ADOBE INC. (ADBE): what the price assumes
In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $291.28, ADOBE INC. (ADBE) is priced for +4.5% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.
Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ADBE
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ADBE |
| Company | ADOBE INC. |
| Sector / Industry | Technology |
| Current price | $291.28/sh |
| Composition | Subscription 96% / Product 1% / Services and other 2% |
What The Price Assumes (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Operating margin (value-band context) | 6.3% |
| Operating margin today | 36.1% |
| Margin compression (value-band) | -29.8pp |
| Implied growth | 4.5% |
| Multiple paid | 13x operating income |
The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 11: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.
Solve inputs: computed at a 9.7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.
How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.78σ |
| cohort percentile (of 188 peers) | 12 |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple and growth-DCF.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.48x | 5 | expensive |
| Earnings | 1.32x | 5 | expensive |
| Relative | 1.14x | 2 | expensive |
| Growth | 0.68x | 3 | justifies |
Families that justify the price: Relative, Growth
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 8.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=15)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | $709.40 | 0.41x | yes | FCF base $10.9B, growth 11% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 8.8%, 6yr projection |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $431.10 | 0.68x | yes | Exit EV/EBITDA: 10.7x / 12.7x / 14.7x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | — | — | no | P/E 27.41x (blended: static sector reference 35x + trailing (TTM) 16x), scenarios: 22.6x / 27.4x / 32.2x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 25x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $196.61 | 1.48x | yes | BV/sh $28.98, ROE (TTM) 62.8%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $712.90 | 0.41x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $265.47 | 1.10x | yes | Rev $25.2B, growth 11% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.8x / 4.6x / 5.4x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $212.04 | 1.37x | yes | EPS $17.47, growth 12% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=1.32 (Fair) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | $153.64 | 1.90x | yes | Normalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $7.16B × (1−24%) / WACC 8.8% → EPV (no growth) |
| Residual Income | Asset | $323.80 | 0.90x | yes | BV $28.98 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 62.8% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 8.8%/yr |
| Graham Number | Asset | $106.72 | 2.73x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $17.47 × BVPS $28.98) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | EBITDA $9.26B × sector EV/EBITDA 25.0x |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | $275.97 | 1.06x | yes | FCF $10280.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | $220.78 | 1.32x | yes | SBC-adj FCF $8.25B (FCF $10.28B − SBC $2.03B) capitalized at Kₑ |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $479.87 | 0.61x | yes | EPS $17.47 × (8.5 + 2×12.1%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | $43.71 | 6.66x | yes | BV $28.98 × (ROIC 13.2% / WACC 8.8%) |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | Revenue $25.20B × sector P/S 8.0x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $318.06 | 0.92x | yes | EPS $17.47 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 12.1% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 18.2x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $188.86 | 1.54x | yes | EPS $17.47 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)
One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.
| Unit | Role | Valuation basis | Revenue | Reported profit | Value evidence | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Digital Media | operating | enterprise | $17.6b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Digital Experience | operating | enterprise | $5.9b | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
| Publishing and Advertising | operating | enterprise | $256.0m | — | withheld | unresolved no unit value |
No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Net debt | $1.0b |
| Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax) | 0.15x |
| Net debt / operating income (pre-tax) | 0.11x |
| Interest coverage | 34.8x |
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -4.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Bullet Takeaways
- Subscription revenue is 96% of the total, with product licences at 1% and services at 2%, so the entire company is a renewal decision made annually by millions of customers.
- The specific pressure is on price rather than on demand, and management has responded by leaning into free tiers and holding back planned Creative Cloud increases, which trades near-term revenue for defending the installed base.
- Fiscal third quarter closes in late August 2026, and the number to watch in the September report is whether total annualized recurring revenue keeps compounding once the free tiers are in the mix, against the $27.10 billion reported for the second quarter.
Bull Case
Take the bear thesis first, because it is the reason this stock is priced the way it is. Machines can now generate an image, a video or a layout from a sentence, and Adobe sells subscriptions to people who make images, videos and layouts. If the skill is automated, the argument runs, the software that supported the skill goes with it. That is a coherent fear and it deserves a serious answer rather than a dismissal.
The answer is that the customer has not behaved that way. Revenue in the second quarter of fiscal 2026 reached $6.62 billion, up 12.7% on the year, and total annualized recurring revenue reached $27.10 billion. AI-first recurring revenue more than tripled year over year to pass $500 million. Those are not the numbers of a business being displaced; they are the numbers of a business selling the new capability to the same customers. Adobe's own framing of its position is that it does not need to win the model race at all: "we offer customers flexibility to use the model of their choice directly within certain Adobe solutions to best serve their needs". Owning the interface where professional work is finished, approved and shipped is a different asset from owning the model that drafts it.
A large slice of the business is not creative software in the first place. The filing separates its customers into two groups, and states that "Revenue associated with the Business Professionals & Consumers customer group consists of Adobe Acrobat offerings and Adobe Express, all of which are part of Digital Media." Acrobat is a document standard rather than a creative tool, and standards are not disrupted by better drawing. The company has been pushing it further into the same territory: "In August 2025, we released Acrobat Studio, which brings together Adobe Acrobat, Adobe Express and AI agents to further unite productivity and creativity".
The economics remain the best in the peer group by a distance. Trailing operating profitability runs at 35.9% of revenue. Among the peers Oracle manages 30.6%, Intuit 27.5%, Autodesk 25.1% and Salesforce 20.4%, while HubSpot earns 1.9% and Atlassian is negative at the operating line. Return on equity of 62.8% is what happens when a software company with a small asset base keeps most of what it charges. That profitability is the buffer: Adobe can concede price and still keep a larger share of each revenue dollar than most of the companies it competes with.
Capital allocation converts that into per-share progress without needing growth. The share count has fallen about 4.0% a year over the four years to May 2026, so a flat profit stream still lifts earnings per share. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 34 times, and borrowings sit at roughly a tenth of a year's operating profit, so there is no financing constraint on continuing. At today's price of $225.11, the market pays about 10 times trailing operating profit for the most profitable operator in its cohort. The bull case does not require the fear to be wrong. It requires the decline to be slower than the buyback.
Bear Case
Ninety-six percent of the revenue here is subscription, which means the whole company is one assumption: that customers renew, at roughly today's prices, in roughly today's numbers. Every other number in the accounts is downstream of that. The fragile part is not whether people still need to make content. It is the price per seat, and the evidence that the price per seat is under pressure came from the company itself. Management deferred planned Creative Cloud increases and moved toward free tiers to defend the base. A company confident in its pricing power does not defer a price increase.
The filing describes the mechanism with more candour than the marketing does. Adobe lists among its competitive threats "AI-first creativity and productivity tools, presentation tools, and social media platforms that offer built-in media editing capabilities", and warns that "limited barriers to entry, short product life cycles, customer price sensitivity, global economic conditions and the frequent entry of new solutions or competitors may increase downward pressure on pricing and gross margins and adversely affect our renewal" rates. Limited barriers to entry, in a risk factor written by the company that owns Photoshop, is a striking admission about where the industry is heading.
Subscription revenue also unwinds in a particular way, which is slowly and then not slowly. Contracts renew on a schedule, so a decision made by a customer in one quarter shows up in revenue several quarters later. The filing notes that while contracts are generally non-cancellable, "a limited number of customers have the right to cancel their contracts by providing prior written notice to us of their intent to cancel the remainder of the contract term", and consumer customers carry termination rights of their own. The reported growth of the last year is therefore evidence about decisions taken a while ago, not about decisions being taken now.
The freemium pivot deserves its own scrutiny because it is being counted in two directions. Giving away a tier expands the funnel, which is the bull argument, and it also converts paying users into free ones, which is not. The AI-first recurring revenue that tripled is real, but a business that adds recurring revenue in one product line while giving away capability in another is not straightforwardly growing; it is repricing. Whether that repricing settles above or below where it started will not be visible in reported numbers for several quarters.
The awkward part for a bear is that the price has already absorbed a good deal of this. At $225.11 the market is embedding an operating profit decline of about 2.5% a year across a five-year horizon, and the multiple sits in the cheaper half of the software peer group. The bear case therefore cannot be that the shares are dear. It has to be that a gentle, orderly 2.5% annual erosion is the optimistic version of what happens when a subscription base reprices, and that the actual path for a business losing pricing power tends to be flat, flat, flat, then a step down. Cheapness against a shrinking base is not a floor.
Valuation
Two readings of this price exist and both are defensible, which is the most useful thing to know about it. Against Adobe's own economics, the price of $225.11 on July 25, 2026 is roughly fair: capitalizing last year's free cash flow after deducting stock-based compensation, at the return an equity owner should require, lands essentially where the shares trade, and the lens built on book value and the returns earned on it sits just under. Read against other software companies, the same price looks like a mistake, because applying sector earnings and enterprise-value ratios to this profit stream produces figures roughly double where the shares trade. The disagreement is not a modelling artefact. It is the market saying this profit stream is worth less per dollar than the sector's, and the reason is duration rather than size.
The embedded assumption puts a number on that. Buying the enterprise here costs about 10 times trailing operating profit, and reconciling that against a cost of capital near nine and a half percent requires operating profit to fall about 2.5% a year across a five-year horizon. Not grow slowly. Fall. That is what "cheap" means in this case: the market has already written down the future of the business, and the multiple is the receipt.
The profitability that assumption is applied to is the strongest in the peer set. Adobe converts 35.9% of revenue into operating profit, against 30.6% at Oracle, 27.5% at Intuit and 20.4% at Salesforce among the peers, with HubSpot at 1.9% and Atlassian negative. Almost all of the revenue, 96%, is recurring subscription rather than one-time licence, so the base being discounted is contractual rather than transactional. A declining stream of contracted, high-margin revenue is a genuinely different asset from a declining stream of product sales, and the methods anchored on the company's own earnings treat it accordingly.
Where the growth-oriented approaches land is worth naming precisely. The forward projections reach well above today's price, which they do by assuming the last few years of expansion continue in some tapered form. That is the assumption in dispute, and it should not be leaned on. The more informative reading is the pattern: the value-based approaches sit close to the price while the comparison-based approaches sit far above it, which describes a company priced as an exception to its sector rather than as a member of it.
Solvency is not the constraint and does not need to be laboured. Operating profit covers the interest bill about 34 times, borrowings amount to roughly a tenth of a year's operating profit, and the company is not consuming cash. What that buys is optionality on the buyback: the share count has fallen about 4.0% a year over the four years to May 2026, and at this multiple each dollar spent retires more earnings power than it would at the sector's ratio. One sensitivity is worth flagging. The read is unusually rate-sensitive, since a single extra percentage point of cost of capital shifts the required profit trajectory by more than four points; on a business whose value is a long stream of renewals, the discount rate does much of the work.
Catalysts
The second quarter of fiscal 2026, reported in June, was a record on the headline and more complicated underneath. Revenue reached $6.62 billion, up 12.7% year over year, and total annualized recurring revenue rose to $27.10 billion. AI-first annualized recurring revenue more than tripled from a year earlier to exceed $500 million, with the Acrobat AI Assistant line growing roughly threefold and the consumer Firefly business up around 50% sequentially. Adobe raised its full-year fiscal 2026 revenue target on the strength of it.
The strategic decision announced alongside those results matters more than the beat. Adobe chose to expand free tiers and to defer planned Creative Cloud price increases, funding the shift out of near-term recurring revenue. That is a deliberate trade of price for volume, and it is the clearest signal available about how management reads its own competitive position. It also means the recurring revenue line for the next several quarters is measuring two opposing forces at once, and separating them will take time.
The next checkpoint arrives with the third quarter, which closes in late August 2026 and is reported in September. Three things in that release carry information: whether total recurring revenue growth holds once a full quarter of the free tiers is included, whether the AI-first line keeps compounding from the base disclosed in June, and whether operating profitability holds near current levels while the freemium funnel is being fed. The first of those is the one that decides whether the market's assumption of gentle erosion is too pessimistic or not pessimistic enough.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Digital Media (reported)
- ADSK (AUTODESK, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …realistic animations and simulations, extraordinary visual effects, and full-length animated feature films. • Media & Entertainment Collection The M&E Collection provides end-to-end creative tools for entertainment creation. This collection enables animators, modelers, and visual effects artists to access the tools…
- FY2025 10-K: …jurisdictions with open tax years ranging from fiscal 2005 to 2025. 97 Table of Contents 6. Acquisitions Fiscal 2025 Acquisitions The results of operations for the following acquisitions are included in the accompanying Consolidated Statements of Operations since their respective acquisition dates. Pro forma results…
- TEAM (Atlassian Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …revenue on digital services more immediately. Notably, France, Italy, Austria, Spain, the UK, and Turkey have enacted this tax, generally 2% on specific in-scope sales above a revenue threshold. The EU and the UK have established a mandate that focuses on the transparency of cross-border arrangements concerning at…
- FY2025 10-K: …and address practices by certain digital platforms that they perceive to be anticompetitive, which may impact our ability to invest in, acquire or enter into joint ventures with other entities. New legislation, regulation, public policy considerations, changes in the cybersecurity environment, litigation by…
- DBX (Dropbox, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …marketing. We use these tactics in combination with the goal of generating increased recurring revenues from our existing user base. Upgrade and expand existing customers We offer a range of paid subscription plans, from Plus, Simple, Professional, and Essentials for individuals to Standard, Advanced, Business,…
- FY2025 10-K: • macroeconomic trends. 21 Table of Contents The content collaboration market is subject to rapidly changing user demand and trends in preferences. If we fail to successfully predict and address these changes and trends, meet user demands, or achieve more widespread market acceptance of our platform, our business,…
- DOCU (DOCUSIGN, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …a complete end-to-end agreement management system of record. This requires strengthening our direct sales force's ability to provide greater consultation and solution education to our customers. We believe the result will be broader IAM deployments across a greater number of use cases vs. our historic eSignature…
- FY2025 10-K: …all our multi-year customers pay in annual installments, one year in advance. We also generate revenue from professional and other non-subscription services, which consist primarily of fees associated with providing new customers with deployment and integration services. Other revenue includes amounts derived from…
- CRM (Salesforce, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …ability of our customers, partners and data providers, to collect, augment, analyze, use, transfer and share personal and other information that is integral to certain services we provide. The interpretation of many of these statutes, regulations and rulings is evolving in the courts and administrative agencies and…
- FY2025 10-K: …of potential defects or disruptions in our or our customers' services. If realized, these risks are reasonably likely to materially affect the Company. Additional information on the cybersecurity risks we face is discussed in Part I, Items 1A-C, "Risk Factors." Cybersecurity Risk Management and Strategy When a…
- INTU (INTUIT INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to continue to have a material impact on our quarterly financial results in the future. MARKETING, SALES, AND DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS Markets Our primary customers are consumers and small and mid-market businesses. We also provide specialized tax and accounting products to professional accountants. We partner with…
- FY2025 10-K: …Our all-in-one platform features AI agents, providing actionable, AI-driven insights and automation to help our customers grow and run their businesses with confidence. These AI agents are also able to work alongside our large network of AI-enabled human experts to provide businesses with additional expertise and…
Digital Experience (reported)
- CRM (Salesforce, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …Tableau enriches Agentforce with best-in-class data visualizations and business context, lowering the barriers of data access for everyone. Other Salesforce Offerings In addition to our solution specific service offerings, we have specialized solutions that work across our offerings to support our customers' business…
- FY2025 10-K: …with retrieval-augmented generation improve customer experiences by transforming unstructured text and data into searchable insights, empowering companies to respond to customer queries with more context, relevance, knowledge, and advanced reasoning. Data Cloud leverages the power of Salesforce metadata to enable…
- SHOP (Shopify Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …ecosystem and partner program, including through the formation of strategic partnerships; • our ability to quickly distribute new versions of our platform; • our expectations regarding our sustainability initiatives; • our assumptions regarding competitive factors in our markets and the expectation of increased…
- FY2025 10-K: …and existing merchants and sustain and manage our growth effectively; • Our dependence on senior management and other key employees, as well as our ability to retain and motivate qualified personnel, hire key talent and maintain and adapt our corporate culture; • Our reliance on third parties to provide key services…
- HUBS (HubSpot, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …data in a connected platform, automate business processes, eliminate time-consuming data cleanup, and query and transform data to enable customer insights and connections. Features include: programmable automation, data sync, data curation, and data quality tools. Commerce Hub. Commerce Hub is a B2B commerce suite…
- FY2025 10-K: …marketing, sales, customer service, operations, commerce, intelligence and content management platform. We believe we are well positioned to capitalize on this opportunity by introducing new products and applications to extend the functionality of our customer platform. As data is becoming more important to our…
- BRZE (Braze, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …with their customers. Our platform empowers brands to listen to their customers better, understand them more deeply, and act on that understanding in a way that is human and personal. As of January 2025, 2,296 customers around the world trusted Braze to power their cross-channel customer engagement strategies. In…
- FY2025 10-K: …other technology investments. We support direct integrations with a range of providers, including cloud data service and warehouses, customer data platforms, analytics and reporting solutions, as well as other components of the modern marketing technology ecosystem such as eCommerce and Software-as-a-Service, or…
- ORCL (Oracle Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …access OCA offerings utilizing common web browsers via a broad spectrum of devices. Customers, partners and other interested parties may elect to subscribe to Oracle applications and infrastructure training and certification programs through learning subscriptions offered by Oracle University. Learners generally have…
- FY2025 10-K: Cloud@Customer, OCI Dedicated Region, Oracle Alloy, other cloud-based IT environments and on-premise data centers, among others. Oracle Database Enterprise Edition is available with a number of optional add-on products to address specific customer requirements. As described above, customers may elect to purchase…
Publishing and Advertising (reported)
- CRM (Salesforce, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …fees and allocated overhead. We believe that our professional services organization facilitates the adoption of our service offerings, helps us to secure larger subscription revenue contracts and supports our customers' success. The cost of professional services may exceed revenues from professional services in…
- FY2025 10-K: …The ESPP includes a reset provision for the purchase price if the stock price on the purchase date is less than the stock price on the offering date. The Company, at times, grants unvested restricted shares to employee stockholders of certain acquired companies in lieu of cash consideration. These awards are…
- INTU (INTUIT INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …to continue to have a material impact on our quarterly financial results in the future. MARKETING, SALES, AND DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS Markets Our primary customers are consumers and small and mid-market businesses. We also provide specialized tax and accounting products to professional accountants. We partner with…
- FY2025 10-K: …impairment of our intellectual property rights could harm our business, our brand, and our ability to compete. Our business depends on our strong reputation and the value of our brands. Developing and maintaining awareness of our brands and platform strategy is critical to achieving widespread acceptance of our…
- ADSK (AUTODESK, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …the majority of our total net revenue. Adverse economic conditions and currency exchange rates in the countries that contribute a significant portion of our net revenue, including emerging economies, may have an adverse effect on our business in those countries and our overall financial performance. Our international…
- FY2025 10-K: …pricing to them, and our distribution model to motivate and reward them for aligning their businesses with our strategy and business objectives. Changes in these relationships and underlying programs could negatively impact their business and harm our business. Further, our distributors and resellers may lose…
- ORCL (Oracle Corp)
- FY2025 10-K: …systems; 14 Table of Contents • the adoption of open source alternatives to commercial software by enterprise software customers; • products, features and functionality developed internally by customers and their IT staff; • products, features and functionality customized and implemented for customers by consultants,…
- FY2025 10-K: …and courts. If we cannot protect our intellectual property against unauthorized copying or use, or other misappropriation, we may not remain competitive. Legal and Regulatory Risks Adverse litigation results could affect our business. We are subject to various legal proceedings. Litigation can be lengthy, expensive…
- SAP (SAP SE)
- FY2025 20-F: 441 million). For more information about financial risk, how we manage credit risk, and details of our trade receivables and contract assets allowances, see Note (F.1) . F-20 Table of Contents (A.3) Capitalized Cost from Contracts with Customers y Costs of Obtaining Customer Contracts Capitalized costs from…
- FY2025 20-F: …Capital II Circle 2024, LLC, Brooklyn, NY, United States Notation Capital II, L.P., Brooklyn, NY, United States Notation Capital III, L.P., Brooklyn, NY, United States Notation Capital, L.P., Brooklyn, NY, United States OpenX Software Limited, Pasadena, CA, United States Paper Education Company Inc.,…
- HUBS (HubSpot, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: , and AI-enhanced engagement tools to interact with prospects and customers. The revenue generated by our sales representatives originates with leads produced by various channels that are now augmented by AI-driven lead scoring and prioritization. In addition, our freemium products and in-product cross-sell offerings,…
- FY2025 10-K: …nonetheless be brought into disputes between our customers and third parties which would require us to devote management time and resources to resolve such matters and any publicity from such matters could also have an adverse effect on our reputation and therefore our business. • In addition to the CDA, the Securing…
- TEAM (Atlassian Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …to develop or package new apps, agents and enhancements to our existing offerings that achieve market acceptance and that keep pace with technological developments, our business and results of operations could be harmed. Our ability to attract new customers and retain and increase revenue from existing customers…
- FY2025 10-K: …and, ultimately, the return on investment from our marketing activities. Seasonality Our business experiences seasonal fluctuations due to customer buying patterns. We expect these patterns to become more pronounced as we continue to target large enterprise customers. Our revenue fluctuates quarterly and within our…
- SHOP (Shopify Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …media sites and paid banner advertisements on other websites, partner and affiliate channels and through a number of free traffic sources, including customer referrals, word-of-mouth and search engines. We also use a number of offline marketing channels as well, including audio, television and direct mail to attract…
- FY2025 10-K: …existing competitors. Additionally, some merchants may select one or more integrated or standalone offerings from other providers such as: • ecommerce software vendors; • content management systems; • payment processors; • point of sale providers; • domain registrars; • shipping label providers; • fulfillment service…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Economic-unit decomposition (SOTP): each disclosed business unit is assigned its native valuation basis before any multiple is applied. Operating units are valued on enterprise value; funded financial units are valued on their own common equity, because their borrowings fund earning assets rather than levering the parent. A company total is stated only once every material unit carries a supported value and the parent capital bridge reconciles.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
Futurum Group analysis of Adobe second-quarter fiscal 2026 results, June 2026 · Adobe second-quarter fiscal 2026 results, June 2026