ADMA BIOLOGICS, INC. (ADMA): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $9.58, ADMA BIOLOGICS, INC. (ADMA) is priced for +4.2% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-09-07 · Exported: 2026-09-09 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADMA

Headline

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 4: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 10.8% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: n/a

Valuation X-Ray

The price is supported by asset-based and relative-multiple and growth-DCF value, while earnings-power lands below the price. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

Families that justify the price: Asset, Relative, Growth Families that call it expensive: Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.5%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

Bullet Takeaways

• ADMA collects its own plasma and turns it into immune globulin, and the specialty product ASCENIV supplies 71% of revenue against 24% for the standard product BIVIGAM, in a U.S. market the 10-K describes as CSL Behring, Grifols, Takeda and ADMA Biologics.
• The concentration risk sits on both sides of the business: two distributors, BioCare and CuraScript, represented an aggregate of approximately 73% and 72%, respectively, of our consolidated revenues, and the standard-IG line has been shrinking fast enough that management cut its 2026 revenue outlook to $530 million to $560 million and pulled its longer-term targets.
• Second-quarter results are due August 12, 2026, and the number that matters is whether ASCENIV keeps growing fast enough to cover what BIVIGAM is losing.

Bull Case

The distance between the price and the operating results is unusually wide here, and it is easy to state. At $8.28 the market pays about 10.6 times a year of company-wide operating profit and embeds growth of roughly 4.3% a year. That is what you pay for a business expected to tick along. What sits underneath it is a company earning a 38.5% operating margin, generating a trailing return on equity in the low forties, and covering its interest bill 24.7 times over.

The reason those two pictures diverge is that one product line is shrinking loudly while the other grows quietly. ASCENIV, the specialty immune globulin, supplies 71% of revenue and grew 28% year over year in the first quarter of 2026. BIVIGAM, the standard product, supplies 24% and is in retreat. The market has taken the headline, which was flat total revenue, and priced the whole enterprise as though the shrinking quarter sets the trajectory for the growing three-quarters.

What makes ASCENIV defensible is that ADMA controls the input. The company describes manufacturing it under HHS License No. 2019 using a process known as fractionation, and it sources the raw material itself: through December 31, 2025 its subsidiary operated a total of ten U.S.-based plasma collection centers. Plasma is the binding constraint in this industry. A competitor that wants to make more immune globulin cannot simply order more raw material; it has to recruit donors, license centers and wait. Owning that step converts a commodity input into a scheduling advantage.

The manufacturing side has been getting steadily more capable rather than standing still. The 10-K notes that fiscal 2026 will be our first full year of yield-enhanced production, supporting sustained gross margin expansion and increasing earnings power, on top of earlier FDA approvals for 4,400L expanded IVIG production scale, as well as our in-house fill-finish and related operations production line. Yield enhancement is the quiet lever in a plasma business: the same donation producing more grams of product improves the economics of every liter already being collected, without a single new donor. Management adds that recent initiatives should provide durable plasma supply confidence through the late 2030s.

The competitive position is narrower than it sounds. The 10-K identifies the U.S. field as CSL Behring, Grifols, Takeda and ADMA Biologics. Three of those are far larger, but a four-participant market for a licensed biologic is not a commodity market, and ADMA is the only one of the four for which a specialty immune globulin is the main event rather than a line item.

The balance sheet gives the thesis time to work. Net debt is $58.7 million against operating profit many times that, at 0.31 times operating income, and the company is not burning anything. Set against a peer group that includes Halozyme (HALO) at 33.9% operating margins on $1.51 billion of revenue growing 39.1%, Catalyst Pharmaceuticals (CPRX) at 44.8% on $597 million, and Repligen (RGEN) at 8.5% on $763 million, ADMA's profitability sits at the upper end of the specialty-pharma range while its multiple sits in the lower half of it. Management has also raised its own guidance eleven times since 2020, which is not the record of a team that habitually oversells.

Bear Case

The advantage that made this company interesting was never only the specialty product. It was that a small manufacturer could sit inside a market of giants and price its way through, because immune globulin supply was tight and ADMA controlled its own plasma. That advantage is measurably thinner than it was a year ago, and the erosion shows up first in the standard product.

BIVIGAM, which supplies 24% of revenue, fell 54% year over year in the first quarter of 2026. Total revenue for that quarter was flat at $114.5 million even though ASCENIV grew 28%. The company then cut its 2026 revenue outlook to $530 million to $560 million and withdrew its longer-term targets, citing competitive pressure in the standard immune globulin market. Measure that against what the same management wrote in the annual report, which described a facility with the potential to produce projected annual revenues greater than $635 million in 2026 and $775 million in 2027. The distance between those two statements, filed months apart, is the erosion expressed in the company's own numbers.

The structural reason is not mysterious. The 10-K names the U.S. field as CSL Behring, Grifols, Takeda and ADMA Biologics, and when the three large fractionators bring standard immune globulin capacity online, the marginal grams land in exactly the segment where ADMA has the least differentiation. Standard IG is a product where the buyer's question is price. The filing also concedes the risk from the other end of the supply chain, warning about pressure created by the entry of competitive plasma centers into regions where ADMA BioCenters operates such centers and by misjudging the demographic potential of expansion regions. Donor recruitment is a local business, and the moat there is only as deep as the nearest competing center.

Customer concentration removes most of the negotiating room. Two customers, BioCare and CuraScript, represented an aggregate of approximately 73% and 72%, respectively, of our consolidated revenues across the last two fiscal years. When a distributor with that share sits opposite a supplier facing new competition in one of its two products, the direction of any pricing conversation is not hard to predict.

Execution has not been flawless either. Across the quarters ended March 31, June 30 and September 30 of 2025 the company voluntarily withdrew three lots of BIVIGAM. Individually small; collectively a reminder that a biologic manufactured from pooled human plasma carries batch risk that a chemical process does not, and that the affected product is the one already losing share.

Now the valuation link, and it is a subtler point than it looks. At about 10.6 times operating profit, with roughly 4.3% annual growth priced in, the market has already marked the moat down. The bear case is therefore not that the shares are expensive against today's earnings. It is that today's earnings may be the peak rather than the base. The earnings-power approach, which capitalizes a five-year average of operating profit including the years before this business turned profitable, lands well below the current price precisely because it refuses to treat the recent run as normal. If standard IG keeps deflating and ASCENIV's growth decelerates for any reason, the 38.5% operating margin is what compresses, and a low multiple on a falling number is not protection.

The concession is real and should not be understated. Net debt is $58.7 million, interest is covered 24.7 times, and there is no financing risk in the next several years. But the share count has still grown about 5.2% a year over the four years to March 2026, so shareholders have been funding some of this expansion, and the company that emerges from the current competitive squeeze will be owned in smaller slices than the one that entered it.

Valuation

Start with the assumption embedded in the quote. At $8.28 the market pays about 10.6 times a year of company-wide operating profit, and what the price requires from here is operating profit growing roughly 4.3% a year. For a business that has just been through a step-change in profitability, that is a modest demand, and it places the multiple in the lower half of the range its specialty-pharma comparison group carries.

That modesty is the finding. Nothing in this price asks the company to repeat its recent trajectory.

The methods mostly agree with it. Asset-based approaches, peer multiples and the discounted cash-flow work all land at or above today's quote. The one lens that lands well below is earnings power, and the reason is worth understanding because it is the bear case in mechanical form: that method capitalizes a normalized operating profit built from a five-year average, roughly $70 million, against the $187 million the company actually earned over the last twelve months. It is not saying the current year is fake. It is saying that four of the last five years looked nothing like it. Whether that averaging is unfair or prudent is the whole question in this name, and the report cannot settle it for you.

The peer group frames the profitability rather than the growth. Halozyme (HALO) earns 33.9% operating margins on $1.51 billion of revenue growing 39.1%, Catalyst Pharmaceuticals (CPRX) earns 44.8% on $597 million growing 11.7%, Indivior (INDV) 25.8% on $1.29 billion, ANI Pharmaceuticals (ANIP) 13.4% on $924 million growing 37.0%, and Repligen (RGEN) 8.5% on $763 million. ADMA's 38.5% trailing operating margin sits toward the top of that spread on roughly half a billion of revenue, which is the right way to read the multiple: this is not a cheap company because it is a poor one, it is cheap because the market doubts the margin holds.

The balance sheet is the quietest part of the file and the most reassuring. Net debt of $58.7 million works out to 0.31 times operating income, and interest is covered 24.7 times over. Liquid assets on the balance sheet come to $138.2 million, and nothing is being burned. For a manufacturer that has to carry plasma inventory through a long production cycle, having the financing question settled removes the failure mode that usually kills small biologics companies.

The offset is dilution. Shares outstanding have grown about 5.2% a year over the four years to March 2026, which means per-share progress has been running behind company progress for the whole of the period in which this business became profitable. Any projection of the current economics forward has to carry that same drag, and at today's multiple it consumes a meaningful share of the growth the price already assumes.

Catalysts

The first quarter of 2026 split the company in two. Total revenue came in flat at $114.5 million, but the composition underneath moved sharply: ASCENIV grew 28% year over year while BIVIGAM fell 54%. A flat headline covering a 28% gain and a 54% decline is not a quiet quarter. It is two trends of similar size pointing in opposite directions, and which one persists longer determines almost everything about the next two years.

Management's response was to reset expectations. Full-year 2026 revenue guidance came down to $530 million to $560 million from a prior range of $575 million to $600 million, and the longer-term outlook was withdrawn rather than revised, with competitive pressure in the standard immune globulin market named as the cause. Withdrawing a multi-year target is a more informative act than trimming one. It says the shape of the future is uncertain enough that management would rather say nothing than say something it may have to take back.

Second-quarter results are scheduled for August 12, 2026. Three readings matter. Whether ASCENIV's growth rate holds near where it was, since that line now carries the company. Whether BIVIGAM's decline is decelerating or still steepening, because a stabilizing standard-IG business changes the arithmetic considerably. And whether gross margin shows the benefit the 10-K expects from fiscal 2026 being our first full year of yield-enhanced production, supporting sustained gross margin expansion, which is the one lever fully inside the company's control.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

ADMA BioManufacturing / Plasma Collection Centers (reported)

• HALO (HALOZYME THERAPEUTICS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …multiple myeloma who are ineligible for autologous stem cell transplant. In December 2019, Janssen elected epidermal growth factor receptor and mesenchymal-epithelial transition factor as a bispecific antibody (amivantamab) target on an exclusive basis, which is being studied in solid tumors. In September 2022,…
• FY2025 10-K: …exon 20 insertion mutations after the failure of 14 Table of Contents platinum-based therapy. In December 2025, Janssen announced the FDA approved RYBREVANT FASPRO (amivantamab and hyaluronidase-lpuj) for the treatment of patients with epidermal growth factor receptor-mutated locally advanced or metastatic non-small…
• RGEN (REPLIGEN CORP)
• FY2025 10-K: …Taiwan. The protein products we provide are manufactured at our sites in Waltham, Massachusetts and Lund, Sweden. Native Protein A ligands and our growth factor products are manufactured in Lund, while recombinant Protein A ligands are manufactured in Lund. Our primary chromatography assembly and manufacturing sites…
• FY2025 10-K: …analogue of human epidermal growth factor, created to serve as a direct substitute for either native EGF or recombinant human EGF ("hEGF") in therapeutic cell culture settings. Corporate Information We are a Delaware corporation with our global headquarters in Waltham, Massachusetts. We were incorporated in 1981 and…
• TECH (BIO-TECHNE Corp)
• FY2025 10-K: …of acquisitions and changes in foreign currency at the corporate and segment level. We also provide quantitative information about discrete tax items and other significant factors we believe are useful for understanding our results. The MD&A should be read in conjunction with the consolidated financial information…
• FY2025 10-K: …us. We strive for every interaction to be seamless, personalized, and exceeding expectations. We aim to deeply understand customers' wants and needs while simultaneously offering high-quality service at every touchpoint. Develop People Through a Transofrmative Culture. As we continue to grow both organically and…
• CPRX (CATALYST PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …patients four years of age and older and on February 13, 2025, Santhera announced an agreement with the German National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-SV) on the 6 Table of Contents reimbursement for AGAMREE® for the treatment of DMD. This agreement makes AGAMREE® the first product to receive an…
• FY2025 10-K: …any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. Item 1. B usiness Overview We are a commercial-stage, patient-centric biopharmaceutical company focused on in-licensing, developing, and commercializing novel high-quality medicines for patients living with rare and…
• INDV (Indivior Pharmaceuticals, Inc.)
• FY2025 10-K: …of our products over alternative treatments, including the cost of treatment and relative convenience and ease of administration; • the prevalence of the disease or condition for which the product is approved and the projected growth of the markets in which our products compete; • the effect of current and future…
• FY2025 10-K: …of approximately 72 employees across three core sub-functions: • Chemistry, Manufacturing, and Controls ("CMC") includes capabilities spanning formulation development, analytical and chemical development, process optimization, and technology transfer. • Medicines Development ("MD") encompasses all required functions…
• ANIP (ANI PHARMACEUTICALS, INC)
• FY2025 10-K: , financial position, and operating results. Our accruals for the rebates under the Medicare Manufacturer Discount Program have increased due to growth and acquisitions. We accrue for these rebates at the time of sale based on our estimates of the amount of product that will be prescribed to patients in the Medicare…
• FY2025 10-K: …of the eye ("NIU-PS") in addition to the then-current indication of Diabetic Macular Edema ("DME"). The Company is currently marketing ILUVIEN for both indications in the U.S. ILUVIEN was already approved for both DME and NIU-PS outside the U.S., including in seventeen European countries. During the second quarter of…
• AMRX (AMNEAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …As of December 31, 2025, our Affordable Medicines segment had 61 products with a pending ANDA and another 43 products in various stages of development in our pipeline, 95% of which are non-oral solid products. We have an integrated, team-based approach to product development that combines our formulation, regulatory,…
• FY2025 10-K: …histories and significantly greater financial, R&D, marketing, and other resources than we do. Competing manufacturers of generic pharmaceutical products create value for our customers by offering substitutes for branded pharmaceutical products at significantly lower prices, and at times we may not be able to…
• INVA (INNOVIVA, INC.)
• FY2025 10-K: …and private research organizations. Our competitors may succeed in developing, acquiring or licensing technologies and drug products that are more effective, more effectively marketed and sold or less costly than our product candidates, which could render our product candidates non-competitive and obsolete. If our…
• FY2025 10-K: …by the FDA on May 23, 2023, and we commenced U.S. commercial sales of XACDURO ® in the third quarter of 2023. In May 2024, XACDURO ® was approved in China by the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) for use in Chinese patients 18 years of age and older. XACDURO ® is a novel IV antibiotic. The product is a…

Methodology Note

• Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
• Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
• Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
• Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
• Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.