Adient plc (ADNT): what the price assumes
boothcheck covers Adient plc (ADNT) but does not put one priced-in number on it: here the defensible answer is the evidence rather than a point estimate. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADNT
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ADNT |
| Company | Adient plc |
| Sector / Industry | Consumer Cyclical |
| Current price | $20.01/sh |
| Composition | Americas 47% / EMEA 33% / Asia 21% / Inter-segment elimination -1% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 0.9% |
| Operating margin today | 1.6% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -0.7pp |
| Multiple paid | 13x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7.2% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: n/a
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| cohort percentile (of 212 peers) | 29 |
Valuation X-Ray
Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 4.01x | 4 | expensive |
| Earnings | 3.85x | 4 | expensive |
| Relative | 3.03x | 5 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.96x | 2 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $33.45 | 0.60x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 17.8x / 19.8x / 21.8x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 5yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $11.16 | 1.79x | yes | P/E 23.64x (blended: static sector reference 20x + trailing (TTM) 32x), scenarios: 19.9x / 23.6x / 27.4x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 15.05x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $6.73 | 2.97x | yes | BV/sh $22.43, ROE (TTM) 2.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $3.96 | 5.05x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $15.25 | 1.31x | yes | Rev $15.1B, growth 5% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.1x / 0.1x / 0.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $6.60 | 3.03x | yes | EPS $0.55, growth 1% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=42.70 (Overvalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | $2.93 | 6.83x | yes | BV $22.43 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 2.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 1.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $16.66 | 1.20x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $0.55 × BVPS $22.43) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $1.34 | 14.93x | yes | EBITDA $0.21B × sector EV/EBITDA 13.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $7.12 | 2.81x | yes | FCF $295.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $1.79 | 11.18x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $0.26B (FCF $0.29B − SBC $0.04B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $4.61 | 4.34x | yes | EPS $0.55 × (8.5 + 2×0.8%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $294.29 | 0.07x | yes | Revenue $15.13B × sector P/S 1.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $2.75 | 7.28x | yes | EPS $0.55 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 0.8% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 1.1x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $5.95 | 3.36x | yes | EPS $0.55 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.5b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 9.21x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 5.95x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.4% |
| Burning cash | no |
Interest expense is not separately reported in the latest filings, so interest coverage cannot be computed.
Bullet Takeaways
- Seats are the single largest and bulkiest thing bolted into a car, and the 10-K describes Adient as a global leader in complete seat assembly and one of the largest in all major seating components including seating foam, metal structures, seat covers and seat mechanisms, split across the Americas at 47% of revenue, EMEA at 33% and Asia at 21%.
- The defining risk is that this scale converts to almost no profit: the trailing operating margin is negative at -0.6% and even the through-cycle figure is only about 0.4%, on contracts the filing says carry annual price reductions and ongoing price adjustments.
- Third-quarter results land August 5, 2026, against a full-year revenue outlook raised to roughly $14.6 billion earlier in the year.
Bull Case
A car seat is an awkward object to make money on and an even more awkward one to move. It is large, heavy, customized to the trim level of a specific vehicle, and it has to arrive at the assembly line in the exact order the cars are being built. That physical reality is the whole moat in this industry: seating plants get built next to the customer's plant, they get designed into a vehicle program years ahead, and once they are in, switching costs the automaker a launch delay it cannot afford.
Adient sits at the center of that arrangement. The 10-K describes it as a global leader in complete seat assembly and one of the largest in all major seating components including seating foam, metal structures, seat covers and seat mechanisms, and as a supplier to all of the global OEMs with longstanding relationships including BMW, Mercedes-Benz Group, Ford Motor Company, General Motors Company, Honda Motor Company, Hyundai Motor Company, Jaguar Land Rover, Kia Corporation, Mazda Motor Corporation, Mitsubishi Motor and others. Being vertically integrated into foam, metal structures, covers and mechanisms matters more than it sounds: the company that makes the components and the assembly can absorb a cost increase in one and recover it in another.
The geographic split is genuinely balanced rather than notionally global. The Americas supply 47% of revenue, EMEA 33% and Asia 21%. Three regions with different production cycles, different customers and different labor economics, which is why a European volume decline does not automatically become a company-wide one.
The bull case runs on operating leverage, and the leverage here is extreme. Through the cycle this business earns an operating margin of about 0.4% on revenue of roughly $14.9 billion. That is a razor-thin conversion, but it also means the sensitivity works both ways: a single percentage point of margin on that revenue base is a multiple of everything the business currently earns. This is the rare situation where operational improvement, not growth, is the entire investment case. Revenue does not have to expand at all.
Capital allocation has been pointed at exactly that idea. The share count has fallen about 4.4% a year over the four years to March 2026, so the same eventual recovery is being spread over meaningfully fewer shares. The company is not burning through its resources while it waits, and it refinanced ahead of maturity rather than into it, using proceeds from new notes together with cash on hand to fully redeem AGH's 4.875% senior unsecured notes in March 2025.
The peer group shows the target rather than the ceiling. Lear (LEA) earns 3.6% operating margins on $23.5 billion of revenue, Aptiv (APTV) 5.4% on $20.7 billion, BorgWarner (BWA) 4.4% on $14.3 billion and Autoliv (ALV) 9.7% on $11.0 billion. None of those is a spectacular business. All of them are several times more profitable per dollar of revenue than Adient currently is, at comparable scale. The bull thesis is not that seating becomes a wonderful industry. It is that a global leader in it should not be earning less than the companies it sits alongside, and that closing even part of that gap on a $14.9 billion revenue base is worth far more than the equity currently costs.
Bear Case
Read the buyback and the bond indenture side by side and the tension is immediate. Adient's own notes carry covenants that restrict the company's ability to create, assume, incur or guarantee certain indebtedness; pay dividends or make other distributions on, or repurchase or redeem, Adient's capital stock or certain other debt. Those restrictions exist because lenders regard this balance sheet as needing them. And yet the share count has been reduced about 4.4% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is management spending on equity while creditors sit ahead of it in a business whose borrowings run roughly 42 times operating profit in a normal year.
That is not automatically wrong. A cheap share bought back is real value transferred to the holders who stay. But it is a choice, and the alternative use of that money was reducing the claim that ranks ahead of them. In a business earning a -0.6% operating margin over the last twelve months and only about 0.4% through the cycle, the margin for error on that choice is very small.
The second problem is that the contracts themselves are designed to take the improvement away. The 10-K states that Adient's transaction prices are based on purchase orders, annual price reductions and ongoing price adjustments, with price reductions over the production life of the awarded program. Read that plainly: the customer has already negotiated a lower price for next year, and the year after that. Every efficiency the company finds is partly pre-committed to the automaker. This is not an Adient failing; Garrett Motion (GTX) describes the same industry mechanism in its own filing, noting continuous pressure on OEMs to reduce costs and that supply agreements typically require step-downs in component pricing over the period of production. Structural, permanent, and the reason seating margins do not compound.
The customers are also the competition. Adient's filing warns that Adient's customers may increase levels of production insourcing for a variety of reasons, such as shifts in customers' business strategies or the emergence of low-cost production opportunities in other countries, and Visteon (VC) reports the same threat, that certain customers have communicated an intent to manufacture components internally that are currently produced by outside suppliers. A supplier whose largest buyers can credibly threaten to make the product themselves has a ceiling on what it can ever charge.
Meanwhile the geography that matters most for growth is turning against Western suppliers. Lear (LEA) observes in its filing that Chinese domestic automakers, in particular, continue to expand their market share in China (through electric vehicles), and Aptiv (APTV) notes that in 2025, General Motors ("GM") restructured their operations in China given challenges in the Chinese market. Asia supplies 21% of Adient's revenue. If share in China keeps rotating toward domestic automakers with domestic supply chains, that is the piece most at risk.
Set all of that against what the price assumes. At $20.41 the market pays about 58 times a normal year's company-wide operating profit, which amounts to today's economics being sustained for roughly 6.8 years at a pace running well above what the company has actually delivered. Historically, only about 23% of comparable fast-growing companies held such a pace for that long. And management's own record since 2017 is one raise, one cut, three reaffirmations, one initiation and one withdrawal, which is a company that has needed to change its story roughly as often as it has confirmed it.
The concession: the business generates real free cash flow, it is not burning down its resources, and it trades below the stated book value of $21.60 a share. Those facts bound the downside. What they do not do is create earnings, and it is earnings, not assets, that eventually have to service what the company owes.
Valuation
Two facts about this company look contradictory until you separate what it owns from what it earns. Book value is $21.60 a share, and the shares are quoted under that figure, which is the profile of a deeply discounted asset. Measured against profit instead, the price of $20.41 works out to about 58 times a normal year's company-wide operating income, which is the profile of an expensive one. Both are true, and reconciling them is the entire analytical task in this name.
The bridge between them is a through-cycle operating margin of about 0.4%, against -0.6% over the last twelve months. When a business converts almost nothing into profit, its assets can look cheap and its earnings expensive at the same moment. What today's price then asks for is time: today's economics sustained for roughly 6.8 years, at a pace running well above what the company has actually delivered. Historically, only about 23% of comparable fast-growing companies held such a pace that long.
The methods split along exactly this seam. Peer multiples and the forward cash-flow work land close to the price, because both anchor on revenue and volume, which this company has in abundance. The asset-based and earnings-power approaches land far below it, and the mechanism is worth understanding because it is not simply a low book value. The excess-return methods start from that $21.60 of book and charge it a trailing return on equity of 3.4% against a required return near 9.3%. Equity earning less than its cost is worth less than its carrying amount no matter how large that carrying amount is, which is why those methods land well under a share price already sitting below book. Trading below book is only a bargain if the book eventually earns something.
The comparison group is where the size of the gap becomes concrete. Autoliv (ALV) earns 9.7% operating margins on $11.0 billion of revenue, Modine (MOD) 10.8% on $3.18 billion with revenue up 23.1%, PHINIA (PHIN) 7.3% on $3.57 billion, Aptiv (APTV) 5.4% on $20.7 billion and Lear (LEA) 3.6% on $23.5 billion. Adient's roughly $14.9 billion of revenue is second only to Lear and Aptiv in that set, and its profitability is last. Scale is evidently not the constraint.
The balance sheet is the reason the arithmetic is unforgiving rather than merely disappointing. Borrowings run about 42 times operating profit in a normal year, which means the enterprise is mostly financed by lenders and the equity is the thin slice on top. That structure is why small changes in operating margin move this share price so much in both directions, and it is also why the interest bill claims the first call on any improvement. The company is not burning through its resources, and it refinanced its nearer maturity ahead of time, so the risk here is not an imminent one.
The share count falling about 4.4% a year over the four years to March 2026 is the one unambiguous tailwind in the file. Every buyback at these levels concentrates whatever margin recovery eventually arrives into fewer hands. It also concentrates the outcome if the recovery does not.
Catalysts
The March quarter was the first real evidence that the operating plan is producing something. Revenue came in at $3.9 billion, up 7% year over year, with the growth attributed to currency tailwinds and higher volumes in the Americas and Asia, and the company returned to profitability on its reported measures. In a business this leveraged to small margin moves, the direction matters more than the size.
Earlier in the year management had already lifted the full-year revenue outlook to roughly $14.6 billion from about $14.4 billion. Two raises in the same fiscal year is a change of tone for a company whose guidance record since 2017 includes as many cuts and withdrawals as increases. Whether it marks a genuine turn or a favorable currency window is the open question, and it is worth noting that a meaningful part of the reported revenue growth came from exchange rates rather than from more seats being built.
Third-quarter results are scheduled for August 5, 2026. The number that matters is not revenue. It is the operating margin, and specifically whether the Americas and EMEA regions are converting the higher volume into profit rather than into launch costs. A supplier at this level of financial leverage does not need a large improvement to change the equity story. It needs a durable one, and one quarter of it is not yet proof.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- LEA (LEAR CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …entering or expanding in certain regions, and the restructuring actions, including facility closures, of our customers. Chinese domestic automakers, in particular, continue to expand their market share in China (through electric vehicles) and outside of China with both innovative designs and attractive pricing. As a…
- FY2025 10-K: …is calculated using Lear's prior year regional sales mix. Management believes this provides a more meaningful comparison of our global revenue growth relative to global vehicle production. For a description of risks related to macroeconomic events and tariffs, sanctions, export controls and other trade restrictions,…
- APTV (APTIV PLC)
- FY2025 10-K: …taking steps to reduce or restructure their operations in China. For example, in 2025, General Motors ("GM") restructured their operations in China given challenges in the Chinese market. As GM, along with other traditional OEMs, are among our largest customers, our business and financial results may be adversely…
- FY2025 10-K: 702; Driving more than 75% of new business awards in China with local OEM customers; • Delivering record revenue, with strong revenue growth over the prior year despite the dynamic vehicle production environment, helped by strong growth in other industrial end markets; • Successfully mitigating substantially all…
- VC (VISTEON CORPORATION)
- FY2025 10-K: …In addition, certain customers have communicated an intent to manufacture components internally that are currently produced by outside suppliers, such as the Company. If the Company's OEM customers successfully insource products currently manufactured by the Company, the discontinuation or loss of business for…
- FY2025 10-K: …that gain greater customer or consumer acceptance, which could have a material adverse effect on the future growth of the Company. The automotive industry is cyclical and significant declines in the production levels of the Company's major customers could reduce the Company's sales and harm its profitability Demand…
- ALV (AUTOLIV, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …see "Risk Factors - The cyclical nature of automotive sales and production can adversely affect our business, operating results, and financial condition. Our business is directly related to LVP in the global market and by our customers, and automotive sales and LVP are the most important drivers for our sales" in…
- FY2025 10-K: …results are regularly reviewed by the CEO/CODM to allocate resources and assess performance. Additionally, as Autoliv supplies customers on a global basis it also manages the business on a global basis. Therefore, based on the above analysis, the Company has concluded that the Company is the single operating and…
- BWA (BORGWARNER INC)
- FY2025 10-K: …participant. • Operating income (loss) margin: The Company used historical and expected operating income (loss) margins, which may vary based on the projection of the reporting unit being evaluated. • Revenue growth rates: The Company used a global automotive market industry growth rate forecast adjusted to estimate…
- FY2025 10-K: …growth strategy. The automotive supply market in China is highly competitive, with competition from many of the largest global manufacturers and numerous smaller domestic manufacturers. As the Chinese market evolves, market participants have acted, and we anticipate will continue to act aggressively to increase or…
- GTX (Garrett Motion Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …deteriorates, our financial position and results of operations could be adversely affected. Industry and economic conditions, including any economic downturns, could adversely affect our business and results of operations. We are dependent on the continued growth and financial stability of our customers, a…
- FY2025 10-K: …and continuous pressure on OEMs to reduce costs, including the costs of the products we supply. Our customer supply agreements with automotive OEMs typically require step-downs in component pricing over the period of production. In addition, our customers often reserve the right to terminate their supply contracts at…
- PHIN (PHINIA INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to our customers. We rely on sales to OEMs around the world of varying credit quality and manufacturing demands. Supply to several of these customers requires significant investment by us. We base our growth projections, in part, on commitments made by our customers. These commitments by OEMs generally renew yearly…
- FY2025 10-K: , our competitive position and business, financial condition and results of operations could be adversely impacted. In addition, if the market adoption for electric vehicles (particularly light and medium duty commercial vehicles) grows faster than expected, or if authorities implement additional, more stringent or…
- MOD (MODINE MANUFACTURING CO)
- FY2025 10-K: …in these international markets in the years ahead. 7 Table of Contents Customer Dependence Our ten largest customers, some of which are conglomerates or otherwise affiliated with one another, accounted for 43 percent of our consolidated net sales in fiscal 2025. In fiscal 2025, 2024 and 2023, our largest…
- FY2025 10-K: …the terms within the customer agreement, purchase order, or customer-owned tooling contract do not provide the Company with an enforceable right to payment for performance completed to date. As a result, the Performance Technologies segment recognizes revenue primarily at the time control is transferred to the…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Adient Q3 fiscal 2026 earnings date announcement and fiscal 2026 guidance, 2026 · Adient second quarter fiscal 2026 results, May 7, 2026 · Adient first quarter fiscal 2026 results, February 4, 2026 · Adient Q3 fiscal 2026 earnings date announcement, 2026