the July print a straightforward pass or fail rather than a matter of interpretation.

Two lines inside that release will carry more information than the headline. The first is interest on funds held for clients, because it moves with rates and with the size of the client payroll base rather than with sales execution, and it fed both revenue and Employer Services margin in the last fiscal year. The second is new business bookings, which is where a slowdown in small business hiring would appear first, ahead of any change in retention. Analysts polled ahead of the print expect fiscal fourth-quarter diluted earnings per share of $2.59 against $2.26 in the same quarter a year earlier.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Employer Services (reported)

PEO Services (reported)

Article Insight (Recent News Sentiment)

Sentiment score: 55.00 (MEDIUM confidence) FUD/Hype: NONE Claim alignment: MIXED

The articles collectively present a mixed signal, largely confirming recent performance data while offering little directional insight beyond the existing analyst consensus.

Stifel Nicolaus Sticks to Its Hold Rating for Automatic Data Processing (ADP)

Analysts Offer Insights on Technology Companies: Automatic Data Processing (ADP), Everspin Technologies (MRAM) and Euronet Worldwide (EEFT)

ADP: Fiscal Q3 Earnings Snapshot

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

ADP fiscal Q3 2026 earnings release, April 29, 2026; ADP investor relations announcement, June 29, 2026 · ADP investor relations announcement, June 29, 2026 · ADP fiscal Q3 2026 earnings release, April 29, 2026 · analyst consensus compiled ahead of the July 29, 2026 report

View the full interactive ADP report on boothcheck