ABBOTT LABORATORIES (ABT): what the price assumes

In the published model solve dated 2026-Q2, anchored at $112.48, ABBOTT LABORATORIES (ABT) is priced for +13.7% growth. boothcheck publishes no house fair value, target price, or buy/sell rating; individual model outputs and user-controlled scenarios are analytical inputs, not Boothcheck targets. Narrative composed 2026-07-25.

Generated: 2026-08-30 · Source: https://boothcheck.com/report/ABT

Headline

FieldValue
TickerABT
CompanyABBOTT LABORATORIES
Sector / IndustryHealthcare
Current price$112.48/sh
CompositionKey Emerging Markets 9% / Established Pharmaceutical Products - Other 3% / Pediatric Nutritionals 9% / Adult Nutritionals 10% / Core Laboratory 12% / Molecular 1% / Point of Care 1% / Rapid Diagnostics 6% / Rhythm Management 6% / Electrophysiology 6% / Heart Failure 3% / Vascular 7% / Structural Heart 6% / Neuromodulation 2% / Diabetes Care 18% / Other 0%

What The Price Assumes (Inversion)

The assumption today's price embeds, recovered by inverting the valuation.

FieldValue
Inversion basiswhole-company
Operating margin (value-band context)8.9%
Operating margin today17.1%
Margin compression (value-band)-8.2pp
Implied growth13.7%
Multiple paid29x operating income

The operating-margin figure is value-band context at year 12: derived from the framework's value band, a separate calculation — not part of the priced-in solve.

Solve inputs: computed at a 7.5% cost of capital with 4% terminal growth over a 5-year stage.

How unusual the bet is: within-range (limited comparison data)

ReferenceValue
vs own history+0.09σ
cohort percentile (of 115 peers)69

Valuation X-Ray

Asset, earnings-power and peer-multiple models all land far below the price; ONLY the growth-DCF reaches it. The bet is durable compounding the static frames structurally cannot price (a moat/durability premium).

How the valuation models price the stock relative to the market price. Price/FV above 1.0 means the market pays more than that lens defends (expensive); at or below 1.0 the lens can defend the price.

FamilyMedian price/FVModelsReads
Asset2.51x4expensive
Earnings4.04x4expensive
Relative0
Growth1.18x3expensive

Families that justify the price: Growth Families that call it expensive: Asset, Earnings

The models below discount at their own flat-beta convention rates (cost of equity 9.3%, WACC 7.9%); the inversion above states its own rate.

Per-Model Detail (n=11)

ModelFamilyFVPrice/FVApplicableMethodology
DCF Perpetual GrowthGrowth$95.591.18xyesFCF base $7.6B, growth 7% (input: historical growth), terminal g 4.0%, WACC 7.9%, 6yr projection
DCF Exit MultipleGrowth$105.091.07xyesExit EV/EBITDA: 22.3x / 24.3x / 26.3x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull), 6yr
Relative ValuationRelativenoP/E 24x (static sector reference · 2026-04), scenarios: 20.0x / 24.0x / 28.0x (bear / base = reference held flat / bull), EV/EBITDA 18.49x
Simple DDMGrowthno
Two-Stage DDMGrowthno
Simple Excess ReturnAsset$38.952.89xyesBV/sh $29.89, ROE (TTM) 12.1%, ke 9.3%
Two-Stage Excess ReturnAsset$44.202.54xyes5yr excess ROE then converge to ke=9.3%
Discounted Future Market CapGrowth$83.071.35xyesRev $45.1B, growth 7% (input: historical growth; tapered), Terminal P/S: 3.6x / 4.3x / 5.1x (bear / base = today's held flat / bull, cap 8x)
Growth-Adjusted P/ERelativeno
Margin TrajectoryGrowthno
Earnings Power ValueEarnings$22.644.97xyesNormalized EBIT (5y avg op income, one-time charges added back) $7.48B × (1−26%) / WACC 7.9% → EPV (no growth)
Residual IncomeAsset$45.272.48xyesBV $29.89 + 5yr PV of (ROE (TTM) 12.1% − Kₑ 9.3%) × BV; BV grows 7.8%/yr
Graham NumberAsset$49.002.30xyes√(22.5 × EPS $3.57 × BVPS $29.89) — Graham's conservative floor
EV/EBITDA RelativeRelativenoEBITDA $9.18B × sector EV/EBITDA 16.0x
FCF YieldEarnings$30.153.73xyesFCF $7378.0M / Kₑ 9.3% — zero-growth perpetuity
SBC-Adj FCF YieldEarnings$25.864.35xyesSBC-adj FCF $6.69B (FCF $7.38B − SBC $0.69B) capitalized at Kₑ
Ben Graham FormulaEarnings$2.9937.62xyesEPS $3.57 × (8.5 + 2×-5.0%) × (4.4 / 5.3%) (excluded from median)
ROIC-Justified P/BAsset$4.7523.68xyesBV $29.89 × (ROIC 1.3% / WACC 7.9%) (excluded from median)
P/Sales SectorRelativenoRevenue $45.13B × sector P/S 4.0x
PEG Fair ValueRelativeno
Earnings YieldEarnings$38.592.91xyesEPS $3.57 / required return 9.3% (Rf 4.3% + ERP 5.0%)
Funds From Operations MultipleRelativeno
Clinical Phase NPVGrowthno
MertonAssetno
V5 Mechanicalno

Economic-Unit Decomposition (Sum Of The Parts)

One or more material disclosed units has unresolved economics. Unknown/general is not evidence of homogeneity: segment SOTP is primary but incomplete, consolidated cash flow may remain only a secondary cross-check when every unit shares an enterprise basis, and one sector multiple or target margin is withheld.

UnitRoleValuation basisRevenueReported profitValue evidenceStatus
Established Pharmaceutical Productsoperatingenterprise$5.5b$1.3b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Nutritional Productsoperatingenterprise$8.5b$1.6b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Diagnostic Productsoperatingenterprise$8.9b$1.7b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value
Medical Devicesoperatingenterprise$21.4b$7.2b operating-incomewithheldunresolved no unit value

No total common-equity value is stated. One or more material units lack a supported unit value. The displayed values are an indicative subtotal; consolidated debt and cash cannot be applied to a fraction of the company.

Solvency

FieldValue
Net debt$26.8b
Net debt / NOPAT (after-tax)4.67x
Net debt / operating income (pre-tax)3.47x
Interest coverage14.4x
Share count CAGR (buyback)-0.4%
Burning cashno

Bullet Takeaways

Bull Case

The structural advantage here is not one product. It is the refusal to depend on one. Sixteen distinct product lines carry meaningful revenue, and the largest of them, Diabetes Care, accounts for about 18% of the total. Core Laboratory diagnostics runs near 12%. Adult and pediatric nutrition together come to roughly 19%. The cardiovascular lines, taken together, sit near 28%. No single approval, recall, reimbursement decision or patent expiry can take out more than a fraction of the whole, and the filing says as much about the patent question directly: There are no significant patent or license expirations in the next three years that are expected to materially affect Abbott. For a healthcare company, that sentence is the moat described in one line.

Diversification that produces mediocrity is not worth much, so look at where the money is being made. Continuous glucose monitoring sales totaled $7.6 billion in 2025 and $6.4 billion in 2024, and the filing records growth across all businesses, with double-digit growth in Diabetes Care, Heart Failure, Electrophysiology, and Structural Heart, and in 2025, Rhythm Management. Five product lines compounding at double digits inside a company this size is unusual. Gross profit margins ran at 52.6 percent, which is the pricing power of a business whose products are chosen by clinicians rather than bought on tender.

Compare that with the peer set and the position sharpens. Abbott turns 16.2% of revenue into operating profit. Teva (TEVA) reports the same 16.2% operating margin but on revenue that fell over the year. Viatris (VTRS) sits close to breakeven at 1.0%, and Perrigo (PRGO) is loss-making at the operating line. Among the larger healthcare names in the comparison set, Qiagen (QGEN) runs at 18.4% and AbbVie (ABBV) at 24.4%. Abbott lands mid-pack on profitability while carrying far less exposure to any single molecule than the pharmaceutical names do, which is precisely the trade a diversified device and diagnostics company is supposed to make.

The manufacturing base is the part that is hardest to copy. The 10-K lists Medical Devices 33 Diagnostic Products 21 Established Pharmaceutical Products 22 Nutritional Products 13 Worldwide Total 89 manufacturing sites. Eighty-nine regulated plants across four therapeutic areas is not an asset a competitor assembles quickly, and it is the reason Abbott can absorb a large acquisition without rebuilding its distribution or its regulatory apparatus.

Which is exactly what the Exact Sciences purchase is meant to exploit. Abbott bought a cancer-screening franchise for around $21 billion and dropped it into a diagnostics organisation that already has the laboratory relationships and the sales force. The second quarter of 2026 showed the early arithmetic: sales up 13.0% on a reported basis and 4.8% comparable, with the company raising its full-year outlook on the strength of structural heart and electrophysiology. Abbott returned $2.1 billion to shareholders in that quarter alone through dividends and buybacks.

Operating profit covers interest 13.1 times. That is what lets a company do a deal of this size without the transaction becoming the story of the next three years, and it is the quiet advantage of having spent two decades running the balance sheet conservatively before needing it.

Bear Case

Look at what the company chose to do with its money and the bear case writes itself. In November 2025 Abbott agreed to buy Exact Sciences at a total equity value of approximately $21 billion and an estimated enterprise value of $23 billion, with financing that contemplates absorption of Exact Sciences' estimated $1.8 billion of net debt and a 364-day senior unsecured bridge term loan facility for an amount not to exceed $20.0 billion standing behind it. That is a company spending more than a tenth of its market value in a single decision, in cash and borrowings, in a diagnostics market where its own sales had been shrinking. Management told investors the deal would dilute 2026 adjusted earnings by about $0.20 a share. Acquisitions of that size get judged over a decade, and the decade has not started.

The base it was bolted onto was already carrying debt. Net debt of roughly $26.8 billion stands at 3.74 times operating profit before tax, or 5.04 times operating profit after tax. Interest is covered comfortably, which is the reason none of this is alarming today. But those figures describe the balance sheet as it stood before the acquisition funding was fully absorbed, and the direction of travel is one way. Meanwhile the share count has fallen only about 0.4% a year over the four years to March 2026, so the buyback has been doing little more than offsetting the dilution from stock compensation. The cash that would have bought back shares went into an acquisition instead.

The part of the company being reinforced by that acquisition is the part that has been going backwards. The filing records that, excluding currency, Diagnostic Products segment sales decreased 4.5 percent in 2025 and 3.9 percent in 2024. Two consecutive years of decline in a segment representing roughly a fifth of revenue is a trend, not a comparison artefact. Buying growth into a shrinking segment can work. It also raises the stakes on integration, because the acquired revenue now has to carry both its own price and the drag from what it was bought to fix.

Legal exposure sits underneath all of it. The 10-K discloses that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), through the United States Attorney's Office for the Western District of Michigan, is conducting a criminal investigation related to Abbott's manufacturing of powdered infant formula and that in January 2023 Abbott received a civil investigative demand from the United States Federal Trade Commission. Separately, preterm infant formula claims were consolidated when the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered all federal court cases consolidated for pretrial purposes in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and Abbott won summary judgment in favor of Abbott on all claims in one of them in May 2025. Winning one case is real progress and is not the same as resolution. These are matters with tails measured in years, attached to a nutrition business that is roughly a fifth of revenue.

Now put that against what the price asks for. The market pays about 29 times what the whole company earns at the operating line, and to support that the business needs operating profit to compound at roughly 13.3% a year over a five-year stage. Abbott's own recent record runs below that pace, and among companies that have grown at that kind of rate, only about half held it for five years. This is not an extreme demand by the standards of what this framework usually finds. It is simply more than the company has been delivering, applied to a business that has just taken on a large integration and a step up in borrowings at the same moment.

Book value is $29.80 a share. Return on equity over the trailing twelve months is 12.1%. The cost of that equity is near 9.3%. Abbott therefore does create value on the equity it retains, but the gap doing that work is a few points wide, no more. Buy the shares at more than three times book and the return the buyer earns on their own outlay is a fraction of the return the company earns on its capital. That arithmetic does not break when the business is good. It simply means the price already contains the answer, and the disappointment case does not require anything to go wrong at all.

Valuation

At today's price of $103.11 the enterprise sits at about 29 times what it earns at the operating line. Invert that and the assumption becomes legible: to support the price the business needs operating profit to compound at roughly 13.3% a year across a five-year stage. That is a real demand on a company of this size, though not an outlandish one. Among companies that have grown at that pace, about half held it for a further five years. The multiple sits in the upper part of its sector's range without being at the edge of it.

There is a second version of the requirement worth stating because it points the other way. Carried out over a twelve-year horizon, the price is also consistent with the company sustaining an operating margin near 8.4%, against the 16.2% it earns now. Depending on which lever you allow to do the work, the price either asks for growth Abbott has not recently produced, or asks for barely half the profitability it already has. Both readings are in the same set of numbers, and the honest summary is that the price is demanding on the growth axis and forgiving on the profitability one.

The methods split the way they usually do for a large, high-quality compounder. Only the forward cash-flow approaches reach the price, and they only just reach it, landing about 5% under it. The price sits about 131% above where the book-value-plus-profitability approaches land and about 271% above the earnings-power approaches. The static frame that comes closest is peer multiples, with the price about 29% above where they land, working off a sector reference near twenty-four times earnings. That configuration is not a mispricing signal. It says the price is paying for durability, and durability is the one thing no method that values the existing balance sheet or the existing profit stream is built to capture.

The reason the static frames land so far under is visible in one comparison. The earnings-power approach capitalises normalised operating profit at the cost of capital and credits no growth at all. For a business whose entire investment case is a pipeline of approvals and a base of recurring diagnostic and monitoring revenue, a no-growth valuation is a floor rather than an estimate. It tells the reader how much of today's price is a claim on the future rather than a claim on what already exists, and for Abbott that share is most of it.

Solvency does not constrain the story, but it has become more relevant than it was. Net debt of about $26.8 billion sits at 3.74 times operating profit before tax, or 5.04 times operating profit after tax, and that profit covers interest 13.1 times. The company is not consuming cash. The share count has fallen about 0.4% a year over the four years to March 2026, which is a buyback running just fast enough to offset issuance rather than one that meaningfully shrinks the base. Against that starting point sits the 364-day senior unsecured bridge term loan facility for an amount not to exceed $20.0 billion arranged for the Exact Sciences purchase. A company covering interest thirteen times over can carry that. What it cannot do is carry it and also compound operating profit in the low teens without the acquisition working.

Catalysts

The defining event of the year has already happened. Abbott completed its acquisition of Exact Sciences on March 23, 2026, after receiving all regulatory clearances, in a transaction the company valued at roughly $21 billion. Abbott told investors the deal would add approximately $3 billion of incremental sales in 2026, lift full-year sales growth by about half a percentage point, and dilute 2026 adjusted earnings per share by approximately $0.20. Exact Sciences brings the Cologuard colorectal screening test, Oncotype Dx, and earlier-stage products in multi-cancer detection and molecular residual disease monitoring, which places Abbott in cancer screening for the first time at scale.

The second quarter, reported on July 16, 2026, was the first clean look at the combined business. Sales rose 13.0% on a reported basis and 4.8% on a comparable basis, with reported diluted earnings of $0.53 a share under GAAP and $1.31 on the company's own adjusted measure. Abbott raised its full-year 2026 adjusted diluted earnings guidance to a range of $5.45 to $5.60, from $5.38 to $5.58 previously, and attributed the improvement mainly to medical devices, specifically the structural heart and electrophysiology portfolios. The company returned $2.1 billion to shareholders during the quarter through dividends and repurchases.

The gap between the reported and comparable sales growth rates is where the next several quarters will be decided. Reported growth is running far ahead because acquired revenue is being added to the base; comparable growth is what the existing business is doing on its own. As the Exact Sciences revenue anniversaries into the comparison, those two numbers converge, and the question of whether a large diagnostics acquisition fixed a declining diagnostics segment stops being a matter of guidance and becomes a matter of arithmetic.

Peer Cohorts (Per Segment, With Filing Citations)

Established Pharmaceutical Products (reported)

Nutritional Products (reported)

Diagnostic Products (reported)

Medical Devices (reported)

Methodology Note

Fundamentals sourced from SEC EDGAR filings. Current price from Databento. The priced-in inversion and valuation x-ray are computed by the boothcheck engine; narrative composed by AI from the structured data.

Sources

Abbott press release, March 20, 2026 · Abbott second-quarter 2026 results release, July 16, 2026

View the full interactive ABT report on boothcheck