Arch Capital Group Ltd. (ACGL): what the price requires
At today's price, Arch Capital Group Ltd. (ACGL) is priced for 11.2% return on equity. boothcheck doesn't publish a fair value or a price target; it shows what the price assumes, so you can judge whether that bar is too high.
Generated: 2026-07-14 · Exported: 2026-07-16 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ACGL
Headline
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Ticker | ACGL |
| Company | Arch Capital Group Ltd. |
| Current price | $103.11/sh |
| Composition | Insurance 46% / Reinsurance 48% / Mortgage 7% |
What The Price Requires (Inversion)
The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Inversion basis | financials |
| Return on equity needed | 11.2% |
| Return on equity now | 18.6% |
| ROE gap | -7.4pp |
| Price-to-book | 1.54x |
Solve inputs: computed at a 8.6% cost of equity with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage, on common book equity (FY2026); each 1pp of cost of equity moves the implied ROE ~1.5pp.
How unusual the bet is: within-range
| Reference | Value |
|---|---|
| vs own history | -0.63σ |
| cohort percentile (of 80 peers) | 40 |
| sustained it ~10 years at this level | 72% |
| implied end-window share | 0% |
Valuation X-Ray
The price is supported by asset-based and earnings-power and relative-multiple value. A value/asset-supported name, not a pure growth bet.
How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.
| Family | Median price/FV | Models | Reads |
|---|---|---|---|
| Asset | 0.70x | 3 | justifies |
| Earnings | 0.49x | 2 | justifies |
| Relative | 0.23x | 3 | justifies |
| Growth | 1.27x | 1 | expensive |
Families that justify the price: Asset, Earnings, Relative
The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 4.8%); the inversion above states its own rate.
Per-Model Detail (n=9)
| Model | Family | FV | Price/FV | Applicable | Methodology |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCF Perpetual Growth | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Bank Fair Value (P/TBV) | — | $239.59 | 0.43x | yes | TBVPS $67.24 × 3.56x (ROE (TTM) 20.1% / CoE 9.3%, g=5.0% (sustainable: 65% retention × ROE, 5% cap; not the terminal-growth assumption)) |
| Relative Valuation | Relative | $162.69 | 0.63x | yes | P/E 11x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 9.2x / 11.0x / 12.8x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 10x |
| Simple DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Two-Stage DDM | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Simple Excess Return | Asset | $146.43 | 0.70x | yes | BV/sh $67.24, ROE (TTM) 20.1%, ke 9.3% |
| Two-Stage Excess Return | Asset | $213.92 | 0.48x | yes | 5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3% |
| Discounted Future Market Cap | Growth | $81.35 | 1.27x | yes | Rev $19.8B, growth 9% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 1.6x / 1.9x / 2.2x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x) |
| Peter Lynch Fair Value | Relative | $455.00 | 0.23x | yes | EPS $13.00, growth 35% (input: historical EPS growth), PEG=0.22 (Undervalued) |
| Margin Trajectory | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Earnings Power Value | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Residual Income | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| Graham Number | Asset | $140.25 | 0.74x | yes | √(22.5 × EPS $13.00 × BVPS $67.24) — Graham's conservative floor |
| EV/EBITDA Relative | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| SBC-Adj FCF Yield | Earnings | — | — | no | — |
| Ben Graham Formula | Earnings | $419.47 | 0.25x | yes | EPS $13.00 × (8.5 + 2×15.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) |
| ROIC-Justified P/B | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| P/Sales Sector | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| PEG Fair Value | Relative | $487.50 | 0.21x | yes | EPS $13.00 × (PEG 1.5 × growth 25.0% (input: historical EPS growth)) → PE 37.5x |
| Earnings Yield | Earnings | $140.54 | 0.73x | yes | EPS $13.00 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%) |
| Funds From Operations Multiple | Relative | — | — | no | — |
| Clinical Phase NPV | Growth | — | — | no | — |
| Merton | Asset | — | — | no | — |
| V5 Mechanical | — | — | — | no | — |
Solvency
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Share count CAGR (buyback) | -1.6% |
Deposit/float-funded balance sheet: debt is funding, not corporate leverage, and GAAP operating cash flow follows loan flows. Net-debt, interest-coverage, and cash-burn lenses do not apply. The solvency frame for a financial is regulatory capital and payout capacity (CET1, stress buffer, dividends plus buybacks against earnings).
Bullet Takeaways
- The surprising number is the gap between what Arch earns and what the price assumes. The insurer has recently earned a return on equity near 18%, yet at about 1.4 times book the price implies it sustains only about 10.4% going forward. The market is pricing in a sharp normalization that has not yet happened.
- Nearly every valuation method lands above the $91 price: the bank-style price-to-tangible-book model near $240, the excess-return method near $146, the relative valuation near $163. On book value and current returns the stock screens as cheap.
- The reason for the discount is the cycle. Q1 2026 was excellent, with a consolidated combined ratio of 81.7% and net income of $1.04 billion, but the insurance market is softening, property-catastrophe reinsurance rates are falling, and the current returns reflect a hard-market peak the price doubts will last.
Bull Case
The most surprising thing in Arch Capital's numbers is the disconnect between its demonstrated returns and what the market is willing to pay for them. The company has recently earned a return on equity near 18%, an elite level for a property-and-casualty insurer, yet at about 1.4 times book value the price implies the market expects only about a 10.4% return going forward. That is the market pricing in a near-halving of profitability that the first quarter of 2026 gave no sign of. Net income available to common shareholders rose to $1.04 billion, or $2.88 per diluted share, from $564 million a year earlier, with an annualized return on average common equity of 17.8%. The business is earning at the top of its range, and the price assumes it reverts to the middle.
The underwriting quality behind those returns is genuine, not a lucky quarter. The consolidated combined ratio improved to 81.7% from 90.1%, meaning Arch is keeping about 18 cents of underwriting profit on every premium dollar before investment income, and it did so across a diversified book. Reinsurance posted $441 million of underwriting income at a 75.9% combined ratio, and the mortgage-insurance segment delivered a remarkably low 22.3% combined ratio. Even excluding catastrophes, the reinsurance accident-year combined ratio held near last year's level despite rate declines, which the company highlighted as evidence of underwriting consistency. A company that maintains discipline as rates soften is one whose returns are driven by skill, not just a favorable market.
The valuation methods reinforce the gap. The bank-style price-to-tangible-book model, the right tool for an insurer, values Arch near $240 using tangible book of about $67 per share and the elevated return profile, and the excess-return and relative methods land near $146 to $163, all well above the $91 price (June 27, 2026). Arch is also buying back stock at these levels, shrinking the share count, which is accretive when the stock trades below the value its returns justify. The bull case is a best-in-class specialty insurer earning elite returns, with a diversified insurance, reinsurance, and mortgage book, trading at a discount to book-value-based fair value while management repurchases shares. The market is treating peak returns as already gone when they are still being earned.
Bear Case
The discount exists for a reason, and the reason is the insurance cycle turning over. Property-and-casualty insurance is one of the most cyclical businesses there is: when capital is scarce and losses are fresh, rates harden and returns soar, and when capital floods back in chasing those returns, rates soften and profitability normalizes. Arch's recent 18% returns are a hard-market peak, and the market is correctly skeptical that they persist. The company's own commentary in the first quarter flagged a more competitive market and pronounced softness in property-catastrophe reinsurance, the exact segment that drove the windfall, with the ex-catastrophe accident-year combined ratio already rising 130 basis points to 82.3%. The deterioration the bears expect is not hypothetical; it is showing up in the numbers as rates decline.
The peak-versus-sustainable problem is precisely what the price-to-book multiple is debating. Paying 1.4 times book for an insurer earning 18% looks cheap, but paying 1.4 times book for an insurer about to earn 10% to 12% as the cycle softens is roughly fair. The valuation methods that land far above the price, the price-to-tangible-book model near $240 and the earnings-based methods in the $400s, are extrapolating the current elevated return on equity and the current peak EPS. Capitalize a peak and you get a high number. The bear's point is that those methods are anchoring to a cyclical high, and a property insurer at the top of its cycle should be valued on its through-the-cycle returns, not its best year.
The catastrophe exposure is the tail risk that compounds the cycle. Arch took $174 million of pre-tax catastrophe losses in a relatively benign first quarter; a major hurricane season or a single large event can swing a quarter from strong profit to loss, and the softening reinsurance market means the company is being paid less to take that risk than it was a year ago. The mortgage-insurance segment, which posted a spectacular 22.3% combined ratio, is itself tied to the housing and credit cycle and would deteriorate in a downturn. The bear case is that you are buying a cyclical insurer at peak underwriting margins, into a softening rate environment, with catastrophe and credit tail risks, and the cheap-looking multiple is the market correctly pricing the normalization rather than missing an opportunity.
Valuation
An insurer is worth the return it earns on its capital, so the price is read off price-to-book rather than an operating multiple. At about 1.4 times book the price inverts to an assumption that Arch sustains a return on equity of only about 10.4%, against the roughly 18.6% it has recently earned, solved at an 8.7% cost of equity. Treat the figures as approximate. The comparisons are telling: the assumed return is within reach of what Arch has earned, the price-to-book sits in the lower half of the peer group, and on the historical base rate about 75% of firms earning this return sustained it for a decade. The read comes out within range, which is the model's way of saying the price already discounts a meaningful normalization from the current peak.
The valuation X-ray lands almost uniformly above the price, and the reason matters. The bank-style price-to-tangible-book model, the correct tool for a financial, values Arch near $240 by applying a 3.56 times multiple to tangible book given the 20% trailing return on equity. The excess-return method lands near $146, the relative valuation near $163, and the earnings-based methods, Peter Lynch and the Graham formula, land in the $400s because they extrapolate the peak EPS of about $13. The only method near the price is the discounted-future-market-cap method at $75. So the X-ray says deeply undervalued, but it says so by capitalizing a peak-cycle return on equity, which is exactly the assumption a disciplined buyer should question for a cyclical insurer.
The honest conclusion is that the valuation depends entirely on what return on equity you believe is sustainable. If Arch's underwriting skill lets it earn mid-teens returns through the cycle rather than reverting to 10%, the methods are right and the stock is cheap at 1.4 times book. If the softening rate environment pulls returns back toward the low end, the current multiple is roughly fair and the apparent discount is just the market pricing the cycle. This is a high-quality insurer whose cheapness is real on current returns and conditional on those returns proving durable as the market softens.
Catalysts
The first-quarter 2026 report, released in late April, was strong. Net income available to common shareholders rose to $1.04 billion, or $2.88 per diluted share, from $564 million a year earlier, with after-tax operating income of $901 million, or $2.50 per share, and an annualized return on average common equity of 17.8%. The consolidated combined ratio improved to 81.7% from 90.1% on a lower loss ratio. Reinsurance posted $441 million of underwriting income at a 75.9% combined ratio and mortgage delivered a 22.3% combined ratio, while pre-tax catastrophe losses were a contained $174 million. The company continued repurchasing shares.
The forward catalysts are all about the cycle. The items to watch are the trajectory of property-catastrophe reinsurance rates, which the company flagged as softening, the ex-catastrophe accident-year combined ratio as a gauge of underlying underwriting margin through the rate decline, catastrophe activity through the Atlantic hurricane season that can swing any quarter, the health of the mortgage-insurance book against housing and credit conditions, and the pace of share repurchases. The next quarterly print, due in late July, will show whether the elite returns are holding or beginning to normalize as competition intensifies. Continued mid-teens-plus returns with disciplined underwriting would validate the view that Arch's profitability is durable and the discount unwarranted; a meaningful combined-ratio deterioration would confirm the market's read that the current returns are a cyclical peak.
Sources: Arch Capital Q1 2026 results (stocktitan.net); ACGL Q1 2026 earnings call highlights (gurufocus.com); Arch Capital Q1 2026 earnings transcript (fool.com, 2026-04-29).
Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)
Insurance (reported)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CB (Chubb Limited)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- MKL (MARKEL GROUP INC.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AXS (AXIS CAPITAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AIG (American International Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RLI (RLI Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HIG (The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Reinsurance (reported)
- CB (Chubb Limited)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- TRV (Travelers Companies, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- PGR (PROGRESSIVE CORP/OH/)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ALL (ALLSTATE CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- AIG (American International Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- CINF (CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORPORATION)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- HIG (The Hartford Insurance Group, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- WRB (W. R. BERKLEY CORP)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Mortgage (reported)
- MTG (MGIC Investment Corp)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- ESNT (ESSENT GROUP LTD.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- RDN (RADIAN GROUP INC)
- (no filing in the citation store)
- NMIH (NMI Holdings, Inc.)
- (no filing in the citation store)
Methodology Note
- Priced-in inversion: the valuation is inverted on the current price to recover the operating-income growth, duration, and steady-state margin the price embeds (ROE for financials, FFO growth for REITs).
- Valuation x-ray: the valuation models, grouped into four families (asset, earnings, relative, growth). Each model is expressed as a price/FV ratio (distance from price), not a point fair-value estimate. The spread across families is the disagreement.
- Solvency: net cash/debt, net-debt-to-NOPAT, interest coverage, and share-count CAGR from EDGAR financials (net debt / FFO and fixed-charge coverage for REITs; regulatory-capital framing for financials).
- Peer cohorts: per-segment comparables with deep-linkable SEC filing citations.
Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.