Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. (ACHC): what the price requires
The current priced-in claim for Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. (ACHC) is temporarily suppressed because the live engine record is unavailable. The dated report remains a snapshot, not a current market read.
Generated: 2026-07-19 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ACHC
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ACHC |
| Company | Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. |
| Current price | $30.27/sh |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | whole-company |
| Multiple paid | 9x operating income |
The price sits below what even a 5%/yr operating-profit decline would warrant; the inversion reports a bound, not a solved growth path.
Solve inputs: computed at a 7% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage (computed at the 7% minimum rate; the CAPM rate 5.2% sits below it).
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -1.19σ |
| cohort percentile (of 113 peers) | 5 |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is justified by relative-multiple.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 1.48x | 2 | expensive |
| Earnings | — | 0 | — |
| Relative | 0.33x | 1 | justifies |
| Growth | — | 0 | — |
Families that justify the price: Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 5.7%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=3)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | Reference only (OCF-based, capex excluded): OCF $0.2B |
| DCF Exit Multiple | Growth | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero FCF or EBITDA — equity value floored at $0 |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $92.76 | 0.33x | yes | P/S fallback (negative EPS): Sector P/S 2.5x × TTM revenue — excluded from consensus |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $21.55 | 1.40x | yes | Reference only (book value floor): BV/sh $21.55, ROE negative |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $19.40 | 1.56x | yes | Reference only (book value with convergence): BV/sh $21.55, ROE converges to ke |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $23.70 | 1.28x | no | Rev $3.4B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 0.7x / 0.8x / 1.0x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $0.00 | — | no | Negative/zero EPS — earnings-based value floored at $0 |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | $0.01 | 3027.00x | yes | EBITDA $0.19B × sector EV/EBITDA 12.0x (excluded from median) |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | $92.76 | 0.33x | no | Revenue $3.37B × sector P/S 2.5x |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (dilution) | 0.0% |
| Burning cash | no |
Operating profit is negative or near zero and the company has no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so years-to-repay cannot be computed honestly.
Operating profit is negative or near zero and there is no demonstrated through-cycle (mid-cycle) operating margin to normalize against, so interest coverage cannot be computed honestly.
Bullet Takeaways
- Acadia runs the largest pure-play network of behavioral health facilities in the country, and the engine is bed additions to existing campuses plus joint ventures, not multiples expansion: same-facility revenue grew 4.9% in 2025 on patient-day growth of 2.1% and admissions growth of 2.3%, with total revenue up 5.0% to $3,312.8 million.
- The biggest specific risk is the payor mix: the company derives a significant portion of revenue from Medicare, Medicaid and other government programs, and on a $2.38 billion net debt load (about 4.1 times operating income), a few points of reimbursement pressure or rising denials compress the equity fast.
- Watch the cadence of bed additions and the denial-and-bad-debt trend over the next two prints, plus full-year 2026 EBITDA guidance the company set at $580 to $615 million, because the price is being carried by asset value and turnaround execution rather than by earnings the model can credit today.
Bull Case
Look at where the cash goes, and the bet becomes legible. Acadia spends to add beds inside facilities it already owns and to stand up joint ventures with health systems, and the 2025 filing shows that strategy converting to demand: same-facility revenue grew 4.9%, driven by patient-day growth of 2.1% and admissions growth of 2.3%, with revenue per patient day up 2.8%. The 10-K is explicit that the growth in patient days came "from the addition of beds to our existing facilities and ongoing demand for our services". That is the cleanest version of capital allocation in healthcare services: you are not paying full acquisition multiples for new revenue, you are pouring concrete next to a building you already run. Total revenue rose $158.8 million, or 5.0%, to $3,312.8 million.
The second piece of the bull case is that the demand is structural, not promotional. Behavioral health capacity in the United States is short of need, and Acadia operates across the full continuum, acute psychiatric, residential, and comprehensive treatment. The 10-K names the company's central strategy plainly: "A principal element of our business strategy is to grow by acquiring other companies", and alongside that it builds. A network of this scale carries a referral and payor-contracting position that a single facility cannot replicate, which is the durable part of the moat. Peer Universal Health Services frames the competitive landscape in its own 10-K as one where "there are other facilities that provide services comparable to those offered by our facilities", including tax-supported and nonprofit operators, so scale and breadth of service line are what separate the for-profit operators that win contracts from the ones that do not.
The last leg is the valuation floor under the bet. At today's price the asset-value methods and the peer-multiple lens both find support: book value sits near the price, and a revenue-multiple read against the sector lands well above it. The company is profitable at the operating line, $574.4 million of trailing operating income, and it is not burning cash. So the bull case is not a moonshot. It is that a profitable, scaled operator with a self-funded bed-expansion runway has been priced as if the operating story has stalled, when the same-facility numbers say it is still compounding. If denials normalize and the bed pipeline keeps filling, the earnings the market is currently refusing to credit come back into view.
Bear Case
The bear case starts with the demand-cycle question hiding inside a steady-looking top line. Same-facility revenue growth decelerated from 7.7% in 2024 to 4.9% in 2025, and patient-day growth slowed from 3.2% to 2.1%. A facility operator adds capacity years ahead of the patients who fill it, so a network mid-build into softening volume growth is the classic spot where margins get squeezed: the beds, the salaries, and the rent arrive before the revenue does. Salaries, wages and benefits ran $1,691.0 million, more than half of revenue, and that cost base does not flex down when admissions cool.
The deeper problem is who pays. Acadia tells investors directly that it "derive[s] a significant portion of our revenue from Medicare, Medicaid and other payors", and the reimbursement environment is moving against volume-based payment. The 10-K warns it expects programs "that condition reimbursement on patient outcome measures, to become more common and to involve a higher percentage of reimbursement amounts", and notes that the enhanced premium tax credits from the American Rescue Plan Act expired on December 31, 2025, which can reduce the insured population that walks through the door. When a government payor sets your price and the rule book is shifting toward outcomes and away from days, the operator absorbs the gap, and the recent denial and bad-debt pressure the company has flagged is that gap showing up early.
The balance sheet turns those operating risks into equity risk. Net debt of $2.38 billion is roughly 4.1 times operating income, and the company's own filing acknowledges that a default "under the indentures governing the Senior Notes, and the remedies sought by the holders of such debt, could adversely affect our ability to pay the principal, premium, if any, and interest on the Senior Notes", with no assurance it can obtain waivers if it cannot comply. Layer in that the company is "subject to various claims, lawsuits, governmental investigations and regulatory actions", and the picture is a leveraged operator running a regulated, litigation-exposed business into a softer reimbursement cycle. The price sits near book value for a reason: only the asset and revenue-multiple lenses support it, the earnings-based methods do not reach it at all, and that pattern is the market saying it will pay for the assets but not yet for the earnings power.
Valuation
Start with what the price is willing to pay for. At $24.88 (June 27, 2026) the market is valuing Acadia at roughly 8 times company-wide operating income, a multiple so compressed it sits below what even a 5%-a-year decline in operating profit would warrant. Read plainly, the price is not asking the business to grow. It is asking it not to fall apart.
The methods split cleanly on whether that is the right read. The asset-value lens carries the price: book value per share is about $21.55, so the stock trades just above the accounting net worth of the business, the kind of pricing reserved for operators the market thinks are stuck. The peer-multiple lens points the other way, with a revenue-multiple read against the sector landing far above today's price, because Acadia generates $3,312.8 million of revenue and the market is applying a thin sales multiple to it. The earnings-power methods do not reach the price at all, but for a specific reason worth naming: the company reports a net loss and negative retained earnings, so the earnings-based models floor out and the model that uses them carries no weight here. That is why the supportable read leans on assets and revenue, not on a price-to-earnings story that does not exist yet.
Solvency is where the bet is decided. Net debt of $2.38 billion is about 4.1 times operating income, the company is profitable at the operating line and not burning cash, but interest coverage is not separately disclosed in the latest filings, which removes one of the usual comfort checks. With $574.4 million of trailing operating income against that debt, the equity is a thin slice that responds violently to reimbursement and volume. The reason the price hugs book value is that the downside is bounded by the assets while the upside is gated by a turnaround in denials and a reacceleration of bed-fill, neither of which the static methods can credit until they show up in the prints.
Catalysts
The clearest near-term swing factor is the 2026 guide and the analyst response to it. Acadia raised its full-year 2026 Adjusted EBITDA guidance to $580 to $615 million and Adjusted EPS guidance to $1.35 to $1.60, on revenue guidance of $3.37 to $3.45 billion. The market took the higher outlook well, and sentiment has been turning: Raymond James upgraded the stock after a strong first-quarter report, and Jefferies moved off a hold rating and raised its price target to $30 on June 3, 2026. Wall Street coverage now skews positive, with a consensus that leans Buy and a median target clustered in the low-to-mid $20s.
The offsetting catalysts run through reimbursement and collections. The expiration of the enhanced premium tax credits at the end of 2025 is a real headwind to the insured population, and the company is working through elevated denials and bad-debt pressure that, if they persist, would undercut the EBITDA build the guidance assumes. Underperforming locations remain a drag management has flagged. The next two earnings prints are the events that matter, because they will show whether the denial trend is stabilizing and whether the bed-addition pipeline is still converting to patient days at the pace the same-facility numbers have shown.
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Core business (reported)
- UHS (UNIVERSAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …in operations and capital expenditures is, therefore, highly competitive in these states. In those states that do not have CON laws or which set relatively high levels of expenditures before they become reviewable by state authorities, competition in the form of new services, facilities and capital spending is more…
- FY2025 10-K: …In all of the geographical areas in which we operate, there are other facilities that provide services comparable to those offered by our facilities. In addition, some of our competitors include hospitals that are owned by tax-supported governmental agencies or by nonprofit corporations and may be supported by…
- SEM (SELECT MEDICAL HOLDINGS CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …Competition Critical Illness Recovery Hospitals and Rehabilitation Hospitals Our critical illness recovery hospitals and our rehabilitation hospitals both compete on the basis of the quality of the patient services we provide, the outcomes we achieve for our patients, and the prices we charge for our services. The…
- FY2025 10-K: …illness recovery hospital, rehabilitation hospital, and outpatient rehabilitation businesses, our ability to retain customers and physicians, or maintain or increase our revenue growth, price flexibility, control over medical cost trends, and marketing expenses may be compromised and our revenue and profitability may…
- EHC (Encompass Health Corporation)
- FY2025 10-K: …contract labor. See Item 1A, Risk Factors , for further discussion of competition for staffing, shortages of qualified personnel, and other factors that may increase our labor costs and constrain our ability to take new patients. We remain confident in the prospects of our business based on the increasing demands for…
- FY2025 10-K: …competition from local or national entities with longer operating histories or other competitive advantages, such as acute-care hospitals who provide post-acute services similar to ours or other post-acute providers with relationships with referring acute-care hospitals or physicians. Aggressive payment review…
- SGRY (Surgery Partners, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …we compete with hospitals and operators of other surgical facilities to attract physicians and patients. We believe that the competitive factors that affect our surgical facilities' ability to compete for physicians are convenience of location of the surgical facilities, quality of care offered, convenience of…
- FY2025 10-K: …in multiple markets, each with a different competitive landscape, shifts within our payor mix or case mix may not be uniform across all of our affiliated facilities. Rather, these shifts may be concentrated within certain markets due to local competitive factors. In addition, we are unable to predict the results of…
- ARDT (Ardent Health, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …subject to various federal, state and local statutes and ordinances regulating their operation. Management does not believe that compliance with such statutes and ordinances will materially adversely affect our financial position or results of operations. Competition The hospital industry is highly competitive, and…
- FY2025 10-K: …including its geographic coverage, and access to patients. A location convenient to a large population of potential patients or a wide geographic coverage area through a hospital network can significantly benefit an acute care hospital's competitive position. Another important factor is the scope and quality of…
- MD (Pediatrix Medical Group, Inc.)
- FY2025 10-K: …of the applicable practice group. See "Government Regulation-Fee Splitting; Corporate Practice of Medicine." COMPETITION The physician services industry is highly fragmented. Competition in our business is generally based upon a number of factors, including reputation, experience and level of care and our affiliated…
- FY2025 10-K: …Economic Conditions and Other Factors Our operations and performance depend significantly on economic conditions. During the year ended December 31, 2025, the percentage of our patient service revenue being reimbursed under government-sponsored or government-funded healthcare programs ("GHC Programs") remained stable…
- DVA (DAVITA INC.)
- FY2025 10-K: …and operations in light of evolving marketplace dynamics or broader changes to the regulatory landscape, including changes related to the antitrust and competitive environment or changes resulting from new business activities in the dialysis or pre-dialysis space by our existing competitors, other market…
- FY2025 10-K: , regulations and other requirements...;" and "We are subject to risks associated with our participation in government healthcare programs." Medicare Advantage revenue Medicare Advantage (MA, managed Medicare or Medicare Part C) plans are offered by private health insurers who contract with CMS to provide their…
- NHC (NATIONAL HEALTHCARE CORP)
- FY2025 10-K: …our competitors' facilities are located in newer buildings and may offer services not provided by us or are operated by entities having greater financial and other resources than us. Certain of our competitors are operated by not-for-profit, non-taxpaying or governmental agencies that can finance capital expenditures…
- FY2025 10-K: …non-operating income from equity in earnings of unconsolidated investments, dividends and realized gains and losses on marketable securities, interest income, and other miscellaneous non-operating income. 4 Quality of Patient Care The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") introduced the Five-Star Quality…
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.
Sources
company FY2026 guidance, June 2026 · Jefferies note, June 3, 2026 · analyst consensus, 2026