ADOBE INC. (ADBE): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $291.28, ADOBE INC. (ADBE) is priced for +4.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADBE

Headline

FieldValue
TickerADBE
CompanyADOBE INC.
Sector / IndustryTechnology
Current price$291.28/sh
CompositionSubscription 96% / Product 1% / Services and other 2%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)6.3%
Operating margin today36.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-29.8pp
Implied growth4.5%
Multiple paid13x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history-0.78σ
cohort percentile (of 188 peers)12

Valuation X-Ray

The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF.

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset1.48x5expensive
Earnings1.32x5expensive
Relative1.14x2expensive
Growth0.68x3justifies

Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=15)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$709.400.41xyesFCF base $10.9B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$431.100.68xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 10.7x / 12.7x / 14.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 27.41x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 16x), scenarios: 22.6x / 27.4x / 32.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$196.611.48xyesBV/sh $28.98, ROE (TTM) 62.8%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$712.900.41xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$265.471.10xyesRev $25.2B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.8x / 4.6x / 5.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Peter Lynch Fair ValueRelative$212.041.37xyesEPS $17.47, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.32 (Fair)
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$153.641.90xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $7.16B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$323.800.90xyesBV $28.98 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 62.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$106.722.73xyes√(22.5 × EPS $17.47 × BVPS $28.98) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $9.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$275.971.06xyesFCF $10280.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$220.781.32xyesSBC-adj FCF $8.25B (FCF $10.28B − SBC $2.03B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$479.870.61xyesEPS $17.47 × (8.5 + 2×12.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$43.716.66xyesBV $28.98 × (ROIC 13.2% / WACC 8.8%)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $25.20B × sector P/S 8.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelative$318.060.92xyesEPS $17.47 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.2x
Earnings YieldEarnings$188.861.54xyesEPS $17.47 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Digital Mediaoperatingenterprise$17.6bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Digital Experienceoperatingenterprise$5.9bwithheldunresolved no unit value
Publishing and Advertisingoperatingenterprise$256.0mwithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$1.0b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)0.15x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)0.11x
Interest coverage34.8x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-4.0%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

Take the bear thesis first, because it is the reason this stock is priced the way it is. Machines can now generate an image, a video or a layout from a sentence, and Adobe sells subscriptions to people who make images, videos and layouts. If the skill is automated, the argument runs, the software that supported the skill goes with it. That is a coherent fear and it deserves a serious answer rather than a dismissal.

The answer is that the customer has not behaved that way. Revenue in the second quarter of fiscal 2026 reached $6.62 billion, up 12.7% on the year, and total annualized recurring revenue reached $27.10 billion. AI-first recurring revenue more than tripled year over year to pass $500 million. Those are not the numbers of a business being displaced; they are the numbers of a business selling the new capability to the same customers. Adobe's own framing of its position is that it does not need to win the model race at all: "we offer customers flexibility to use the model of their choice directly within certain Adobe solutions to best serve their needs". Owning the interface where professional work is finished, approved and shipped is a different asset from owning the model that drafts it.

A large slice of the business is not creative software in the first place. The filing separates its customers into two groups, and states that "Revenue associated with the Business Professionals & Consumers customer group consists of Adobe Acrobat offerings and Adobe Express, all of which are part of Digital Media." Acrobat is a document standard rather than a creative tool, and standards are not disrupted by better drawing. The company has been pushing it further into the same territory: "In August 2025, we released Acrobat Studio, which brings together Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Express and AI agents to further unite productivity and creativity".

The economics remain the best in the peer group by a distance. Trailing operating profitability runs at 35.9% of revenue. Among the peers Oracle manages 30.6%, Intuit 27.5%, Autodesk 25.1% and Salesforce 20.4%, while HubSpot earns 1.9% and Atlassian is negative at the operating line. Return on equity of 62.8% is what happens when a software company with a small asset base keeps most of what it charges. That profitability is the buffer: Adobe can concede price and still keep a larger share of each revenue dollar than most of the companies it competes with.

Capital allocation converts that into per-share progress without needing growth. The share count has fallen about 4.0% a year over the four years to May 2026, so a flat profit stream still lifts earnings per share. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 34 times, and borrowings sit at roughly a tenth of a year's operating profit, so there is no financing constraint on continuing. At today's price of $225.11, the market pays about 10 times trailing operating profit for the most profitable operator in its cohort. The bull case does not require the fear to be wrong. It requires the decline to be slower than the buyback.

Bear Case

Ninety-six percent of the revenue here is subscription, which means the whole company is one assumption: that customers renew, at roughly today's prices, in roughly today's numbers. Every other number in the accounts is downstream of that. The fragile part is not whether people still need to make content. It is the price per seat, and the evidence that the price per seat is under pressure came from the company itself. Management deferred planned Creative Cloud increases and moved toward free tiers to defend the base. A company confident in its pricing power does not defer a price increase.

The filing describes the mechanism with more candour than the marketing does. Adobe lists among its competitive threats "AI-first creativity and productivity tools, presentation tools, and social media platforms that offer built-in media editing capabilities", and warns that "limited barriers to entry, short product life cycles, customer price sensitivity, global economic conditions and the frequent entry of new solutions or competitors may increase downward pressure on pricing and gross margins and adversely affect our renewal" rates. Limited barriers to entry, in a risk factor written by the company that owns Photoshop, is a striking admission about where the industry is heading.

Subscription revenue also unwinds in a particular way, which is slowly and then not slowly. Contracts renew on a schedule, so a decision made by a customer in one quarter shows up in revenue several quarters later. The filing notes that while contracts are generally non-cancellable, "a limited number of customers have the right to cancel their contracts by providing prior written notice to us of their intent to cancel the remainder of the contract term", and consumer customers carry termination rights of their own. The reported growth of the last year is therefore evidence about decisions taken a while ago, not about decisions being taken now.

The freemium pivot deserves its own scrutiny because it is being counted in two directions. Giving away a tier expands the funnel, which is the bull argument, and it also converts paying users into free ones, which is not. The AI-first recurring revenue that tripled is real, but a business that adds recurring revenue in one product line while giving away capability in another is not straightforwardly growing; it is repricing. Whether that repricing settles above or below where it started will not be visible in reported numbers for several quarters.

The awkward part for a bear is that the price has already absorbed a good deal of this. At $225.11 the market is embedding an operating profit decline of about 2.5% a year across a five-year horizon, and the multiple sits in the cheaper half of the software peer group. The bear case therefore cannot be that the shares are dear. It has to be that a gentle, orderly 2.5% annual erosion is the optimistic version of what happens when a subscription base reprices, and that the actual path for a business losing pricing power tends to be flat, flat, flat, then a step down. Cheapness against a shrinking base is not a floor.

Valuation

Two readings of this price exist and both are defensible, which is the most useful thing to know about it. Against Adobe's own economics, the price of $225.11 on July 25, 2026 is roughly fair: capitalizing last year's free cash flow after deducting stock-based compensation, at the return an equity owner should require, lands essentially where the shares trade, and the lens built on book value and the returns earned on it sits just under. Read against other software companies, the same price looks like a mistake, because applying sector earnings and enterprise-value ratios to this profit stream produces figures roughly double where the shares trade. The disagreement is not a modelling artefact. It is the market saying this profit stream is worth less per dollar than the sector's, and the reason is duration rather than size.

The embedded assumption puts a number on that. Buying the enterprise here costs about 10 times trailing operating profit, and reconciling that against a cost of capital near nine and a half percent requires operating profit to fall about 2.5% a year across a five-year horizon. Not grow slowly. Fall. That is what "cheap" means in this case: the market has already written down the future of the business, and the multiple is the receipt.

The profitability that assumption is applied to is the strongest in the peer set. Adobe converts 35.9% of revenue into operating profit, against 30.6% at Oracle, 27.5% at Intuit and 20.4% at Salesforce among the peers, with HubSpot at 1.9% and Atlassian negative. Almost all of the revenue, 96%, is recurring subscription rather than one-time licence, so the base being discounted is contractual rather than transactional. A declining stream of contracted, high-margin revenue is a genuinely different asset from a declining stream of product sales, and the methods anchored on the company's own earnings treat it accordingly.

Where the growth-oriented approaches land is worth naming precisely. The forward projections reach well above today's price, which they do by assuming the last few years of expansion continue in some tapered form. That is the assumption in dispute, and it should not be leaned on. The more informative reading is the pattern: the value-based approaches sit close to the price while the comparison-based approaches sit far above it, which describes a company priced as an exception to its sector rather than as a member of it.

Solvency is not the constraint and does not need to be laboured. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 34 times, borrowings amount to roughly a tenth of a year's operating profit, and the company is not consuming cash. What that buys is optionality on the buyback: the share count has fallen about 4.0% a year over the four years to May 2026, and at this multiple each dollar spent retires more earnings power than it would at the sector's ratio. One sensitivity is worth flagging. The read is unusually rate-sensitive, since a single extra percentage point of cost of capital shifts the required profit trajectory by more than four points; on a business whose value is a long stream of renewals, the discount rate does much of the work.

Catalysts

The second quarter of fiscal 2026, reported in June, was a record on the headline and more complicated underneath. Revenue reached $6.62 billion, up 12.7% year over year, and total annualized recurring revenue rose to $27.10 billion. AI-first annualized recurring revenue more than tripled from a year earlier to exceed $500 million, with the Acrobat AI Assistant line growing roughly threefold and the consumer Firefly business up around 50% sequentially. Adobe raised its full-year fiscal 2026 revenue target on the strength of it.

The strategic decision announced alongside those results matters more than the beat. Adobe chose to expand free tiers and to defer planned Creative Cloud price increases, funding the shift out of near-term recurring revenue. That is a deliberate trade of price for volume, and it is the clearest signal available about how management reads its own competitive position. It also means the recurring revenue line for the next several quarters is measuring two opposing forces at once, and separating them will take time.

The next checkpoint arrives with the third quarter, which closes in late August 2026 and is reported in September. Three things in that release carry information: whether total recurring revenue growth holds once a full quarter of the free tiers is included, whether the AI-first line keeps compounding from the base disclosed in June, and whether operating profitability holds near current levels while the freemium funnel is being fed. The first of those is the one that decides whether the market's assumption of gentle erosion is too pessimistic or not pessimistic enough.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Digital Media (reported)

Digital Experience (reported)

Publishing and Advertising (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Futurum Group analysis of Adobe second-quarter fiscal 2026 results, June 2026 · Adobe second-quarter fiscal 2026 results, June 2026

View the full interactive ADBE report on boothcheck